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ABSTRACT
The Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg, the personalities associated with
the trial, the verdicts rendered, and criticisms directed toward both those verdicts and the
tribunal itself have generated a multitude of historical works. However, few historians
have explored the American print media‟s coverage of the trial and even fewer have
studied how a newspaper‟s disposition towards the trial reflected that publication‟s
political ideology and influenced the newspaper‟s coverage of the trial itself. For this
reason, it is the objective of this thesis to examine this neglected area, thus contributing to
the scholarship of the first Nuremberg Trial.
The newspapers chosen for assessment reflect varying degrees of ideological
affiliation and are somewhat diverse geographically. Of the five publications selected,
two, The Wall Street Journal and Chicago Daily Tribune, were recognized to be solid
supporters of the political right. Likewise, during the period examined, the other
publications, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times, were
considered politically moderate to liberal in their ideology. This study examines
editorials, columns (both unique to the specific publication and those syndicated
nationally), and letters to the editor dedicated to the trial, in conjunction with the actual
reports filed by the newspaper‟s correspondents and wire services. This thesis also
examines the regularity of each newspaper‟s coverage of the trial and its selection of the
information published within its pages, including a comparison with the other
publications.
After an intense examination of the materials listed above, this study finds that there
exists a strong correlation between the political ideology associated with the individual
newspapers and their disposition towards the trial, a bias that often manifested itself in
i

the newspaper‟s coverage of the proceedings. As one might expect, those publications
considered traditionally moderate to liberal endorsed the trial and viewed it as a positive
step towards strengthening international law and establishing global security. Those
newspapers often identified as being politically conservative questioned the trial‟s
legitimacy, believing that its mechanisms were anathematic to western legal principles
and infringed on national sovereignty.

ii
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Second World War, the concept of “war crimes” seldom registered on the
global consciousness. In the decades that followed the Nuremberg Trials, the idea that
the actions of a warring nation could be subject to criminal prosecution would resonate
worldwide. Even before the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps and the
recognition of the scope of Adolf Hitler‟s “Final Solution,” the Allies had begun planning
the joint Anglo-American and Soviet prosecution of Hitler and his acolytes at the
Moscow Conference of 1943. The signing of the Moscow Declaration signaled the first
tangible step towards the creation of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) that would
sit in judgment over the major war criminals. Over the next twenty-one months, the
Allies constructed a method of trying the accused that would be both legal and
satisfactory to the global community. On 20 November 1945, with the eyes of the world
upon them, the IMT began its grim duty with the stated belief that the Trial of the Major
War Criminals represented the antithesis of the Nazi regime, justice and, perhaps, mercy
for those who offered none. However, questions regarding the legality of the IMT, the
charges presented by the prosecution, the selection of defendants, as well as some of the
final verdicts, divided the print media of the trial‟s principal architect, the United States.
Although most major metropolitan American newspapers provided extensive coverage of
the proceedings and, in doing so, addressed the criticisms levied against it, of the five
publications chosen for this thesis the tone of that coverage remained consistent
throughout the trial and reflected the political ideology of each publication.
The five publications chosen for assessment represent varying ideological
perspectives as well as being diverse geographically. Three of the five publications
selected, the Los Angeles Times (LA Times), The Washington Post (The Post), and The
1
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New York Times (The Times) were moderate to liberal in their political ideology, while
the remaining two, The Wall Street Journal (The Journal) and Chicago Daily Tribune
(the Tribune), were solid supporters of the political right.1 To provide as complete a
representation of each newspaper‟s stance on the trial as possible, the author has chosen
to include in his analysis editorials, syndicated columns, and letters to the editor
dedicated to the IMT, in conjunction with the actual reports filed by the newspaper‟s
respective correspondents and wire services. This thesis also looks at the frequency of
each newspaper‟s coverage and its selection of the information published within its
pages, including a comparison with the other publications. The period examined in the
selected newspapers focuses primarily on the events occurring between the
announcement of the IMT‟s charter in London on 8 August 1945 and the month
following the executions, which occurred on 16 October 1946. It is in this timeframe that
the author devotes the bulk of his study and it is in these sixteen months that the author
will compare the coverage between the five newspapers selected.
However, this analysis begins by presenting an overview of the events that led to the
creation of the IMT. It is by investigating the tribunal‟s evolution that one may
understand the pressures on the parties involved in creating the tribunal and identify the
criticisms the members of the IMT knowingly dealt with and that both the professional
historian and the novice point to when examining a noble, if flawed, attempt at holding
the surviving representatives of the Third Reich accountable. In this chapter, as with
those that follow it, the term “war crimes” program, policy, or proposal will refer to the
development of what eventually became the International Military Tribunal. The author
will designate “war crimes” as a specific charge when it applies. Chapter two examines
1

Author‟s Note: The Chicago Daily Tribune (later shortened to the Chicago Tribune) designated its
Sunday edition as the Chicago Sunday Tribune.
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the choice of the defendants and the prosecution‟s rationale for their selection, and
presents a brief biography of each of the accused. Interwoven throughout the first two
chapters are policy issues and incidents that address the aforementioned criticisms.
Chapter three represents the bulk of this thesis and examines newspaper coverage
following the announcement of the IMT‟s creation in August 1945 and through the
prosecution‟s final summation the following July. Chapter three will again revisit the
criticisms identified in the first two chapters and examine each individual newspaper‟s
treatment of the trial based on the criteria discussed above. Chapter four examines the
press‟s coverage of the verdicts, executions of the condemned, and the trial‟s aftermath
following the pattern set forth in chapter three. While indicative of both the coverage of
the five publications and their attitudes toward the trial, the articles and commentary
discussed in the final two chapters are by no means exhaustive, as to make them so would
be superfluous. The conclusion will compare the five newspapers‟ overall treatment of
the Trial of the Major War Criminals,2 summarizing the trends and deviations in their
reporting and providing a breakdown of each publication‟s total coverage.
The Third Reich and its denunciation at Nuremberg have spawned countless accounts
in the past sixty years. Three sources examined in preparation for this thesis come from
former Fulbright Scholar Dr. Bradley F. Smith: The Road to Nuremberg, Reaching
Judgment at Nuremberg, and The American Road to Nuremberg. In The Road to
Nuremberg, Smith examines the policy debates within Franklin Roosevelt‟s cabinet that
culminated in the development of the Bernays Plan and the formulation of the IMT.
Smith‟s Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, published four years prior to The Road to

2
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Nuremberg, provides an overview of the Trial of the Major War Criminals itself. The
American Road to Nuremberg contains declassified British and American documents
used by Smith in constructing his earlier works and serves as an appendix to both.
Unlike Smith, Dr. Sheldon Glueck, a professor of criminal law and criminology at
Harvard University, addresses primarily the legal foundation of the IMT itself. Produced
while the Trial of the Major War Criminals was in process, The Nuremberg Trial and
Aggressive War also examines the criminality of waging an aggressive war and that
argument‟s foundation in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial,
a collection of essays addressing many of the political, legal, and moral questions raised
by the proceedings, will provide some of the criteria used when identifying criticisms of
the IMT. This collection includes contributions from members of the tribunal and the
American prosecution team, including Justice Robert Jackson and Colonel Telford
Taylor. Similarly, Taylor‟s The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials contributes to the
historiography by providing a firsthand account of Nuremberg from the prosecution‟s
vantage point and addressing its critics.
Like Taylor‟s memoirs, the late Airey Neaves‟s On Trial at Nuremberg provides a
personal account of the proceedings as well as Neaves‟s own interactions with the
defendants. The author recounts the difficulties the defendants‟ German legal counsel
encountered in adapting to the unfamiliar trial procedures that stemmed from AngloAmerican legal customs. Finally, William J. Bosch‟s Judgment on Nuremberg:
American Attitudes toward the Major German War-Crime Trials provides excellent
insights into American opinions on the legality of the trials themselves and contains a
chapter dealing specifically with American media coverage.

5
However, with the exception of the Bosch chapter dealing with media coverage, little
scholarship has focused on the American press‟s coverage of the Trial of the Major War
Criminals by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In the past decade,
several MA theses in the United States have addressed aspects of media coverage. Ohio
State University graduate student Brian K. Feltman‟s MA thesis, “Window to
Nuremberg: The American Press and the International Military Tribunal, 1945-1946,”
addresses the role American newspapers played in legitimizing the IMT, but does not
concentrate on its criticisms. McMillan Houston Johnson‟s MA thesis, “Hitlerian
Jurisprudence: American Periodical Media Responses to the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial, 1945-1948,” adheres to a methodology helpful to this study, though Johnson‟s
thesis focuses on periodicals rather than daily newspapers. Matthew J. Hawkins‟ MA
thesis, “Representing evil: British and American media depictions of the Nazi defendants
at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-6,” compares and contrasts British and
American media coverage of the Trial of the Major War Criminals. However, like
Johnson, Hawkins utilizes only periodicals (with the exception of The Times of London
and New York Times) as his source material. This thesis fits into the historiography of the
IMT/Nuremberg Trials through its examination of the American press‟s coverage of the
Trial of the Major War Criminals, its assessment of the selected newspapers‟ coverage of
identified criticisms related to the proceedings, and its comparison of the newspapers‟
coverage in toto. As such, it is unique in both its scope and focus.

CHAPTER ONE
NAVIGATING BUREACRACIES AND RECONCILING DISPARATE LEGAL
TRADITIONS: THE ALLIES‟ CONSTRUCTION OF A TRIAL SYSTEM
“I believe it would make some of these villains reluctant to be mixed up in butcheries
now.”1 – Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 12 October 1943
During the darkest days of the Second World War, on 25 October 1941, only months
after German bombs had rained down on London like the Eumenides of Greek myth,
Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt announced concurrently that the world would
hold Adolf Hitler and his regime accountable for their transgressions.2 Less than three
months later, nine representatives of occupied Europe met at Saint James‟s Palace in
London and issued a similar condemnation of Nazi atrocities, proposing that their
respective nations would “place among their principal war aims the punishment, through
the channels of organized justice, of those guilty or responsible for those crimes.”3 While
at the time it seemed uncertain that such vague promises would become a reality, these
gestures, minor as they were, reflected the outrage felt by the individual parties
concerning what they viewed as a war of aggression launched by Germany. Yet
judgment of the Third Reich, once only hoped for, did transpire. Almost two years after
the pronouncements of Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Declaration of St. James‟s Palace,
Ares had closed his eyes to the Wehrmacht and denied it his favor. Although unbearable
fighting raged in the Ukraine and on the Italian Peninsula, momentum rested with the
Allies.
In October 1943, representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
States met in Moscow to solidify their dedication towards the complete defeat of the Axis
1

Frank M. Buscher, The U.S. War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946-1955 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1989), 9.
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Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 25.
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Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1960), 4.
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Powers and lay the groundwork for the founding of the United Nations. One of the issues
addressed at the Third Moscow Conference concerned the crimes perpetrated by
members of the Third Reich and their punishment. During this conference, the agents of
the “Big Three,” British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M.
Molotov, and American Secretary of State Cordell Hull, constructed the Moscow
Declaration based on the instructions of their respective leaders. The declaration stated
that after the establishment of an armistice, the Allies would return those accused of
atrocities to the countries in which those crimes had allegedly been committed. The
respective governments would then try the defendants according to their laws. However,
the declaration did not address the trial and punishment of those within the Nazi
hierarchy who did not fall into the former category, only that the declaration‟s signatories
would decide it later.4
Although the Moscow Declaration did little to produce the actual mechanisms of
what would become the International Military Tribunal, it did, according to Lieutenant
Colonel Telford Taylor (who later served as an assistant prosecutor for the U.S. team at
Nuremberg), establish the Big Three‟s dominance in the construction of any postwar
prosecutions. With their domain cemented at the expense of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission (UNWCC), not to be confused with the United Nations founded in
June 1945, the Big Three found themselves in a more advantageous position than the
UNWCC, which Taylor claims wielded little actual authority due to the absence of the
Soviet Union. The UNWCC, Taylor explains in his memoirs, was itself a civil body
consisting of the United States, Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, China, and
4

U.S. Department of State, “From Declaration of German Atrocities, 1 November 1943,” in Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, General, 1943, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgibin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1943v01&isize=M&page=768 (accessed 19 December
2009).
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the nine provisional governments in exile that had originally produced the Declaration of
St. James‟s Palace.5 At the Third Moscow Conference, conflicts arose between the Allies
regarding the fate of those deemed war criminals. Perhaps surprising to the modern
reader, the British delegation called for the summary execution of all those suspected of
atrocities (a sentiment later endorsed by the United States Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau, Jr.). Perhaps equally as startling was the Soviet Union‟s insistence on
placing the Nazi hierarchy on trial. Smith notes that the latter revelation seems bizarre in
that as a rule the Red Army inflicted the ultimate penalty on “Hitlerites” in the field.6
Between these two extremes, the task of creating a system acceptable to all parties fell to
the United States, while the British, still intent on a political solution, assumed an
investigative role.
Following the Moscow Conference, the Americans made little headway in the
development of an appropriate method of prosecuting agents of the Third Reich, as
responsibility rested primarily with the War and State Departments. Pressure, both
internal and external, slowed the United States government‟s progression in the early
months of 1944. How could the Allies purge Germany of the Nazi Party‟s influence
without repeating the mistakes of Versailles? To complicate matters, the American
Jewish Conference and the governments-in-exile pressed the disinterested Roosevelt
Administration to adopt a punitive plan towards Hitler and Nazi Germany in the same
vein as that conducted towards Imperial Germany following the First World War. Both
the British and Americans were hesitant to endorse such rhetoric lest Anglo-American

5

Taylor, 26-7.

6

Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981), 10.

9
prisoners of war (POWs) face German retaliation.7 Yet during the early summer months,
the British Foreign Office composed a roster of Nazi and Wehrmacht officials accused of
war crimes while the Lord Chancellor, Lord John Simon, composed a memorandum
reaffirming the political solution first suggested in Moscow. Later, the Foreign Office
and Lord Chancellor submitted their material to the prime minister prior to Churchill‟s
meeting with Roosevelt in Quebec on 12 September.8
However, across the Atlantic the Roosevelt Administration showed little such
initiative in assuming their assigned function. Bradley F. Smith states that as late as 29
July 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt declared plans for a postwar trial of Nazi war
criminals to be “premature.”9 The Department of War‟s own inertia prompted the
creation of an ad hoc policy for the occupation of Germany by the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Under instructions from the
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower, SHAEF personnel fashioned
the Handbook for Military Government in Germany that established governance through
a central administration, the reinstitution of a civil government, and the restoration of the
economy, and ordered the detainment of “250,000 high-ranking Nazis . . . [and] all
members of the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).”10
The SHAEF handbook, endorsed that August by Secretary of War Henry Stimson,
might well have become the official American occupation policy had Morgenthau not
traveled to Western Europe that same month. Appalled by what he viewed as an

7

Ibid., 8-9.
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10
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extremely lenient occupation policy, the treasury secretary returned to the US determined
to persuade Roosevelt to employ a draconian alternative.11 The significant influence
Morgenthau wielded over Roosevelt and within the cabinet is evident in a memo
Roosevelt sent Stimson immediately following the former‟s meeting with Morgenthau.
In the communication, dated 26 August, Roosevelt chastises his secretary of war, stating
that the American occupation would not include the implementation of any programs
similar to that of the New Deal and calls the handbook in general “pretty bad.”12
Roosevelt‟s condemnation of the handbook, coupled with Morgenthau‟s alternative,
which the latter presented to the president in early September, set the tone for the
American policy towards Germany going into the Second Quebec Conference.
The Morgenthau Plan, so named for its primary architect, called for the
pastoralization of Germany through the elimination of its heavy industries and the
destruction of its war-making capabilities to eliminate any future threat to Western
Europe and the world. Consistent with the Treaty of Versailles, Secretary Morgenthau
insisted that Germany pay significant reparations, a precept insisted on by the Soviets at
the Moscow Conference.13 In regards to the treatment of war criminals, clauses (a) and
(b) found in appendix B, section A, subsection (1) called for the arrest, identification, and
execution by firing squad of arch-criminals recognized as such by the Allies.14 The plan
contained no provisions for a trial of any kind for those identified as arch-criminals nor
11
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did it cite specifically who those arch-criminals were.15 Fortunately for Morgenthau, the
British corrected his omission by supplying a list of individuals who might fit the treasury
secretary‟s obscure description of who an arch-criminal might be.
Although supplied with the Foreign Office‟s list of war criminals and Lord Simon‟s
recommendation of punishment by summary execution, Churchill arrived in Quebec
focused more on procuring American aid for the postwar reconstruction of Great Britain
than on advancing the question of the Third Reich’s postwar prosecution and judgment.
Serendipitously, the position endorsed by Lord Simon coincided with that of the
Morgenthau Plan. Roosevelt‟s unexpected summons of Morgenthau to the conference,
the treasury secretary‟s recognition of Britain‟s financial straits, and his willingness to
exploit it led to the Anglo-American endorsement of the Morgenthau Plan.16 In spite of
some misgivings by Churchill, the two statesmen agreed to present the plan, Lord
Simon‟s memorandum, and the Foreign Office‟s list of war criminals to Josef Stalin at a
later date.17
Despite Roosevelt‟s initial enthusiasm and Churchill‟s reluctant acceptance, the
Morgenthau Plan‟s status as the favored occupation policy, as well as its agreement with
the Lord Chancellor‟s proposal on the summary execution of arch-criminals, was shortlived. Shortly after Quebec, Secretary of State Hull warned Roosevelt that Stalin would
never accept the Morgenthau Plan in that its provisions for the deindustrialization of
Germany would conflict with the Soviets‟ desire for compensation.18 In addition, fearing
15
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that such a plan would cement German hostility after the war, Stimson and the Chief of
Staff of the Army General George Marshall petitioned Roosevelt to consider other
alternatives to the Morgenthau Plan.19
Providentially for the War Department, the Nazi propaganda machine of Reich
Minister Joseph Goebbels learned of the Morgenthau Plan and, in typical fashion, used it
as motivation in urging the German people to fight to the death. Such propaganda led
many in the American press to believe that the adoption of the Morgenthau Plan would
only strengthen German resistance. Conscious of the negative reaction in the press,
Roosevelt withdrew his earlier approval of the treasury secretary‟s plan.20 By the time a
visibly ill Roosevelt met with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, support
within Roosevelt‟s cabinet for the Morgenthau Plan had vanished almost completely. In
April, the punitive aspects of the Morgenthau Plan died with Roosevelt, although the
British still pushed for a political solution rather than a judicial one. Roosevelt‟s
successor, Harry Truman, “made it clear that he opposed summary execution and
supported the creation of a tribunal to try the Nazi leaders.”21 Stimson accommodated his
new commander-in-chief with a proposal that had been incubating within the Roosevelt
Cabinet for the past eight months.
Following Morgenthau‟s criticisms of the Handbook for Military Government in
Germany and Roosevelt‟s subsequent rebuke the previous August, Stimson had conferred
with his colleagues in the War Department and concluded that a system by which the
Allies could charge and prosecute Reich officials would be preferable to the summary

19
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execution called for in the Morgenthau Plan and by British officials. On 28 August, after
speaking by telephone with the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Stimson
decided that a trial system would best prevent the martyrdom of those individuals singled
out for punishment.22 A week later, in the first of two telephone conversations with
Major General Myron C. Cramer of the Judge Advocate General‟s (JAG) Office, Stimson
asked Cramer for an opinion on the legality of establishing a commission to try the archcriminals, the inclusion of civilians on the commission, and the wisdom of allowing them
a traditional defense. After deliberation, the major general called back and informed
Secretary Stimson that the creation of a hybrid commission or tribunal consisting of
civilian and military personnel was, indeed, feasible.23
Four days later, Stimson wrote to Roosevelt before the president left for Quebec
outlining his objections to the Morgenthau Plan and offering the alternative framework
based on his discussions with McCloy and Cramer. In the letter, Stimson argued that a
publicized and simplified trial of the arch-criminals, which allowed the accused the right
to counsel, to call witnesses, and speak in their defense, provided the Allies with the
moral high ground while revealing to Germany the full extent of the crimes of its
leadership.24 Stimson viewed the latter aspect as beneficial in avoiding the mistakes of
Versailles. Although the secretary of war‟s petition failed to sway the president away

22
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from Morgenthau‟s proposal prior to the Quebec Conference, Stimson urged Cramer‟s
office to formulate an alternative trial plan for Roosevelt.
As Roosevelt‟s support for the Morgenthau Plan wavered when confronted by Hull,
Stimson, and a hostile press, the war department believed it had found a suitable, if
imperfect, option to summary execution. Working in conjunction with JAG and the war
department‟s civil affairs branch, Colonel Murray Bernays, chief of Special Projects
Office in the Personnel (G1) branch and a lawyer in his civilian life, developed the
foundation for that option. The proposal involved indicting the organizations and
agencies affiliated with the Nazi regime on charges of conspiracy to commit war crimes,
in addition to the war crimes themselves. On 15 September, using the Gestapo, SD
(Sicherheitdienst), SS (Schultzstaffel), and SA (the virtually defunct Sturmabteilung)
interchangeably in his brief, Colonel Bernays summarized his proposal to his superior,
General Stephen G. Henry, stating that
the Nazi Government and its Party and State agencies, including the SA, SS, and
Gestapo would be tried before an international court and charged with conspiracy to
commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations in violation of
the laws of war.25
The Bernays Plan acknowledged that many of the Nazis‟ offenses, including those
against Germany‟s own people (particularly the Jews), did not fall under traditional war
crimes. In addition, the plan recognized that, given the thousands of potential defendants,
the time and expense devoted to trying them would likely allow many of the guilty to
escape prosecution.26 As such, Bernays proposed that the Allies try representatives of the
indicted organizations first in a streamlined trial like that argued for by Stimson. After
25
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the establishment of each organization‟s guilt, the Allies could then go back and try other
identified members as part of that conspiracy.27 Although it needed extensive revision,
the Bernays Plan amassed support within the halls of the war department, albeit at a
glacial pace.28
The first modification to the Bernays Plan came when Cramer suggested to McCloy,
whom Stimson had appointed to head the war department‟s development of a war crimes
program, that the proposed trial system adopt the procedures and evidentiary procedures
of a military tribunal, deny the defendants the right to appeal the verdict, and the direct
implementation of the sentences passed.29 Shortly thereafter, McCloy turned the
Bernays‟ memorandum of 15 September over to Colonel Ammi Cutter, his assistant
executive officer and a civilian lawyer, for review. In his reply to the assistant secretary
of war, Cutter affirmed the ingenuity of the conspiracy charge and the inventiveness of
trying the Nazi state as a criminal organization. However, Cutter cited several areas
where the Bernays proposal veered sharply from traditional legal theory: the
advantageous position of the prosecution and the novel approach of trying individuals for
the crimes of the state. Presumably, continued Cutter, a large trial, or series of trials,
might provide the defendants a platform for their own martyrdom.30
Over the next month as Stimson garnered support for a trial system among
Roosevelt‟s Cabinet officials, Bernays, Cutter, and the JAG Office continued refining the
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specifics of the Bernays Plan. On 24 October, Bernays presented the corrected proposal
to Stimson who received it enthusiastically.31 While Stimson did not approve of the
Bernays Plan officially, the secretary of war passed it on the departments of state and the
navy. In a memorandum designated as a working draft dated 11 November, the
secretaries of state, war, and the navy agreed to the tenets of the revised Bernays Plan.
The revised plan expanded the original conspiracy charge beyond the commission of war
crimes and aggressive war and included trying the Nazis for crimes committed against
their own people before and during the war. Admittedly, the new charges presented a
challenge to national sovereignty. The draft also suggested that, due to some of the
plan‟s more inventive aspects, it would be best to create the court through international
treaty, although the signatories admitted that the publication of the treaty might result in
retribution against Allied POWs.32 Finally, on 21 November, Stimson introduced
Bernays‟ proposal to Roosevelt who gave his blessing for its continued development.33
Roosevelt then asked his close advisor, Judge Samuel Rosenman, to coordinate the
departments‟ views on war crimes policy.34
Having decided on the basic method of trying the arch-criminals and the scope of
their alleged crimes, the next step involved solidifying the legal footing for the
procedures and charges. While the charge of traditional “war crimes” encountered little
opposition, the legitimacy of the charge labeled eventually as “crimes against peace,” or
31
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the waging of an aggressive war, required some considerable theoretical gymnastics.
Throughout the world, conducting a war of aggression did not register as a crime.
However, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, to which Germany, Italy, and Japan had all
been signatories, both condemned and renounced war as an instrument of foreign
policy.35 Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact contained no punitive clause for its violation,
the Deputy Director of Military Government, Colonel William Chanler, argued for its
inclusion based on the claim that Nazi aggression against neutral countries was a breach
of the treaty and, therefore, international law. Germany‟s violation of the treaty revoked
its status as a lawful belligerent. Hence, Chanler reasoned, the Allies could punish
Germany under the laws of the neutral countries it had invaded, citing Poland and,
erroneously to some extent, Czechoslovakia as examples.36 Writing well before Chanler
developed his rationale, Justice Robert Jackson, who would eventually lead the American
prosecution team at Nuremberg, went a step further, stating that the Kellogg-Briand Pact
“created substantive law for its signatories and there resulted a right [italicized in the
original] to enforce it by the general sanctions of international law.”37
The origins of international law, which lay at the foundation of the Allies‟ charge of
aggressive war and in the arguments of those who challenged its legality, deserve some
consideration and clarification. Both before the completion of the Trial of the Major War
Criminals and in its aftermath, legal scholars debated what exactly constituted
international law. While fluidity exists between the two extremes of strict pragmatism
and strict positivism, to simplify, pragmatic-natural law argues that international law
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flows from custom and the rights inherent to man, so that the criminalization of
aggressive war and the creation of the IMT developed out of necessity rather than
stemming from any established legal precedent.38
However, legal positivists argue that it is agreements between states that create
international law and that law binds only those nations that are a party to that agreement.
These legal positivists have a contrasting view of Chanler‟s dependence on the KelloggBriand Pact. Arguing against the criminality of aggressive war, the absence of a penalty
within the treaty implies that its violation is meaningless. In addition, legal positivists
argue that the Allies engaged in waging aggressive war during the Second World War
and that the IMT represented only the spoils of victory.39 It follows then that the Allies‟
criminalization of aggressive war was a retroactive law, just as trying individuals for
crimes committed by the state, and the IMT‟s rejection of superior orders as a defense,
violates the doctrine of nulla poena sine since there is no precedent for either in
international law.40 Within JAG, Lieutenant Alwyn Freeman refuted Chanler‟s argument
that existing international law criminalized aggressive war. In addition, he also rejected
the criminality of the conspiracy charge in the Bernays Plan, arguing that it, like
aggressive war, was not illegal under international law.41 The Department of Justice
joined with JAG in its critical assessment of the plan‟s legal foundation.
Commenting on the trial as it was still in process, Sheldon Glueck, a professor of
criminal law and criminology at Harvard, offered a rebuttal to the previous argument that
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the criminalization of aggressive war was ex post facto. He argued that, even if no statute
existed outlawing aggressive war, Hitler and his officials knew that their actions were
criminal and thus prosecution would be ex post facto in name only rather than spirit. This
knowledge of criminality, Glueck reasoned, extended to the agent‟s culpability for the
actions of the state they represent.42 In reference to the positivist assault on the IMT‟s
rejection of the respondeat superior doctrine, the advocates of the IMT‟s legitimacy
again refer back to the defendants‟ actual knowledge of their actions‟ criminality. Using
the British Manual of Military Law as an example, Robert Woetzel asserts that “the
military law of many civilised states contains express provisions to the effect that a
subordinate must only obey lawful orders.”43
As the year ground to an end, the preceding arguments weighed heavily on the minds
of the trial system‟s architects inside the state and war departments. The resignation of
Secretary of State Hull, the inexperience of his successor Edward Stettinius, and the
passivity of the naval secretary, James Forrestal, repositioned the development of a war
crimes policy into a showdown between the Department of War and the Department of
Justice, resulting in deadlock. While Morgenthau maintained his opposition to the idea
of a trial system, his influence within the Cabinet had lessened significantly since the
public‟s negative reaction towards his proposal had become clear that fall. However, a
massacre, in a war filled with butchery, united the Roosevelt Cabinet and freed the war
crimes proposal from its developmental purgatory. In December during the Battle of the
Bulge, the Waffen SS executed more than seventy American POWs at Malmedy,
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Belgium. Buttressing a massive public outcry, their own revulsion stiffened the resolve
of the Cabinet officials and reinvigorated the process.
While JAG retained some reservations about the plan‟s legal footing, Attorney
General Francis Biddle reversed the Justice Department‟s prior stance and, along with
Stimson and Stettinius, endorsed the Bernays Plan. After several revisions, Stimson
forwarded it to Roosevelt on 22 January. The revised plan called for an international
military tribunal established by executive agreement rather than by treaty and inserted the
charge of joint participation in a criminal enterprise in place of the conspiracy charge.44
While Stimson and Biddle intended that Roosevelt discuss the memo with Stalin and
Churchill at the Yalta Conference the following month, other events prevented this from
transpiring.45
Later that spring, Lord Simon invited Rosenman to London in the hope that the
British and Americans could reach a compromise. The Lord Chancellor agreed to drop
Britain‟s demand for summary execution of the arch-criminals and offered an
arraignment in lieu of a full trial. In the memorandum sent to Rosenman, Lord Simon
wrote:
The Allies should draw up . . . a “document of arraignment [italicized in the
original]” in somewhat general terms and that an inter-allied judicial tribunal . . .
should be appointed to report upon the truth of this Arraignment after Hitler and Co.
had been brought before the tribunal and given the opportunity to challenge the truth
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of its content, if they could.46
Rosenman felt the Lord Chancellor‟s concession afforded the United States its best
opportunity to advance a joint Anglo-American plan and, on 5 April, he received the
authority to draft an agreement from acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson.47
However, Britain‟s War Cabinet soon disavowed the Lord Chancellor‟s proposal and
reaffirmed its desire for a political solution. Coupled with Rosenman‟s departure for
Roosevelt‟s funeral, this action ended any hope for an Anglo-American policy prior to
the San Francisco Conference in May. However, while Rosenman left Britain deflated,
his compatriot John McCloy obtained vital support from a contentious ally. While in
Europe, the assistant secretary of war learned that Charles de Gaulle, speaking tentatively
for the Provisional French Republic, did not object to a trial.48 With Soviet and,
presumably, French support, the Americans felt that Britain would agree eventually to a
trial system.
Truman‟s commitment to a trial system, noted above, allowed the Bernays Plan to
progress unhindered. On 26 April, Truman appointed Justice Jackson to lead the
American prosecution team for the duration of the war crimes program. With Jackson‟s
assistance, McCloy, Bernays, and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler drafted
an executive agreement for presentation along with the Bernays Plan to the British and
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Soviet delegations in San Francisco on 3 May.49 At the conference, the “Big Three”
invited France to participate in additional meetings, while the British dropped their
insistence on summary executions and stated that they would go along with a trial plan.
Robert Conot suggests that Hitler‟s apparent demise, later confirmed, influenced the
British delegation‟s decision. Although Rosenman did present the American war crimes
proposal along with the executive agreement, the three visiting powers could not assent to
the executive agreement, as Molotov had not received authorization from Moscow to do
so. However, by the middle of May, Molotov, Eden, and the French Foreign Minister,
Georges Bidault, joined Stettinius in agreeing to the basic tenets of the Bernays Plan.50
Over the summer months, the four powers would resolve areas of contention within the
Americans‟ trial proposal and construct a binding agreement.
On 26 June, Jackson and the American delegation met with their counterparts from
France, Britain, and the Soviet Union at the International Conference on Military Trials
in London. Confusion marked the early stages of the conference. Unfamiliarity with
some of the procedures, concepts, and legalese laid out in the American proposal and a
misinterpretation of the tribunal‟s intended role were but some of the obstacles the
delegates faced. The charge of conspiracy, a staple in the American criminal code since
the Gilded Age and familiar as a legal concept to the British was foreign to both
continental and Soviet legal traditions. In addition, the French delegate Robert Falco,
accustomed to the continental system, voiced his displeasure that the defendants would
not have full knowledge of the prosecution‟s evidence against them. Telford Taylor
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recalls that the four delegations reached a compromise rather quickly, allowing for some,
but not all, of the evidence against the defendants to accompany the indictment.51
The Soviet delegates, I.T. Nikitchenko and A.N. Trainin, also had difficulty with
some of the procedures, particularly the process of cross-examination.52 However, the
Soviets‟ bewilderment over procedure seems almost trivial compared to their objections
to trying the Nazi organizations alongside individuals. This provision, found in Article
Six of the proposed agreement, created the foundation for the future indictment of
secondary Nazi officials. At Yalta, Nikitchenko argued, the “Big Three” had already
declared the criminality of the organizations. The purpose of the IMT, he believed, was
only to determine the individual member‟s level of guilt and then pass sentence. After
considerable deliberation, the delegates repositioned the conspiracy clause to read that a
conviction of any of the other three charges resulted also in a conviction on the
conspiracy count. However, in the indictment, the conspiracy charge remained listed as
count one. Satisfied, the Soviets went along with the American plan.53
Similar debates continued throughout the duration of the London Conference. The
French echoed the earlier argument put forth by the American JAG officer Freeman that
launching an aggressive war was not illegal under international law and punishment
remained ex post facto. Eventually, the delegates reworded the clause so that the French
found it tolerable if not ideal.54 Finally, on 8 August, Jackson, Falco, Nikitchenko,
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Trainin, and the new Lord Chancellor, William Jowitt, signed the agreement establishing
the London Charter for the International Military Tribunal.
Under the terms of the London Charter, the tribunal would consist of eight total
members, a representative and alternate chosen by each signatory. The Charter afforded
the defendants most of the rights associated with the Anglo-American and continental
trial systems; however, the convicted could not appeal their conviction to a higher court.
The charges consisted of four counts: crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and the aforementioned charge of conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes, which the members of tribunal later applied only to count two. In addition, the
Charter forbade the usage of “acting in an official capacity” as a primary defense,
although the tribunal would consider respondeat superior as a mitigating circumstance
during sentencing. The IMT‟s charter consisted of thirty articles divided into seven
sections. For the sake of brevity, only the individual sections of the charter appear below
to serve as a future reference point in future chapters:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Constitution of the International Military Tribunal
Jurisdiction of and General Principles
Committee for the Investigation and Prosecution of Major War Criminals
Fair Trial for Defendants
Powers of the Tribunal and Conduct of the Trial
The Judgment and Sentence
Expenses55
The participants then decided that the Americans would conduct the prosecution as it

related to the conspiracy charge. The British would oversee count two, the waging of
aggressive war or crimes against peace. The French prosecutors would undertake count
three, war crimes. Finally, the Russians would assume responsibility for trying the
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accused on count four, crimes against humanity, as the majority of crimes associated with
the charge had taken place in territory now occupied by the Soviet Union.
After six years of war and millions of lives lost, destroyed, and uprooted, the Allies
prepared to try the remnants of the Third Reich. The four prosecution teams of the
Charter‟s signatories now faced the daunting task of gathering evidence, selecting
Morgenthau‟s arch-criminals, and trying them as most of the world looked on. With
hundreds of potential defendants available, choosing an appropriate cross-section of
officials who were representative of the organizations charged proved challenging. Most
names did not resonate in the ears of the public. Yet of the twenty-four men indicted,
twenty-one came to sit in the dock at Nuremberg. To the world, these men would soon
represent the Nazi regime and their names would become synonymous with those of
Hitler, Goebbels, and Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler.

CHAPTER TWO
MURDERERS‟ ROW: THE ACCUSED AS DEPICTED IN THE AMERICAN PRESS
“We must make it clear to the Germans that the wrong for which their fallen leaders
are on trial is not that they lost the war, but that they started it.”1 – Justice Robert H.
Jackson, 8 August 1945
The suicides of Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler forced the Allies to expand the list of
“arch-criminals” indicted for prosecution. In the deceaseds‟ stead, the four prosecution
teams selected a cross-section of representatives from the indicted organizations: the
Nazi Party leadership, the Reich Cabinet, the SS, SA, SD, Gestapo, and the loosely
termed General Staff and High Command (although the prosecution would present its
case against the SD congruently with that of the Gestapo). Of the twenty-four men listed
in the original indictment, the majority were already in the custody of the British and the
Americans. So, too, did France and the Soviet Union produce three prisoners for
prosecution. In a conciliatory gesture towards their still skeptical partners, the Americans
and British accepted the Soviet submission of the previously retired Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder and a functionary in Goebbels‟ Ministry of Propaganda and Public
Enlightenment, Hans Fritzsche. Likewise, the French prosecution team‟s offering of the
former Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath met with no objection.2
However, some of the other individuals listed in the indictment presented their own
unique set of circumstances. The patriarch of the Krupp munitions dynasty, Gustav
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, had been merely a figurehead in the company since
suffering a stroke in 1941. He had remained enfeebled in both mind and body since and
his active participation in the proceedings was in doubt as he lay in an American military
hospital in Salzburg. Unlike Krupp, who posed little flight risk, the twenty-fourth
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indictee, Nazi Party Secretary Martin Bormann, remained at large although presumably
deceased. Others among the indicted presented less overt, yet compelling, circumstances
that would hinder their prosecution.
Upon the release of the names slated for indictment, the coverage they garnered
among the American press varied from publication to publication, as did the description
of the accused. Of the five newspapers, the announcement of those selected for
prosecution made the front page of the 30 August 1945 editions of The Times, The Post,
LA Times, and The Journal. On the same day, the Tribune relegated the publication of
the list to page five. In addition to the positioning of the individual articles, their length
and depth also differed. Devoted primarily to business and finance, The Journal‟s article
took up less than one quarter of a single column and merely listed the accused along with
a superficial and, as discussed below, often-misleading title. Like The Wall Street
Journal, the Tribune limited its coverage to a single page although it provided a less
perfunctory description of the accused. The Times, LA Times and The Post surpassed the
proceeding two newspapers‟ coverage in article length, if not depth. All three continued
their respective articles on an interior page.
In the LA Times, Raymond Moley, a columnist known for his work in Newsweek,
provided commentary on the selection of the defendants and their potential defenses. In
an erroneous prediction, Moley suggested that Hermann Göring would testify against his
fellow Nazis in return for a prison sentence, foregoing the death penalty that would
assuredly accompany his conviction. The columnist admitted that the trial was without
precedent as would be its punishments apparently in recognition of the controversy
surrounding the IMT‟s creation. However, Moley argued that the trial process should not
offend humanity‟s collective conscience, as the Nazis‟ crimes presented “an unusual

28
case.”3 It would be from these and subsequent articles that the public‟s general
perception of the accused would be formed beginning with the former Reichsmarschall,
Hermann Göring.
Drug-addled and corpulent upon his surrender to the Americans, Göring provided the
last direct link to Hitler‟s inner circle (assuming Bormann was, in fact, dead) and was the
most polarizing figure among the defendants. From the moment of his incarceration, the
press identified the unrepentant Nazi as the focal point that the other defendants would
alternately rally around and assail.4 The New York Times portrayed him initially as
“Hitler‟s right-hand man,” the head of the Luftwaffe, a member of the Elite Guard (SS)
and SA, and Hitler‟s former successor-designate.5 The description appears detailed in
comparison to similar articles published on 30 August, as the usage of the word “former”
in reference to his position as Hitler‟s onetime designated successor seems to allude to
Göring‟s falling-out with Hitler. However, the article did not provide further
explanation. The LA Times depicted Göring in a similar fashion, though omitting any
direct reference to the former Reichsmarschall’s ouster as Hitler‟s political heir.
However, unlike the other four newspapers, the LA Times speculated that Göring might
face prosecution for the bombing of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. In addition, it
suggested that the Allies would also hold the former head of the Luftwaffe accountable
for authorizing the execution of those Allied airmen who attempted to escape from
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prisoner of war camps.6 This latter contention of the west coast paper would prove
correct.
At the time of the article‟s publication, the Allied prosecution teams had yet to
complete the formal indictment charging each of the accused on specific counts. The
Chicago Daily Tribune referred to Göring‟s ouster from Hitler‟s inner circle, along with
his duties in the German Air Force, in its brief introduction.7 The Wall Street Journal
similarly referred to Göring as “air force commander” but contradicted The Times
account by referring to former Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess as “Hitler‟s right-hand man.”8
The basis for this interpretation is unclear as the latter had been in British custody since
his bizarre flight to Scotland in May 1941. Finally, The Post article echoed the Tribune’s
characterization of Göring, along with his fall from grace.9
After his inclusion in the initial listing of war criminals selected for prosecution at
Nuremberg, subsequent reports detailing Göring‟s background and the counts for which
he was charged varied. Of the five newspapers selected, The Times provided the most
extensive coverage, publishing the indictment in its entirety along with editorial
commentary in a five-page exposé on 19 October. The indictment‟s Appendix A, printed
verbatim in The Times, charged Göring with all four counts and listed his multiple roles
within the Reich, including his former position as both the Plenipotentiary of Germany‟s
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Four Year Plan and Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police.10 Coverage in the LA
Times reflected that of the New York daily, with Göring “heading the list” of defendants.
Among those indicted, only the former Reichsmarschall had his individual indictment
published.11
While devoting more space to its coverage of the indictment than that provided in its
article of 30 August, the Tribune relegated the bulk of the article to page ten after an
introductory column on its front page. The article reported that the IMT had indicted
Göring on all four counts but did not provide additional information on his role within the
Reich as it pertained to the charges.12 While providing a lengthier examination of the
indictment and the evidence on which the charges rested than that found in the Tribune,
The Post did not list the counts each individual defendant faced.13 On the same day, The
Wall Street Journal also published a brief, straightforward account of the indictment
listing the charges but, like The Post, did not specify which counts each defendant
faced.14 Regardless of the extensiveness of each paper‟s coverage one constant emerged,
the press‟s emphasis on Herr Göring. Just as Kathleen McLaughlin, a foreign
correspondent for The New York Times, had identified Göring as the epicenter around
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which the other defendants would revolve like so many satellites, so, too, did he become
something of a lightening rod among the press.
Almost approaching the notoriety of his former comrade, Rudolf Hess captured the
attention of the American press albeit more for his mental instability than for any
blustering. Indicted on all four counts for his membership in the NSDAP, SS, and SA,
members of the IMT early on called into question Hess‟s competency to stand trial.15
Having maintained that he suffered from amnesia since his capture, Hess‟s self-diagnosis
seemed to gain credibility after undergoing a battery of psychiatric tests leading up to and
during the trial. The Times reported that after evaluating Hess most of the psychiatrists
concluded that he suffered from partial amnesia, particularly in response to his behavior
following his viewing of newsreel footage taken during the apex of the Third Reich.
While Hess recognized Hitler, Göring, and other former colleagues shown on screen, the
article reported, the defendant could not recall participating in the events captured on
film.16
On 3 November, the Tribune reported that a majority of those who had examined
Hess believed his condition to be legitimate and speculated that the former Deputy
Führer would not face prosecution.17 Likewise, the LA Times reported that Hess‟s
participation in the trial remained in doubt.18 However, The Times characterized Hess‟s
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condition as a ploy, describing his indifference upon receiving the formal indictment
from his jailers as “praying [sic] insane in an attempt to cheat justice.”19
Hess‟s behavior after the trial began seemed to confirm their suspicions. Rejecting
the advice of his lawyers, the gaunt Hess petitioned the tribunal for an audience and
announced to its members that he had faked his amnesia and was prepared to take an
active role in his own defense.20 The Post also reported that Hess had feigned loss of
memory as a temporary defense tactic while he evaluated the mechanics of the IMT.21
As the American prosecutor Telford Taylor notes in his memoirs, the legitimacy of
Hess‟s statement and his overall mental capacity remained an issue of contention among
the members of the tribunal. An unwillingness to upset the Soviets, Taylor concludes,
likely contributed to the tribunal‟s ruling.22 However, the day after Hess‟s
announcement, the IMT ruled that he was mentally competent to stand trial.23
Unlike Hess, the IMT chose to excuse his fellow defendant, the elderly Krupp.
Initially selected to placate calls for accountability among German industrialists, Allied
prosecutors had charged Krupp with all four counts, citing, among other things, that his
support facilitated Hitler‟s rise to power and that Krupp Armaments had utilized slave
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labor.24 The situation surrounding Krupp‟s health attracted considerable attention in
three of the five newspapers examined. While The Wall Street Journal and The
Washington Post chose not to follow the story, the remaining three papers followed the
sparring between the prosecution, defense, and tribunal over the septuagenarian‟s fitness
to stand trial.
As Krupp‟s dismissal seemed imminent, Robert Jackson requested that the
prosecution substitute Krupp‟s son Alfried in place of his father. The younger Krupp had
taken an active role in the day-to-day management of the family holdings following his
father‟s incapacitation in 1941. Jackson‟s British counterparts suggested that, like
Bormann, the IMT try the elder Krupp in absentia.25 After some deliberation, the IMT
rejected both suggestions and indicated that Gustav Krupp would remain under
indictment but tried later if his condition improved.26
In contrast to the divergent coverage surrounding Hess‟s competency, The New York
Times, Tribune, and LA Times presented a unified front in their framing of the Krupp
proceedings. The consensus among the publications that reported on the ruling presented
the loss of Krupp as a blow to the prosecution, specifically to Justice Jackson. In a ruling
that lasted less than a minute, the IMT flatly denied his motion to indict Alfried Krupp
and offered little justification for their decision.27 Oddly, the Tribune chose not to attack
Jackson or the attempted substitution of Krupp on its editorial page despite being an
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ardent critic of the IMT since its formation in August, referring to its charter as a
“streamlined lynch law.”28 However, the Chicago Daily Tribune’s silence might have
stemmed from a desire not to draw attention to the apparent fairness of the IMT‟s
decision.
The ambiguity surrounding Martin Bormann‟s status also provided fodder for the
print media and gave rise to rampant gossip and conjecture. The LA Times speculated
that the former NSDAP Secretary had escaped the rubble of Berlin and survived long
enough to be captured based on his inclusion in the list published on 30 August.29 The
Post supported this dubious assumption, suggesting that Bormann was in Soviet custody.
Their source, and likely that of the LA Times, lay within Justice Jackson‟s Washington
D.C. office which offered that “we don‟t know where he is. But the fact that his name is
on the list means that he is alive and in custody.”30 The Tribune cited the same
Associated Press (AP) report in its 30 August edition, but did not supply any details of
Bormann‟s role within the Reich.31 After the prosecution released the full indictment, the
Tribune named Bormann as the head of both the SA and Volkssturm (the militia charged
with defending the Reich during its dying days). In contrast to Hitler‟s other former
intimates, Göring and Hess, the indictment charged Bormann only with counts one, three,
and four.32
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In keeping with a developing trend, The Times provided much of the detail about
Bormann and his status, publishing several reports of his supposed whereabouts. As it
had done with the other defendants, The Times listed Bormann in its preliminary
announcement of the indicted on 30 August and again when it published the full
indictment on 19 October, citing similar details found in the Tribune regarding
Bormann‟s duties within the Reich. In reference to the theories put forth in the LA Times,
The Post, and Tribune concerning Bormann‟s location, The New York Times supported
the assumption that he was in Soviet hands. However, it cited British Field Marshal Sir
Bernard Law Montgomery‟s headquarters in Hamburg rather than Justice Jackson‟s
office as its source.33 As the trial neared, Bormann remained at large although British
prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross maintained “there was „less reason [to believe] that
Bormann might be dead‟” and that he should remain under indictment.34 A follow-up
article published in The Times twelve days later echoed Shawcross‟s confidence. The
article reasoned that Bormann‟s attempt to escape Berlin and contact Hitler‟s successor,
Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, indicated a survivalist instinct and justified Bormann‟s
inclusion in the indictment.35
The prosecution‟s resolve appeared to falter, however, as Jackson later admitted that
the IMT might drop the indictment against Bormann after the latter failed to surface.36
Jackson‟s fears never came to fruition as the IMT ruled that Bormann remain under
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indictment and tried in absentia in the event he surfaced. Converse to its fellow New
York publication, The Wall Street Journal continued its subdued and sporadic treatment
of the Trial of the Major War Criminals, a trend that would continue throughout the next
sixteen months. The financial journal never addressed Bormann‟s whereabouts or the
charges he faced, describing him simply as “Hitler‟s secretary.”37
Prior to the onset of the trial, the remaining defendants, often referred to as the “Nazi
small fry” in the publications, usually did not attract the attention of the previous four.
However, some deviations from this trend arose. Dr. Robert Ley, certainly not a
prominent name during the war, presented one such divergence. Initially, the five
newspapers‟ aforementioned editions of 30 August and 19 October depicted Ley, once
the head of the German Labor Front, in a fashion quite similar to those of his cohorts.
The Tribune and The Times both reported that the Allies had indicted Ley on counts one,
three, and four, while The Times noted that Ley‟s crimes stemmed from his utilization of
slave labor.38
The focus on Ley arose from his response to the indictment served to him. The LA
Times reported that upon receiving his indictment, Ley accused the Allies of retroactive
prosecution, protesting that “God first made the Ten Commandments and judged people
by them afterwards.”39 In the publications examined, this utterance by Ley represented
the first attack on the trial by one of the indicted using the ex post facto argument. The
article also reported Jackson‟s response to Ley‟s concerns, citing the Supreme Court
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justice‟s assurances that the IMT‟s charter had already resolved the issue.40 The Chicago
Daily Tribune also reported Ley‟s criticisms, as well as Jackson‟s retort, in its 21 October
edition.
The defendant, however, would not live long enough to enter the dock. On 26
October, the media reported that the former Nazi labor leader had killed himself inside
his cell at Nuremberg by fashioning a noose from a bath towel suspended from a pipe and
choking himself to death. News of Ley‟s suicide ran on the front page of each of the five
newspapers. Consistently restrained, The Journal’s coverage consisted of six lines at the
bottom of page one mentioning Ley‟s former office and the means of his suicide.41 The
Post described the conditions surrounding Ley‟s suicide in considerable detail, noting
how he had had hidden himself from view in the alcove that housed his toilet and gagged
himself so as not to alert his guards before the act could be completed.42 The Tribune
cited the same AP report, adding that Ley‟s jailers had taken precautions against such
acts and had attempted artificial respiration upon discovering the deceased. The article
noted that Ley had displayed considerable emotional distress during his incarceration and
had attempted to poison himself following his capture in May.43 In the LA Times,
coverage of Ley‟s suicide reflected that found in the Tribune, adding the he had been a
veteran of the First World War and an alcoholic.44 In addition to the information
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published in the Tribune and LA Times, The Times offered an obituary of sorts and noted
that Ley‟s fellow defendants, save Julius Streicher, had snubbed him in the weeks leading
up to his death.45
With the exception of The Wall Street Journal, the following day brought with it the
publication of Ley‟s final testament, which made the front page in all but The Post, which
printed the story on its second page. In his suicide note, Ley expressed his desire to join
Hitler in death and suggested that God had forsaken the Nazis because of their antiSemitism.46 The LA Times reported that in Ley‟s testament, he complimented his jailers
and their treatment of him, noting that the “Americans are correct and partly [sic]
friendly.”47 The article offered no speculation on whether the first portion of the previous
quote referred to the Americans‟ professional conduct or Ley‟s acceptance of the charges
levied against him. It likely refers to the captors‟ conduct, although the repentant tone of
Ley‟s testament might indicate otherwise. On page four, the LA Times also published
reactions from Ley‟s fellow defendants. Göring, the article reported, rejoiced after
receiving news of Ley‟s demise. Although prison officials did not relate the cause of
death, the article noted that Streicher suspected it was a suicide and likened Ley to a
pig.48
As it had with Göring, Hess, and Bormann, The Times provided the most coverage of
the five newspapers and offered the only analysis of the suicide. In addition to the AP
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report utilized by the Tribune, the New York paper printed Ley‟s final testament in its
entirety as well as an article by its military correspondent, Drew Middleton, suggesting
that his death fulfilled a suicide pact made with Goebbels.49 Finally, The New York
Times suggested on its editorial page that Ley‟s suicide, like his alcoholism, indicated
signs of remorse for his past brutality.50
The print media‟s description of the surviving defendants did not provide the high
drama of those discussed previously. However, the majority of the newspapers reported
the overt anti-Semitism of Julius Streicher, albeit periodically. The Chicago Daily
Tribune also characterized Streicher as being “an originator of the anti-Semitic
movement.”51 Early in The Times’ coverage of the accused, Middleton labeled the
former publisher of Der Sturmer and NSDAP Gauleiter of Franconia the “high-priest‟ of
anti-Semitism.”52 In his description, the American reporter engaged in no mere
hyperbole. Indicted on counts one and four, Streicher did little to distance himself from
his reputation as a rabid anti-Semite who, the Allies contended, had encouraged violence
against Jews through his newspaper. Even while incarcerated, the man who had spread
obscene anti-Jewish propaganda across Germany during the 1930s continued spewing his
bile.
Streicher‟s conduct won him little sympathy in the press or with those asked to
defend him. The LA Times, The Times, and the Tribune reported that, upon being handed

49

Middleton, “Suicide Pact Implied,” The New York Times, 27 October 1945.

50

Editorial, “DEATH OF A NAZI,” The New York Times, 27 October 1945.

51

Associated Press, “HUMANITY HIT BY NAZI CRIMES, ALLIES CHARGE,” Chicago Daily
Tribune, 12 October 1945.
52

1945.

Middleton, “10 GERMAN LEADERS FIRST TO BE TRIED,” The New York Times, 8 August

40
a list of counsel available for his defense, Streicher scoffed at several names he identified
as being of Jewish origin, informing his guards, “I could not ask a Jew to defend me.”53
Streicher‟s obstinacy later hindered his defense, as the attorney who came to represent
him, Dr. Hans Marx, found Streicher‟s conduct exasperating. After dropping a motion to
have Streicher examined by a psychiatrist, the lawyer reportedly conceded to the tribunal
that his client was being “very difficult.”54
Early in his captivity, the LA Times noted that while Streicher expected to hang, he
also believed that the British and Americans would eventually come to accept the
righteousness of both his words and deeds.55 The 2 September edition of The New York
Times also published a report similar to its counterpart on the West Coast. It appears that
Streicher never wavered in his convictions. As the trial loomed closer, he proclaimed his
conscience untroubled after being informed that a date for the opening proceedings had
been set.56 This apparent lack of remorse and already sordid reputation marked him as an
object of scorn in the press during the trial progression. While neither The Wall Street
Journal nor The Washington Post addressed Streicher‟s pretrial conduct, The Post
described him briefly as the publisher of Der Sturmer, Gauleiter of Franconia, and “a
notorious Jew-baiter.”57
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It would be redundant to examine the pre-trial coverage of each of the other eighteen
defendants as the five newspapers introduced them in relatively the same fashion. As
noted above, the announcement of their selection on 30 August usually listed their
general titles while foregoing any other background on the accused. The presence of four
members of the Wehrmacht on the list prompted the speculative columnist Moley to
suggest that each would utilize respondeat superior in his defense.58 It appears that the
columnist was unaware that the IMT‟s Charter had already forbade its usage.
If Moley was unfamiliar with the particulars of the charter, he was apparently not
alone. In an editorial in the 19 October edition of The New York Times, the editorial‟s
authors asked rhetorically if the four could plead respondeat superior due to the eventual
horrors their profession facilitated. The editorial also questioned whether the military
was as culpable as brutes like Streicher or Reich Commissar for the Netherlands Arthur
Seyss-Inquart and whether the Allies should try the Wehrmacht alongside them, if at all.59
Exactly one week later, the newspaper published a letter from one Henry Rheinstrom
who responded to their query. Quoting similar precedent as that later cited by Robert
Woetzel in his book, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, Rheinstrom argued that
Section 47 of the German Military Penal Code held the subordinate criminally
responsible if he knew the order “concerned an act by which a civil or military crime was
intended.”60 The exchange of information found on the op-ed page of The New York
Times foreshadowed a debate that would recur throughout the trial. Over a year later, the
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rejection of this defense, the conviction of the four officers, and the sentences imposed
upon them would incite discord among their American counterparts.
Of the four professional soldiers, the IMT indicted Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and
Colonel General Alfred Jodl (identified incorrectly in The New York Times as Lieutenant
Colonel) on all four counts. As Chief of the German High Command (Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht or OKW), Keitel‟s primary duties were to convey Hitler‟s instructions to
the rest of the Wehrmacht, thus taking responsibility for their dissemination, if not their
actual origin. In addition, the indictment contended that in his role within the OKW,
Keitel had also served in Hitler‟s secret cabinet. In regards to Jodl, the indictment held
the Chief of the OKW‟s Operations Staff responsible for actualizing Hitler‟s orders, thus
abetting in the commission of counts two, three, and four.61
The two veteran seamen, Grand Admirals Erich Raeder and Dönitz, each faced
prosecution on all but count four, crimes against humanity.62 In the eyes of the IMT,
Raeder‟s retirement in 1943 had not relieved the former Commander in Chief of the
German Navy from responsibility. His advocacy of the invasion of Norway provided the
foundation for his indictment on count two. Discussed in the following chapter, Raeder‟s
rationale for the invasion placed the British in an uncomfortable position, as they too had
been in the process of planning an invasion as a preventive measure. Likewise, the
defense of his successor Dönitz against charges of war crimes while the latter served as
commander of the U-boat arm of the German Navy presented the Anglo-Americans in an
unfavorable light. Dönitz also had the unenviable position of being Hitler‟s political heir
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and, in reference to his brief term as Germany‟s president, received the derisive title “the
five-day Führer” from the Los Angeles Times.63
Of the remaining defendants, the IMT indicted eight others on all four counts. In
addition to Seyss-Inquart who, along with his crimes against the Dutch, had also
facilitated the Anschluss was von Neurath and the latter‟s successor as Hitler‟s Foreign
Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Alfred Rosenberg, Minister for the Eastern occupied
territories and the NSDAP‟s philosopher; the urbane Albert Speer, Minister of
Armaments and Munitions; Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for Labor and underling of Ley
and Speer; Reich Minister of the Interior and Protector of Bohemia and Moravia,
Wilhelm Frick; and Walter Funk, President of the Reichsbank rounded out this select
group of defendents.64 In the article cited above, The Times published the multiple titles
each of the accused held; however, for the sake of brevity, this study includes only those
most connected to the charges.
While The Times appeared less concerned with the personalities of what one might
call the second-tier Nazis, on one occasion The Post provided a somewhat humorous
account of von Ribbentrop prior to the trial. Having alluded to an earlier despondency
that had previously gone unreported in the press, the article reported an improvement in
the ex-diplomat‟s demeanor and noted a return to his former arrogance. The paper went
on to recount a colorful tête-à-tête between the former foreign minister and a Czech
interrogator. The latter, a Colonel Ecer, after tiring of von Ribbentrop‟s braggadocio,
belittled his skills as both a diplomat and a champagne salesman (von Ribbentrop‟s
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former occupation).65 While such an anecdote amounted to little more than frivolity, it
reflected a press that often reveled in the derision of the men who had wrought such
chaos. The exchange provided a of touch of joviality and, perhaps, degradation in its
treatment of the first Nuremberg trial, during which those who followed the events would
be hard-pressed to find the former but the latter in multitudes.
Along with Bormann, the three defendants indicted on counts one, three, and four
included Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Hans Frank, and Goebbels‟ alleged protégée, Fritzsche. In
addition to being a general in the SS, the Austrian-born Kaltenbrunner had succeeded
Reinhard Heydrich as chief of the Reich Main Security Office (the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) following Heydrich‟s assassination in Prague.
Kaltenbrunner‟s ascension placed him second only to Himmler within the multifarious
RSHA, which encompassed portions of the SS, the SD, Gestapo, and other intelligence
and police organization. With Himmler‟s suicide, it also made him a prime defendant as
the Allies indicted him on count one for his role in the perpetration of the Anschluss, and
counts three and four based on a range of atrocities attributed to the RSHA‟s various
sections, including the deportation of individuals to the concentration camps.66 Here the
indictment published in The New York Times does not differentiate between those camps
devoted to the extermination of its inmates, their detainment, or both. One would assume
that the general implication included all three categories.
Kaltenbrunner‟s co-defendant Hans Frank faced damning evidence due in part to his
role as Governor General of the occupied territories of Poland and his service within
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several offices that administered Polish lands absorbed into the Reich.67 Of the
defendants, Frank displayed the first inklings of repentance. During the early months of
his captivity, as reported in the LA Times, Frank devoted considerable time to Bible study
and appeared, in the words of the prison commandant Colonel Burton Andrus, “very
penitent.”68
Despite being technically a journalist himself, the selection of Fritzsche attracted little
attention among his American colleagues. A mouthpiece for the Third Reich over the
radio waves and in print, Fritzsche‟s offices included editor-in-chief of the Deutsches
Nachrichten Buero (German news agency) and head of the Reich Ministry of
Propaganda‟s home press and wireless divisions. His role as an advocate of Nazi ideals,
as well as encouraging both anti-Semitism and the lynching of downed Allied airmen,
contributed to Fritzsche‟s indictment on counts one, three, and four.69 Until his acquittal,
Fritzsche appeared almost as an afterthought in the press and seemed out of place among
the other defendants sitting in the dock.
The youngest of the defendants at thirty-eight, Baldur von Schirach gained most of
his notoriety as the Reichsjugendführer (youth leader) of the Hitler-Jugend, or Hitler
Youth. Charged only with counts one and four, the indictment contended that, as the
head of the Hitler-Jugend, von Schirach assisted in militarizing Germany‟s youth. His
indictment on count four stemmed from von Schirach‟s supplemental role as Gauleiter of
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Vienna, in which he had been culpable in deporting Viennese Jews to concentration
camps.70 Like Fritzsche, von Schirach received little attention in the press.
The final two defendants, Franz von Papen and Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht,
faced indictment on counts one and two based on their roles in bringing the Nazis to
power and in preparing Germany for war.71 A major discrepancy appears to exist,
however, in the indictment‟s Appendix A, published in the 19 October edition of The
Times, and the information reported in the Tribune’s article of the same day. In listing
the former vice-chancellor and ambassador von Papen‟s charges, the appendix
erroneously maintained that he was charged with counts one, two “and the crimes against
humanity set forth in Count Four of the indictment, including more particularly the
exploitation and abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars.”72
However, Appendix A of the indictment, as cataloged in the Yale School of Law‟s
Avalon Project, does not contain the passage quoted above. It includes only von Papen‟s
indictment under counts one and two.73 Based on the archive culled from the above
source, in conjunction with the information published in the Tribune, as well as the
secondary sources reviewed, it seems probable the quotation found in The Times’
publication of the indictment represents a printing error. It duplicates exactly the last
seven lines found in Speer‟s statement of individual responsibility printed below that of
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Papen‟s on page thirteen. The information contained in Schacht‟s indictment, however,
appears correct.
The Allies held that Schacht, as Funk‟s predecessor as president of the Reichsbank,
had propagated Hitler‟s ascendancy to the chancellorship and aided in Germany‟s
rearmament in preparation for war through his fiscal policies, a contention covered in The
Times, LA Times, and the Tribune.74 The LA Times noted that, unlike his fellow
defendants, Schacht had not held any official posts since 1939 after Hitler replaced him at
the Reichsbank with Funk. As it had with Raeder, Schacht‟s retirement did little to
mollify the Allies‟ desire to see him prosecuted.75 Unlike the grand admiral, Schacht had
spent the last ten months of the war as a prisoner in several concentration camps after the
20 July 1944 attempt on the Führer’s life, a fact that exacerbated his animosity towards
his fellow defendents. The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Daily
Tribune each reported Schacht‟s imprisonment under the Nazis and his professed, yet
vague, subversion of the Third Reich.76
The three newspapers referred to in the preceding paragraph also noted Schacht‟s
propensity for theatrics. Arrested by the United States Army after his liberation from a
concentration camp in Tyrol, Austria, Schacht remained indignant during his detainment
at Nuremberg and loudly proclaimed his innocence to jailer and inmate alike. Alternately
mocking the Allies for propping the Weimer Republic up during its darkest days and
threatening his co-defendants, Schacht found himself separated from the other prisoners
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due to his outbursts.77 The Tribune reported that, at one point, Schacht had compared
Hitler and Göring to gangsters and that if the Americans would oblige him, he would
“gladly shoot Göring . . . [and] kill him.”78 Whether the banker‟s disdain for his former
colleagues was genuine, augmented by a belief that he had endured enough suffering, or
simply a ploy designed to separate himself from the other defendants is inconsequential.
It does provide proof that Kathleen McLaughlin‟s prediction two months earlier was, in
part, accurate and served as an indication of alliances among the defendants during the
later stages of the trial.
In examining the American press‟s depiction of the defendants, one should remember
that the US was less than four months removed from Germany‟s capitulation. To expect
an unbiased representation of the accused would be to discount the emotionally charged
atmosphere in which the press had worked the previous five years. Given the depravity
and extent of Nazi “crimes” and the mayhem unleashed upon Europe by the Wehrmacht,
the correspondents and managing staff of the five newspapers examined would be hardpressed to suppress their own sentiments and treat the Reich’s agents as they would
someone accused of a normal domestic crime. In this context, it is understandable that
the tone of the coverage of the incidents, such as von Ribbentrop‟s exchange with his
interrogator or Streicher‟s diatribes, cast the indicted in a poor light. The Trial of the
Major War Criminals, as Raymond Moley pointed out, did subscribe to its own set of
extraordinary circumstances.

77

Associated Press, “ALLIES SUCKERS, WIZARD OF NAZI FINANCE SAYS,” Los Angeles
Times, 8 October 1945.
78

Associated Press, “ALLIES SUCKERS AFTER WAR NO. 1, SAYS SCHACHT,” Chicago Daily
Tribune, 8 October 1945.

49
The five newspapers‟ coverage in the months leading up to the trial finds their
descriptions of the indicted homogenous, indeed almost perfunctory. This should not
strike the reader as unusual, as most of the reports published utilized the same wire
services. Nor should the cavalier titles often flung about in the press such as “Nazi
Philosopher” or “Jew-Baiter Number 1,” bestowed on Rosenberg and Streicher
respectively, surprise the reader. These monikers, like The Times and the Tribune’s
inability to differentiate between Göring‟s initial designation as the Führer’s political
heir and that of Hess as party leader, represent the intricate ties between party and state
within the Third Reich and the bewilderment that it produced. As evident in The Times’
19 October printing of the indictment‟s statement of individual responsibility, one
individual might hold multiple offices within both the Reich and the NSDAP. It appears
then that the press ascribed these generalities to the defendants for the benefit of the
casual reader.
Only in analysis or in examining the more curious incidents like the competency of
Hess and Krupp or Ley‟s suicide did coverage show actual variance and did criticisms
levied against the IMT begin to emerge. Whether it be the spectre of ex post facto raised
by Ley and dismissed by Jackson, the culpability of the Wehrmacht deliberated on the
editorial page of The New York Times, or discussion in Moley‟s column of what role
respondeat superior should play, if any, in the trial, the perspectives presented in the
newspapers began to sharpen. These deviations only widened as the trial progressed. So,
too, would the space the papers devoted to covering the indicted and the frequency of
those reports serve as a harbinger of their future attitudes toward the trial once it began.
Such was the mood of the press as the defendants, now reduced to twenty-two including
the absent Bormann, entered the dock on 20 November 1945.

CHAPTER THREE
MILESTONE, MOCKERY, OR MARATHON: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRIAL
“If we fought against the forces of darkness and evil, we cannot subscribe to a peace
that perpetuates injustice and creates a new world order equally as intolerable as the old,
with the only distinction a new set of victims.”1 – Chicago Sunday Tribune Editorial, 12
August 1945
As alluded to in the previous chapter, of the five newspapers selected for this study,
none covered the Trial of the Major War Criminals more extensively than The New York
Times. As such, in examining the publications‟ treatment of the trial itself it would be
best to begin with the premier newspaper of the Empire City. In doing so, not only does
this provide a rudimentary timeline for readers unfamiliar with the haphazard order of the
trial, it presents a standard by which to compare and contrast the other four newspapers‟
coverage.
The New York Times
Even during the London Conference, The Times provided its readers with varying
perspectives on the issues surrounding the prospective trial. Quoting liberally from a St.
Louis Post-Dispatch editorial, The Times reported that a substantial number of American
and British commanders, including Eisenhower and Montgomery, favored the lenient
treatment of the German General Staff. The article noted that the St. Louis newspaper
adamantly opposed such clemency and expressed apprehension that a delay in finalizing
an agreement between the four powers would result in a loss of public support for the
trial and, consequently, allow war criminals to escape prosecution.2 Although it would
later address the inclusion of the German General Staff and High Command in the
indictment on its editorial page, in this article The Times remained neutral in its position.
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A day after the trial commenced, in its edition of 21 November, The Times reported
that the first day of the trial was devoted solely to the reading of the indictments, which
the newspaper had printed in full on 19 October. The paper presented a detailed account
of the proceedings inside the Palace of Justice. Correspondent Kathleen McLaughlin
provided her readers with observations on the courtroom‟s design, the conduct of the
defendants, and, unlike the other four newspapers, noted the absence of Jackson‟s
counterparts: Francois de Menthon, Sir Hartley Shawcross of Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union‟s Roman Rudenko.3
The following day, Thursday, 22 November, articles covering the activities of day
two, including the entry of the defendants‟ pleas, excerpts from Justice Jackson‟s address
to the tribunal, and a motion challenging the legitimacy of the tribunal filed by the
defense dominated the first three pages of The New York Times.4 The excerpts from
Jackson‟s address took up the newspaper‟s entire second page and in them he emphasized
that the tribunal was not motivated by vengeance, but by justice and the desire to prevent
future war. He then outlined the charges brought against the defendants, explained how
the conspiracy charge related to the commission of the other three counts, and declared
that the defendants own documents would provide ample proof of their guilt. In closing,
Justice Jackson recognized the defense would likely challenge the legality of the tribunal
and some of the charges, but defended its charter by noting that it represented the desires
of humanity.5
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The motion entered on behalf of the entire defense by Göring‟s attorney, Dr. Otto
Stahmer, fulfilled Jackson‟s prediction that the defense would challenge the tribunal‟s
authority. In it, Dr. Stahmer argued that count two was ex post facto as was its
application towards individuals for crimes of the state. Trying the defendants would then
violate Nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without a law), a fundamental legal principle of
western law. The attorney concluded by asking the tribunal to solicit opinions from
recognized experts on international law regarding the legality of the trial.6 The tribunal
denied the motion without comment.
In its 22 November edition The Times published statements from Göring and
Rosenberg, becoming the only newspaper to print both in their entirety. The tribunal had
forbidden the men from reading from them when they had entered their pleas, lest the
Nazis use the trial as a medium for their propaganda. While Göring denied that his
actions had constituted criminal activity, he took responsibility for them but only to the
German people. The tribunal, he argued, held no jurisdiction over him.7 Like Göring,
Rosenberg implied a readiness to accept responsibility for his actions if the prosecution
could prove his guilt, which he did not concede.8
Over the next few days, articles detailing the American prosecutors‟ presentation of
evidence landed on the front page of The Times. In what would become a feature during
the first two months of the trial, the newspaper published a summary of the week‟s
activities in Section E of its Sunday edition. The first summary, written by Kathleen
McLaughlin, marveled at the speed with which the Allies were conducting the trial. The
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only impediment to a quick conclusion, the author observed, would be the defense, as the
attorneys were unfamiliar with some of the foreign elements of the procedures. In such
cases, McLaughlin reasoned, the tribunal had to temper alacrity with fairness.9 In
addition, the same section contained caricatures of the defendants seating in the dock.
The first, located next to McLaughlin‟s summary, was of the hooded personification of
death pointing an accusing finger at Göring, Hess, Keitel, and several other
indistinguishable figures. Below the image, the caption read, “One witness is enough.”10
The second caricature, entitled “The Silent Jury,” featured a seated Göring confronted by
apparitions representing the victims of the Final Solution.11 Both illustrations reflected
the grimness of the proceedings.
While The Times limited its coverage to the events occurring inside the Palace of
Justice during the trial‟s first week, the newspaper did not remain silent on the issues
surrounding the proceedings for long. The following Monday, it reported that some
officers in the United States Army, particularly those stationed in Europe, were wary of
the trial. In short, the officers opposed both the idea of collective responsibility and the
indictment of the German General Staff and High Command.12 In turn, the newspaper
reported that an irate Jackson had refuted these attacks in response to an article found in
the Army-Navy Journal (now known as the Armed Forces Journal) which contained
similar sentiments. Reprinted in Stars and Stripes, the journal article had alleged that the
9

McLaughlin, “WAR CRIMES TRIALS PROCEED AT FAST PACE,” The New York Times, Section
E, 25 November 1945.
10

Alois Derso and Emery Kelen, “At Nuremberg,” The New York Times, Section E, 25 November

1945.
11

12

Unknown, “The Silent Jury,” The New York Times, Section E, 25 November 1945.

Frank E. Mason, “ARMY CALLED FOE OF JACKSON VIEWS,” The New York Times, 26
November 1945.

54
indictment of the German General Staff and High Command as an organization
discredited the military profession and would be detrimental to American officers seeking
higher rank. The New York Times reported that Jackson had dismissed the article as
factually inaccurate and noted that the Allies had indicted the German General Staff and
High Command, Keitel, and his cohorts “not for fighting the war, but for promoting it.”13
The conspiracy case received almost daily attention in The New York Times.
Although most reports contained a recitation of the evidence presented the previous day
(citing heavily from the defendants own documents, journals, etc.) and the points argued
by Jackson and the other members of the American team, occasionally one of the
newspaper‟s own correspondents would interject his own opinion. In reviewing the roles
played by von Ribbentrop, Seyss-Inquart and others in the absorption of territories into
the Reich, war correspondent Raymond Daniell declared that, regardless of the final
verdict, the regime the defendants represented was assuredly guilty. However, Daniell
alluded to the guilt of other nations in allowing Germany to rearm and he bemoaned the
tribunal‟s refusal to hear instances of such impotency. While legally immaterial to the
case against the Nazi regime, the reporter admitted, the inclusion of such information in
the trial record would frame the proceedings in the proper historical perspective.14
Weeks later, in mid-December, as the conspiracy phase of the trial shifted from the
individual defendants to the organizations themselves, the dispute between Jackson and
members of the US military over the Wehrmacht officials‟ culpability resurfaced,
prompting Daniell to characterize it as a misunderstanding. Supportive of Jackson, he
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asserted that the prosecution had proven its case against Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, and Dönitz
already.15
On 20 December, in the middle of Colonel Robert Storey‟s prosecution of the
Gestapo, the tribunal recessed for the holidays. During the break, The Times published
several trifling features about the defendants‟ activities during the lull in the trial. One
article that was decidedly not trivial reported that the army‟s American Information
Control Division had conducted a poll among German citizens concerning the trial. Its
findings revealed that a majority of Germans had little interest in the trial or the
precedents it might set, although eighty percent of those polled believed the defendants
were guilty. Of those who did follow the trial, the poll found that a third opposed the
group indictments. Some disliked the idea of foreigners judging German nationals while
others observed that the Allies did not include in the particulars of the indictment the
bombing of London by the Luftwaffe. By its omission, the respondents construed that the
prosecution did not want to provide the defendants with an opportunity to use tu quoque
in their defense. Citing various sources, the paper concluded that most Germans placed
greater concern on coal shortages and other economic issues than on the proceedings in
Nuremberg.16
When the trial resumed on 2 January, The Times continued in its daily coverage even
though, with some exceptions, it no longer published articles concerning the proceedings
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on its the front page. However, it continued to address the issues surrounding the
indictment of the Wehrmacht officials. Although relegated to page ten of the 8 January
edition, the conspiracy case against the General Staff and High Command received
considerable attention in the newspaper, including the printing of the full text of Taylor‟s
summation. In it, Colonel Taylor argued that the general staff had ventured beyond its
traditional role by facilitating Hitler‟s rise to power and pushing Germany towards war.17
Adding to the documentary evidence submitted by Taylor was the damning testimony of
German General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski who declared that the general staff had
participated in ethnic cleansing on the Eastern Front when it had authorized the slaughter
of partisans at Himmler‟s request.18
After the completion of the American and British phase, fewer articles in The Times
dealt with the controversial aspects of the trial as most accepted that the foundations of
counts three and four were legally sound. This is not to say the newspaper focused any
less attention on the French and Soviet presentations, but rather the reports do not reveal
any personal bias. However, during the opening of the Soviet phase of the trial, The
Times published an article in which it reported that various functionaries within the
United States government supported the trial, refuting several of the most common
attacks against it. Addressing the issue of individual responsibility, Assistant Solicitor
General Harold Judson argued that, following the Great War, an Allied commission on
war crimes had ruled “that even chiefs of state were liable to criminal prosecution.”19
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Furthermore, he contended the trial demonstrated democratic justice. The report noted
that Francis Russell, the acting director for the State Department‟s Office of Public
Information, echoed Judson‟s comments, declaring that the trial was “building the legal
foundations of peace.”20
During the trial‟s defense phase, The New York Times presented the prosecutions‟
performance in glowing terms. As Göring opened his defense, the newspaper published
an article that quoted Justice Jackson exclusively. In it, Jackson promoted the trial,
noting the historic implications that surrounded it, and declared that the four powers were
working well together despite their divergent legal systems.21 Weeks later, the justice‟s
famous exchange with Göring on 18 March, generally accepted as a low point for the
prosecution, garnered little attention in the newspaper. In reporting that day‟s activities,
correspondent Raymond Daniell noted only that the former Reichsmarschall proved to be
a difficult witness and that the tribunal had overruled Jackson when he asked that Göring
limit his responses to the affirmative or negative.22 In truth, Jackson‟s request stemmed
from his own frustration with the direction of the cross-examination. The prosecutor‟s
open-ended questions allowed Göring to expound on the virtues of National Socialism
and ridicule Jackson for some of the more obvious questions posed to him. When the
prosecution‟s cross-examination of Göring ended several days later, Daniell depicted
Jackson as having been victorious, although he also credited British assistant prosecutor
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Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe for forcing Göring to admit that he had ordered the execution of
captured British aviators after they had attempted to escape.23
Following Göring‟s turn on the stand, some followers of the proceedings
characterized the tribunal‟s treatment of the defendants as too lenient. The Times
reported that Martin Popper, secretary of the National Lawyers Guild, adopted this
stance. Popper observed that the tribunal‟s behavior was due likely to its desire to
provide the defendants with a fair trial. While laudable, he continued, this allowed the
defendents and their attorneys a forum in which to defend Nazism. The sentiments
allegedly held by the defense counsel, Popper argued, were indicative of the depths of
Nazism in German society. Popper concluded by praising Jackson for his role in
constructing the tribunal and suggested that the prosecution‟s next target be the German
industrialists.24 Popper‟s critique of the accuseds‟ performance foreshadowed other
tactics used in their defense.
During Rudolf Hess‟s defense, the newspaper reported that his attorney, Dr. Alfred
Seidl, had offered evidence that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, purportedly a treaty of
nonaggression, contained a secret agreement that gave the Soviet Union carte blanche in
the eastern half of Poland and the Baltic states. The article‟s author reported that Soviet
Prosecutor Rudenko had objected to the submission and the tribunal had ruled that the
defense had to translate its affidavit from the Reich Foreign Office Chief Frederick Gaus
(spelled “Gauss” in Daniell‟s article) before they would consider its admissibility.25
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During von Ribbentrop‟s defense, the former foreign minister also referred to this
agreement calling on his former secretary, Marguerite Blank, to confirm its existence.26
In the article, the newspaper speculated that, by referring to the agreement, Ribbentrop‟s
defense had hoped to cause dissension among the Allies. Although The Times never
reported it, the tribunal did allow the reading of the Gaus affidavit and entered it into the
official record on 1 April. However, it did report on additional testimony by Baron Ernst
von Weizsäcker, a former foreign office secretary who confirmed the existence of the
secret agreement.27 While none of the articles reported that Hess, Ribbentrop, or their
witnesses accused the Soviet Union of conducting itself in the same fashion as Germany
had, the implication was clear.
In late May, during Raeder‟s defense, his attorney, Walter Siemers, also raised the
issue of tu quoque. Responding to the charge that, in their capacity as commander of the
German Navy, Raeder and Dönitz had authorized unrestricted submarine warfare,
Siemers introduced an affidavit signed by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The Times
reported that the affidavit detailed the methods used by American submarines in the
Pacific. Using the affidavit, Siemers argued that Germany‟s conduct with respect to
submarine warfare was consistent with that of the United States.28 Later, the newspaper
reported that, under cross-examination for his role in distributing Hitler‟s “commando
order,” Jodl had suggested that the Allies had committed similar atrocities.29
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As May turned to June and the individual defenses continued, The New York Times
published another article that contained praise for the trial. Willis Smith, the president of
the American Bar Association (ABA), speaking before the New York chapter, declared
that the trial had the full support of the ABA. In his remarks, Smith asserted that most
countries, including Germany, recognized as criminal the charges presented at
Nuremberg. Referring to the legality of count two, Smith contended that the KelloggBriand Pact had provided for its foundation.30
Harkening back to Jodl‟s allegations, beginning on 2 July The Times published
several articles describing the defense‟s objection to the Soviet allegation that German
soldiers had massacred 11,000 Polish nationals in the Katyn Forest. The newspaper
reported that German Colonel Friedrich Ahrens had testified that a commission
comprised of members of Axis satellite states investigating the massacre had determined
it had occurred no later than the spring of 1940 while Soviet forces still occupied the
eastern half of Poland. The article stated further that the commission had based its
findings on interviews with the local populace, examinations of the bodies, and various
documents found with them.31 The following day, another article noted that the Soviet
prosecutors had presented a former member of the commission, M.A. Markov, who cast
doubt on the validity of Ahrens testimony. Markov, a Bulgarian, testified that the
commission had reached its conclusion under duress due to the abnormal presence of
Wehrmacht personnel. Markov also testified that the commission consisted entirely of
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“members from other satellite countries.”32 The article did not refer to Bulgaria itself
being in the Soviet sphere of influence.
Over the next month, The Times’ coverage of the trial lessoned somewhat as the
defense summations began, followed by those of the prosecution. Although the
organizations‟ defense had yet to begin, observers of the trial could see its conclusion and
many were pleased with its potential outcome. In the newspaper‟s 10 July edition, a
consultant to the American prosecution team, Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, marveled at the
quantity of captured documents the prosecution had entered on its behalf, observing that
“[t]he German passion for writing things down in great detail operated this time for
humanity.”33 Serving as both the vice-president of Georgetown University and regent of
its School of Foreign Service, Walsh, a Jesuit priest, also commended Jackson for his
performance during the trial, noting that his presentations would “rank with the great
state papers of American history.”34
Jackson‟s summation of the conspiracy case against the defendants began on 26 July
and the following day news of the speech found its way onto the front page of The Times.
In the article, continued on page five, Jackson alleged that, while the defendants had
encouraged Hitler and provided him with the tools in which to pursue his aims, none tried
to stop Hitler, despite their later protests to the contrary. After Jackson had finished, the
article mentioned, British prosecutor Shawcross began his summary of the aggressive war
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case.35 In addition, The Times printed excerpts from Jackson‟s summation on page five.
In it, Jackson rebuked the defendants‟ challenges to the trial and asked the tribunal to
ignore the conditions that led to the rise of Nazism (referring to the defendants‟ usage of
the threat of communism and the humiliation inflicted by the Treaty of Versailles in
justifying their actions). He asked that they focus instead on the crimes committed by the
accused, many for material rather than ideological gain. Singling out Göring, Jackson
described the former fighter ace as a “half militarist and half gangster. . . . [who] stuck a
pudgy finger in every pie.”36
Until the announcement of the verdicts in late September, articles pertaining to the
defense of the indicted organizations, the final pleas of the defendants, and both parties‟
closing statements did not generate any new issues or reveal any additional bias in the
reporting of The Times. However, the newspaper‟s predisposition towards the trial had
been evident since its inception the previous August. Yet this was not the blind support
of a zealot wedded to the tribunal‟s precepts regardless of their foundation. The positions
endorsed by The New York Times were as complicated as the issues it had reported on.
On its editorial page, The New York Times remained firm in its support of the IMT
but, as the newspaper generally had in its reporting, tempered that support by
acknowledging its flaws before and during the trial. For example, in its 9 August edition,
the paper fully acknowledged that the prosecution of the Axis leaders under count two
would be ex post facto. Nonetheless, the editorial contended that, at some point, the
international community must establish a standard and the offenses of the Third Reich
were so egregious that few could argue that they should go unpunished. If critics called it
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victors‟ justice, then so be it. As the creation of the IMT represented a bold innovation in
international law, The Times admitted there existed potential for abuse. To prevent such
misuse, the paper argued, the fairness of the trial had to be beyond reproach, lest it
alienate the world at large and set a dangerous precedent for future trials.37
The paper reaffirmed its stance in another editorial published in October. Responding
to allegations that the trial represented victor‟s justice, the newspaper conceded that
without the Allied victory the establishment of the tribunal would not have been possible
and, as such, the trial was inherently political. However, it warned again that the public
would reject the legitimacy of the proceedings if it believed that the defendants‟ guilt
stemmed only from having lost the war, rather than from their role in committing one or
more of the crimes levied against them. In addition, the editorial argued that, with
respect to the newly created United Nations‟ role as a global peacekeeper, the tribunal
should determine for future reference, albeit cautiously, under what conditions a nation
could legitimately go to war and what constituted aggressive war.38
The Times published a third editorial to coincide with the release of IMT‟s official
indictment on 19 October. While offering a reaffirmation of the paper‟s early position
favoring the trial, it confirmed that, after an examination of the charges laid out in the
indictment, any verdicts the tribunal rendered would meet humanity‟s approval. Yet, in
its language, The Times drifted away from the analytical tone of its earlier editorials. As
addressed in chapter two, the editorial questioned the degree of guilt possessed by Keitel
and the other Wehrmacht officers named in the indictment compared to that of Göring
and his ilk. In doing so, the editorial referred to several defendants as butchers and stated
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clearly that none of the defendants deserved the presumption of innocence fundamental to
Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, as their crimes had been so hideous and notorious.39
On 21 November, one day after the trial began, The Times recognized the tribunal‟s
uniqueness as it had in previous editorials, but provided rationalization for its creation yet
unseen on its pages. The seminal newspaper‟s editorial citied the evolution of English
Common Law and its inherent pragmatic nature, a rationale once argued inside the war
department during the development of the Bernays Plan. Invoking the triumphs once
held in ancient Rome, the editorial advised its readers that, while assured in the guilt of
the accused and the penalty they would ultimately pay, the tribunal had to conduct itself
with fairness and treat those in the dock as individuals rather than vanquished barbarians
of antiquity. It warned that failure to do so would result in unscrupulous nations using
the precedents set forth by the trial as justification for their malevolence in the future.40
While cosmetically different, this continued a pattern established several months earlier
in which The Times tempered its support for the trial with its recognition of the risk that
might arise from abusing the principles established by the trial. However, in the opinion
of the Gotham standard-bearer, the rewards gained from the tribunal‟s formation
overshadowed its potential shortcomings. Several days later, The Times repeated this
statement but predicted that such idealism would flourish only if “the nations now sitting
in judgment live up to the stern code by which they, as victors, condemn[ed] the
vanquished.”41
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Once the trial was under way, the editorials published in the newspaper did little to
detract from its view that the trial would prove beneficial to humanity. This is not to say
that The Times ignored challenges to its basic position. Quite the contrary, for on 6
December the paper‟s editors chastised Justice Jackson for the offhanded fashion in
which he had dismissed the accusations made in the Army and Navy Journal that the
indictment of the German General Staff and High Command would discredit the military
profession and deter American officers from seeking high rank. The editorial surmised
that the inclusion of the military in the indictment weakened the prosecution‟s case
because of its implication of the collective guilt of a legal organization. In closing, the
editorial reminded its readers that the prosecution and tribunal served in different
capacities and that Jackson‟s views did not necessarily represent those held by the
court.42
However, in March, when the prosecution concluded its case against the individual
defendants, the newspaper was noticeably silent regarding its earlier denunciation of the
German General Staff and High Command‟s inclusion in the indictment. Rather, an
editorial cited the damning evidence of the Reich’s crimes and noted that such atrocities
would not have been possible without the willing subordinates found within all six of the
indicted organizations. Furthermore, the editorial declared that the conviction of the
various organizations, including the German General Staff and High Command, would
streamline future trials and ensure the prosecution of secondary leaders guilty of similar
crimes.43
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With some minor exceptions, the editorial page of The New York Times offered little
in the way of commentary until the prosecution‟s closing statements made in late July
1946. In its 27 July edition, the newspaper lamented that attention towards the trial had
waned due to its own excessive duration and the emergence of other pressing global
issues. However, it argued that the havoc wreaked by the Nazi war machine lay at the
root of many of the world‟s current problems and that the lengthiness of the trial reflected
the tribunal‟s efforts to document the accuseds‟ crimes thoroughly. In conclusion, the
editorial predicted that the verdicts would likely be as just as the trial had been fair given
that the defendants had received, quoting Britain‟s chief prosecutor Sir Hartley
Shawcross, “the kind of trial . . . they never gave to any man.”44
In September, as the members of the tribunal deliberated on the fate of the
defendants, The Times published two more editorials praising the trial‟s fairness and its
benefits for humanity. The first repeated the opinion voiced in the editorial of 27 July
that the trial‟s length stemmed from the prosecution‟s thoroughness in documenting the
evidence and the tribunal‟s consideration for the defense. In addition, the editorial
rejoiced at the prospect that the tribunal‟s verdict would establish the illegality of
aggressive war based on “historic and irrefutable evidence.”45 The second editorial,
published the day before the tribunal issued its first verdicts, echoed the sentiments of the
former and argued that further significance lay in the fact that the Allied prosecution had
acted in complete harmony during the trial‟s duration adding more weight to its historical
importance.46
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Over the course of the trial, The New York Times’ editorial page heard from other
voices regarding the IMT and the issues presented by the proceedings. After the
prosecution showed the tribunal a film on 29 November detailing the horrors of the Third
Reich, another of the newspaper‟s foreign correspondents recounted what she had
witnessed during the screening. In her opinion piece, Anne O‟Hare McCormick
described the defendants‟ reactions to the footage: shame, regret, indifference, and, in
the case of Göring, interest. Their responses prompted the author to lament that there
were not more Germans in attendance during the viewing, observing that the trial was
receiving more attention in New York than in Nuremberg itself. To rectify this,
McCormick proposed that the Allies do more to publicize the trial among Germany‟s
own citizenry, thus raising Germans‟ awareness of the crimes committed by their former
leaders against both the Reich and the world at large. She concluded, as had the
newspaper, that a failure to do so would lessen the trial‟s intended effects.47
While The Times supported the international court, opinions differed among its
readers. That the newspaper would publish letters critical of its position, such as the
Rheinstrom letter mentioned in the previous chapter, reinforces the earlier contention that
it strove to present an evenhanded chronicle of the events occurring at Nuremberg, rather
than just disseminate propaganda in favor of the tribunal. While often repetitive, many of
the letters offer unique perspectives on the trial, deriving perhaps from their authors‟
occupations, gender, or the nature of the arguments presented.
For example, one letter published in early August 1945 was cautious in its support for
the trial. The author, retired Judge Paul Thatcher of Ogden, Utah, echoed the arguments
against establishing the tribunal, including charging individuals for violations of the
47
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state, the tentative basis by which the Kellogg-Briand Pact served as precedent for count
two, and the treaty‟s lack of a punitive clause for those who violated it. However,
Thatcher did assert, as The Times would periodically, that despite its potential for abuse,
the tribunal offered the best chance for establishing “world justice and peace.”48
Countering the position of Thatcher and The Times, a former judge advocate and
intelligence officer in the 82nd Airborne, Karl Price, asserted that, even if the KelloggBriand Pact had made war an international crime, it contained no provisions for
punishing the individual leaders of the aggressor state. In addition to the “crimes” being
applied retroactively, the author argued that punishing the leaders of a defeated nation,
aggressor or not, set a dangerous precedent despite the noblest intentions of the IMT.
Price claimed that victorious nations would never allow the prosecution of their own
leaders for engaging in wars of aggression and rightly pointed out that the Allies did not
prosecute one of their own for violating the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Invoking an argument
also found in the editorials of the Chicago Daily Tribune, Price noted that the Soviet
Union had invaded Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states even though the communist
monolith had also been a signatory to the treaty. Furthermore, he argued that, fearful of
postwar prosecution, nations would cast aside the rules of conventional warfare resulting
in greater atrocities. Price concluded that the discrepancy in its application and the
restraints the criminalization of aggressive war would place on international relations,
both peaceful and bellicose, Price concluded, would render the precedents created by the
trial impotent before they were even established.49
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While male readers generated most of the letters published in The Times, its female
readers contributed to the debate as well. In response to the newspaper‟s 6 December
chastisement of Jackson over the indictment of the German General Staff and High
Command, Miriam Stuart, who identified herself as the executive secretary of the Society
for the Prevention of World War III, emphasized that the indicted organization‟s
representatives faced prosecution for their conduct and not because of their chosen
profession. Passionate in her phrasing, Stuart seems shortsighted and legalistically
obtuse in two aspects of her letter. Both aspects echo Jackson‟s confidence in that they
declare that American soldiers need not fear similar repercussions and that the accused
were guilty “by every standard of law and morality, Anglo-Saxon or otherwise.”50
As the trial progressed, the public‟s interest in the Trial of the Major War Criminals
seems to have waned, as letters concerning the proceedings did not appear in print again
until June. During the defense phase of the trial, The Times published a letter unusual in
that, unlike those discussed previously, it mirrored the newspaper‟s equitable treatment of
the proceedings. Serving as both the secretary of the American Society of International
Law and the editor of the American Journal of International Law, legal scholar Pitman
Potter argued that, while the tribunal‟s treatment of the accused during the course of the
trial had been exemplary, the IMT‟s deficiency lay within its composition. He
questioned the Allies‟ declaration that the scope of the war made the selection of judges
from neutral countries nigh impossible. That the IMT consisted of Germany‟s
conquerors, Potter continued, tainted the proceedings in the eyes of Germans regardless
of the tribunal‟s actual conduct. Conceding willingly the validity of count three and the
denial of respondeat superior as a primary defense, Potter asserted that prosecution under
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the other three counts was indeed retroactive, as was the contention that individuals were
accountable for the actions of the state. He suggested that it would have been better had
the Allies charged the accused only under count three. Given that the circumstances
made such a limited prosecution impractical, Potter suggested that the global community
recognize the tribunal as an aberration in international criminal law, albeit a noble one,
rather than an innovation establishing precedent.51
Potter‟s examination of the tribunal‟s legality and potential legacy generated a
response significant for its source rather than its content. Its author, Lord Robert Wright,
the chair of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, justified the legal foundation of
the four counts by citing the Kellogg-Briand Pact (referred to as the Pact of Paris in his
letter) and the Hague and Geneva Conventions, just as Jackson and the other architects
had during the drafting of the London Charter. In a circular argument, Lord Wright
contended that counts two and four were not ex post facto because the IMT‟s charter had
declared them to be in accordance with international law created by the agreements listed
above. He did not address whether the Kellogg-Briand Pact and latter two treaties
actually had done so.52 With one exception, a letter contradicting Justice Jackson by
asserting that Germany‟s preparation for aggressive war had predated the Nazi regime,
The New York Times did not publish any more correspondence from its readers
concerning the trial until October after the tribunal had issued its verdicts.
The Washington Post
Further down the eastern seaboard, The Washington Post reported on the Trial of the
Major War Criminals with slightly less zeal. The newspaper cobbled together most of its
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articles from wire services, so that many lacked the detail or perspective found in The
Times. Often The Post’s reporting of the trial was similar to that of The Times, such as
the paper‟s account of the trial‟s commencement. Although The Post’s article made no
mention of the absent prosecutors, it did describe the seating arrangement of the
defendants and their appearance, using derogatory terms to describe Göring, Funk, and
Schacht.53 The following day, in its edition of 22 November, the newspaper also printed
the same excerpts from Justice Jackson‟s address as those found in The Times.54 Also
diverging from the New York newspaper in its coverage, while another article recapping
the day‟s events referred to the motion filed by the defense questioning the legal standing
of the tribunal, The Post did not publish the actual motion nor did it publish the
statements of Göring and Rosenberg.55
Unlike The Times, The Post seldom published articles that indicated approval or
disapproval of the prosecution‟s performance or the tribunal itself. However, one early
exception occurred just prior to the holiday recess. The newspaper reported that the
tribunal had admonished the American prosecutors during their presentation of evidence
against the Nazi leadership corps and the Reich Cabinet. The article noted that the
tribunal had questioned the extent to which the subordinate levels of the Nazi leadership
(assumedly the Ortsgruppenleiters and lower) knew about the alleged conspiracy.
Concerning the evidence presented against the Reich Cabinet, the tribunal president, Sir
Geoffrey Lawrence, found it to be redundant while Francis Biddle, the American
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representative on the tribunal, remarked that the information presented did not prove
criminality. The article did note briefly that indictment of the organizations was a
contentious issue, but did not elaborate on why.56 While the previous article might have
cast the prosecution in a poor light, on 10 February The Post ran the same article found in
The New York Times in which officials from the State Department and Department of
Justice praised the trial and its contribution toward world peace.57
During the defense phase of the trial, the articles found in The Washington Post
differed rarely from those in The Times. On several occasions though, the former
contained information not found in the Gotham standard. For example, The Post credited
correctly Dönitz‟s attorney, Otto Kranzbuhler, with pursuing Nimitz as a witness and
proposing that the defense obtain an affidavit rather than have the admiral appear in
person.58 Ribbentrop‟s testimony concerning Germany‟s secret agreement with the
Soviet Union also received far greater attention in The Post than it did in The Times. One
article cited Ribbentrop‟s own testimony that a fundamental tenet of the nonaggression
pact had been an “agreement to define sphere[s] which came about in a secret
agreement.”59 A second article reported further testimony from Ribbentrop in which he
described the partition of Poland as well as failed negotiations with the Soviets to do the
same with the Balkans and Scandinavia.60 More than a month later, The Post, like The
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New York Times, reported the allegations made against the Soviets in Wiezsäcker‟s
testimony.61
In other instances, The Washington Post did not report on or omitted information
deemed newsworthy in other publications. The incident on 18 March during the crossexamination of Göring provides one such example. Although it had received scant
attention in The Times, news of Jackson‟s confrontation with the Reichsmarschall and the
subsequent action by the tribunal did not find its way onto the pages of The Post at all.
The newspaper published only one report of the Katyn Forest controversy. The majority
of the article focused on Markov‟s testimony and did not mention the evidence that
pointed toward the Soviet Union‟s involvement in the massacre, only that Germany had
accused them of the slaughter.62
In most instances, The Post’s reporting on the trial was consistent with that of The
Times as both relied heavily on news services for their information. If one examined only
the articles published in The Post, one would be hard-pressed to find any evidence that
debates concerning the trial existed. However, over the course of the trial, The Post
provided its readers with regular and syndicated columnists who, albeit infrequently,
supplemented the information found in the news section.
In addressing the legality of the tribunal, the paper‟s foreign policy columnist Barnet
Nover likened the IMT‟s creation to that of the American colonies separation from
Britain. No statue authorized the action, he reasoned, independence arose from the
colonists exercise of their natural rights. As such, humanity‟s outrage justified the
creation of the tribunal and the penalties it might impose. Written after the prosecution
61
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had released the indictment, the author contended that the document made clear the guilt
of the defendants, the organizations, and the Nazi regime as a whole. Nover concluded
by thanking Jackson and the other prosecutors for establishing a precedent that
criminalized war.63
Following Jackson‟s opening address; Nover reflected that the trial would lay bare the
Nazi regime to German citizens and the world at large. In addition, the columnist refuted
the notion that the trial represented victor‟s justice citing Jackson‟s declaration that the
war had left few parties truly neutral, and the Allies could not leave a defeated Germany
to judge itself. In discussing the legality of count two, Nover labeled the debate hollow
as the accused had committed such heinous acts during the war itself. Finally, he
invoked Jackson again in addressing the trying of individuals for crimes of the state,
citing that “[c]rimes always are committed only by persons.”64 While Nover would not
dedicate another column to the trial until after it had concluded, his affinity for Jackson
was apparent.
The Post featured another supporter of the trial, the renowned Walter Lippmann.
Like Nover, Lippmann also celebrated Justice Jackson in his nationally syndicated
column, Today and Tomorrow. In a column ran in late October 1945, Lippmann
introduced his readers to the trial, explaining the concept of ex post facto and how it
might apply to the charge of planning and waging aggressive war. However, he argued
that, because the Allies had charged Göring, Hess, and the other defendents with offenses
deemed criminal under the laws of most nations (murder, looting, etc), the accused could
not escape punishment simply because those crimes were committed during a time of
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war. Lippmann asserted that because the accuseds‟ guilt was so great their protection
under the principle of ex post facto would be a gross affront both to those it was meant to
protect and to justice in general. Finally, Lippmann conceded that, taken by itself, the
violation of treaties detailed in count two might not be enough to warrant prosecution.
However, coupled with the other atrocities detailed in counts three and four, Lippmann
argued, “the whole record of these men [must] . . . be established.”65 Like Nover,
Lippmann would not write about the trial again until after the tribunal had rendered its
verdicts.
The Washington Post proved equal to The Times in the editorials it generated in
support of the trial, although The Post printed most before the trial had even commenced.
The newspaper acknowledged in a 10 August editorial that the criminalization of
aggressive war and the prosecution of a nation‟s agents in both its initiation and in the
commission of other offenses strayed from established international law. However, it did
not deem such innovations as an affront to western legal concepts. Rather, The Post
viewed the establishment of the IMT as necessary in reinforcing the United Nations
Charter and contributing to global peace. Liberally citing both the London Charter and
Justice Jackson, the editorial outlined counts two through four and lamented that
accusations of victor‟s justice would be unavoidable due to the inherent conditions
surrounding the trial.66 A second editorial published in September blamed the United
States and the world at large for their failure to codify what The Post called “war crimes”
following the First World War. Here, the newspaper‟s accusation toward the
international community likely did not refer to “war crimes” as defined in count three of
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the indictment, as precedent had been clearly set by the Second Hague Convention and
the Geneva Protocol. Rather, it most likely referred to count two, crimes against peace,
based on the failure of the Kellogg-Briand Pact‟s signatories to install a means of
punishment for its violation. It stated that while it was regrettable the IMT lacked
precedent, the three divergent legal systems of the Allies necessitated “compromises and
innovations.”67
Several other editorials followed before the commencement of the trial,
overwhelmingly favoring the trial or at least American participation. One commended
President Truman for his selection of former Attorney General Francis Biddle and
Federal Judge Robert Parker of North Carolina as the American representatives on the
tribunal.68 Another criticized the other three powers for their tardiness in naming
members of the tribunal and assembling their prosecution teams.69 After the publication
of the indictment, The Post recoiled in shock at the allegations found therein. Noting that
some opposed the trial because no precedent existed for its creation, the newspaper
responded that never before had there been anything comparable to the Nazi conspiracy
and the crimes it had generated. In conclusion, the editorial expressed its admiration for
Jackson and the other prosecutors, as well as its hope that the tribunal would conduct
itself with dignity and fairness.70
Preliminary editorials notwithstanding, commentary from The Post’s editorial board
during the duration of the trial was sporadic at best. Commenting on Jackson‟s opening
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statement, the newspaper published an editorial that contained many of the same points
Nover cited in his column of 24 November. Expanding on the theme of individual
responsibility, The Post cited Jackson‟s demand that the accused “not take refuge in
superior orders.”71 The newspaper‟s endorsement of Jackson seemed to extend into the
spring. Just as it had not reported on the justice‟s frustrating cross-examination of
Göring, The Post ignored it in an editorial denouncing the Reichsmarschall’s
performance during his defense. The only indication the editorial gave of Göring‟s
tenacity and potency as an adversary was their description of his pretentiousness and his
self-identification as a loyal acolyte of the Führer’s.72
Deep into the proceedings, as the tribunal heard the individual defenses, in a special
editorial to The Post Alan Barth commented on both the trial‟s length and its procedure.
He conceded that the almost endless stream of documentation submitted by the
prosecution during the four months of the trial and their translation did create monotony
inside the courtroom and contributed to disinterest without. However, Barth suggested to
his readers that had the prosecution relied predominately on witnesses, the defense would
have accused them of bias, embellishment, or, if they had been victims of the accused,
spite. He also reminded them that the accused had been in custody for less than a year
and, even though the trial likely would continue for another five months, its length would
prove trivial if it resulted in a “precedent and a procedure by which international
criminals may be brought to justice.”73 Barth‟s editorial represented the last published by
The Post until October.
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From August 1945 to September 1946, the only real criticism of the trial found in the
newspaper came from one of its readers. In his letter to The Washington Post, Wesley M.
Bagby of North Carolina questioned the legitimacy of international law as a concept,
noting that it existed at the whim of voluntary states. He went on to suggest that when
passions subsided, America would look back on the trial in shame, due to the retroactive
criminalization of count two. He also suggested that a German or Japanese citizen could
look dispassionately at the Allies‟ conduct during and after the war and assert that they
too had committed war crimes.74 Neither the paper‟s editors nor its readers responded to
Bagby‟s letter.
Los Angeles Times
Across the continent, the Los Angeles Times presented a neutral tone in its actual
reporting, much as The Post had done. With the exception of the 21 October article
reporting Ley‟s protest discussed in the previous chapter, the newspaper rarely addressed
the concerns associated with the charges and the tribunal itself once the trial actually
began. Its report of the trial‟s commencement made headlines on 21 November and, as it
had utilized the same AP report as The Post, echoed many of the observations found in
the latter article, as well as those found in Kathleen McLaughlin‟s piece. The LA Times’
article elaborated that Hess suffered from stomach cramps yet remained in the dock but
that physicians had sedated Ribbentrop after he had collapsed and subsequently removed
him from the courtroom. In addition, it reported that prosecutors had read the indictment
against Kaltenbrunner despite his absence in the dock as the former RSHA chief had
suffered a cerebral hemorrhage two days prior. As had The Post, the LA Times noted that
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Streicher appeared indifferent to the proceedings except to mock Göring as the former
Reichsmarschall listened while prosecutors read his indictment.75
The LA Times provided a similar portrait of the defendants as that published in The
Post, albeit one that was less inflammatory. Not found in either The Post or The Times,
the article‟s author, Frederick C. Oechsner, was not even a correspondent for the
California paper. As the manager of the United Press‟s Central European office,
Oechsner had interacted with the accused during the height of the Third Reich.
Juxtaposed with their former selves, Oechsner described the defendants as tired,
frightened, and sallow, remnants of a nightmarish regime now reduced to actors on a
morbid stage.76
On the second day of the trial, the LA Times diverged from the coverage of the
previous newspapers in that it chose not to print substantial portions of Jackson‟s address.
However, like The Post, the LA newspaper ignored the statements of Göring and
Rosenberg but did refer to the defense‟s motion challenging the tribunal‟s standing.77 As
seen above, the LA Times’ reliance on the wire services produced many articles that
mirrored those found in the eastern newspapers. On occasion, however, articles credited
to the new services appeared exclusively in the LA Times. Months before either The New
York Times or The Washington Post printed any reference to the defense‟s introduction of
the Katyn Forest massacre; the LA Times reported that Dr. Stahmer had asked the tribunal
to allow him to call one Oberrleutnant Arnes as a witness for Hermann Göring. The
article mentioned that Stahmer had argued that Arnes‟s testimony would refute the
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accusations levied against the Wehrmacht over its alleged role in the massacre.78 While
the newspaper did not publish a follow up article revealing the tribunal‟s decision, it
would be July before The Times or The Post addressed the issue of responsibility for the
events that occurred in the Katyn Forest.
In relation to Göring‟s defense, while the LA Times covered it well, it too did not
present the Reichsmarschall’s performance as an embarrassment for Jackson and the
prosecution. The newspaper described Göring‟s conduct as candid, truculent, and
defiant.79 Its description of Jackson invoked images of a stern schoolmaster disciplining
a recalcitrant troublemaker, remarking that the justice had given his adversary a “tongue
lashing.”80 Also in line with the other publications, the LA Times’ coverage of the
defenses of Ribbentrop and Hess and the subsequent revelation of the nonaggression
pact‟s so-called “secret protocol” did not reveal any new information. During the defense
of Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, however, no article mentioning the Nimitz affidavit
appeared in the LA Times.
Although little bias surfaced in its actual reporting, it did arise in the columns of the
LA Times’ feature writers in the days leading up to the trial. Mentioned in the previous
chapter, Raymond Moley was one of several who supported the trial and, at least in his
article of 4 September, raised the issue of trying officers for crimes of the state.81
Lacking any pretense of solemnity, Ed Ainsworth‟s flippant column, “As You Might
Say,” joked that Ribbentrop‟s headache would pale in comparison to the neck ache he
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would soon receive.82 Unlike Ainsworth, other writers actually addressed the issues
associated with the forthcoming trial, even if they did so in a biased fashion. In early
September 1945, Bill Henry acknowledged in his column “By The Way” that the world
community had never agreed that planning and waging aggressive war was a crime.
However, he assured his readers that “convicting the Germans would be a cinch.”83
Once the trial had commenced, columns discussing the proceedings seldom appeared
in the LA Times. One exception was an analysis and opinion piece by a writer identified
only as Polyzoides. In his article, he stressed the significance of the tribunal and, more
important, the unity of its architects. The dissolution of their alliance, he predicted,
would result in a catastrophe that would dwarf the prior war. In relation, responding to
the argument that the tribunal was merely an exercise in victor‟s justice, since it consisted
only of representatives chosen by the Allies, Polyzoides maintained that their position
represented a mandate from all of the United Nations. Although the tribunal had little
precedent to guide it, he concluded, the procedures it followed and the verdicts it issued
would establish the foundation of international justice.84
While columnists associated with the LA Times might have supported the trial,
contradictory positions surfaced in the syndicated columns published in the paper. Like
The Post, the LA Times published Lippmann‟s column of late October supporting the
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trial.85 Later, in a column examining the United Nations‟ commitment to collective
security in the Atomic Age, Lippmann cited the trial as the first step towards realizing
that ideal, quoting heavily from Jackson‟s opening address.86
However, months before Lippmann‟s second column, another syndicated columnist
expressed doubts on the significance of the trial. Reviewing Jackson‟s participation at
Nuremberg, Frank R. Kent suggested that Jackson‟s role as chief prosecutor detracted
from his service in the U.S. Supreme Court. An established conservative voice, Kent
implied, albeit indirectly, that the tribunal‟s efforts to convey fairness towards the
defendants had not resonated with the German people. In an apparent shot at the Soviet
Union, Kent concluded that the trial‟s objectives were “not fully appreciated by the
people of this country, not understood by the Germans and not admired by our allies.”87
The LA Times did not exhibit such variance in its editorials. Like its eastern brethren,
the newspaper favored the trial. However, unlike The Times and The Post, the LA Times
adopted a decidedly emotional tone on its editorial page, often dismissive of the trial‟s
critics. In an editorial from its 1 August edition, the paper noted that wrangling over the
particulars of procedure and precedent paled in comparison to the need for retribution. It
went on to state that treaties between nations meant little until the world recognized the
criminality of war and punished those who initiated it. Furthermore, failure to prosecute
war criminals would cripple the newly formed United Nations.88 Later, a second editorial
defended both delays in the commencement of the trial and Jackson‟s response to its
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critics. The LA Times seemed to affirm the contention that the Kellogg-Briand Pact
indeed outlawed warfare as a diplomatic tool and, thus, accusations of ex post facto did
not apply. In addition, the IMT‟s denial of respondeat superior as a legal defense
aroused little sympathy. The editorial‟s author argued that, even if the IMT allowed the
use of respondeat superior and dismissed count two, it would be of little consequence for
the defendants. Without offering specifics, the editorial contended that Göring, Hess, and
the others would “have to answer for other crimes beyond number that shocked and
sickened mankind.”89 Published on the day the trial opened, another editorial reaffirmed
the trial‟s necessity as both a deterrent for future aggressors and a medium through which
to impress upon the German people the extent of their former leaders‟ guilt.90 The final
editorial published in 1945 by the LA Times endorsed the trial but predicted the
resurrection of German nationalism if the trial became “a farce . . . [or] snarled in
technicalities and intricate legalism.”91 After it had offered the previous opinions, the
newspaper‟s editorial board refrained from commenting on the proceedings until the
following autumn.
Commentary did not cease entirely as, on one occasion, an item appeared in the
newspaper that shifted attention away from the general issues of the trial to the specific
and, in one case, the personal. Unique to the Los Angeles Times, the newspaper
published a guest editorial from Austrian-born actor Helmut Dantine in response to Ernst
Kaltenbrunner‟s defense in July. Dantine, a former inmate of the concentration camps
that encircled Vienna, had known the defendant when both had attended the University of
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Vienna, and he had returned recently from attending the trial. In his editorial, the actor
disputed Kaltenbrunner‟s assertion that he was but a minor part of the Nazi leviathan and,
because he was subject to the whims of Himmler, deserving of mercy. Dantine observed
that there were “no small wheels in subversive movements – only big wheels.”92 Dantine
ended his editorial by challenging what he perceived as an apathetic public to reconsider
the importance of the trial.93 Along with the other editorials, features, and syndicated
columns (with the exception of Kent‟s) published in the Los Angeles Times, Dantine‟s
observations indicate that the newspaper was a clear proponent of the trial, even if its
actual reporting did not convey that sentiment.
Chicago Daily Tribune
Of the first three publications, it seems fair to suggest that, given the general absence
of articles that addressed the trial‟s more controversial aspects, The Washington Post and
Los Angeles Times maintained a neutral position towards the trial in their actual
reporting. Using the same scale to determine objectivity, it appears that The New York
Times, while it presented various perspectives on the trial, featured articles that favored
the proceedings. If the preceding statements are true, then one might reasonably suggest
that the Chicago Daily Tribune served as a doppelgänger to The Times. Long an
opponent of the Roosevelt Administration, communism, and “internationalism” in
general, the paper and its owner, Robert R. McCormick, criticized the trial in its reporting
as well as on its editorial page. In fairness to the Tribune, it too published articles that
reflected opposing viewpoints on the trial. However, just as the majority of such articles
printed in The Times cast the trial in a positive light, in the Tribune the reverse was true.
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In several instances after the four powers had announced the creation of the IMT, the
Tribune turned to the city‟s legal community to support its opposition to the tribunal.
Citing a pamphlet published by P.F. Gault, a Chicago attorney and former lieutenant
colonel with the U.S. Army‟s JAG offices, the newspaper contended that the trial violated
the fundamental concepts of the American legal system and was diametrically opposed to
the country‟s values. In addition, it cautioned that the implementation of a mass trial and
the ex post facto criminalization of aggressive warfare reeked of totalitarianism, a not so
subtle jab at the Soviet Union‟s participation in the IMT. Finally, the article warned that,
in the event the United States lost a future war, the victors might use the precedents
established by the trial against American military leaders.94
Several days after the article appeared, the Tribune published another article
questioning the legitimacy of the proposed trial, which again cited Gault. In the article,
Gault stated that an ABA committee formed to examine the question of punishing war
criminals had held that that the trial concept as Jackson had explained it had no
jurisdiction over the accused. Specifically, the committee had declared that no statute or
legal custom existed by which the military or civil courts of one or many nations could
try individuals of another nation for crimes committed in said nation or against its
citizens.95 Although the article did not elaborate on what constituted the aforementioned
crimes, based on the committee‟s opinion it seems reasonable to infer that they were
referring to count four and count one as it related to the commission of crimes against
humanity.
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In September, the Tribune cited once again the opinions of some in the legal
community as the paper reported that a committee organized by the Chicago Bar
Association had opposed the tribunal‟s creation and its jurisdiction in a seven to four
vote. Vague in its wording, the article alleged that the tribunal was born from ex post
facto legislation yet did not explain as to what this actually meant or how the committee
had reached that specific conclusion. It did note that the fourteen-member committee
voted on two questions: was the initiation of aggressive war a punishable offense under
international law prior to 1939 and should a military court have jurisdiction over
violators. The committee answered in the affirmative to the former question by a vote of
eleven to two and voted seven to four against the authority of the tribunal. The article‟s
author, Tribune reporter Orville Dwyer, placed great emphasis on the committee‟s
rejection of the tribunal‟s authority but did not dwell on their recognition of the
legitimacy of count two.96 Obviously, the committee‟s decision was in conflict with the
newspaper‟s position that planning, initiating, or waging an aggressive war was not a
crime prior to the London Charter‟s declaration. However, this revelation did not receive
additional attention in the newspaper.
In the weeks leading up to the trial, the Chicago paper printed two articles by its
foreign correspondent Hal Foust that contrasted the opinions of Maxwell-Fyfe and Justice
Jackson and those of the German lawyers hired to defend the accused. Foust reported
that when asked to respond to the trial‟s critics, Maxwell-Fyfe, assuming a pragmatic
position, declared that the tribunal evolved from treaties that had already declared the
waging of aggressive war a criminal act. The article noted that, building on the words of
his fellow prosecutor, Jackson had asked rhetorically what other options the Allies had
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other than the summary execution of the accused. Jackson reasoned that deviations in
procedure like the trial were necessary in the preservation of world peace. However,
when a reporter had asked Jackson how the tribunal might apply to wars in which the
aggressor was ill defined, he responded that the language of the IMT‟s charter limited its
scope to “European aggressors only.”97
The second Foust article reported that the counsel for the defense protested not only
the application of count two and the indictment of the six organizations but many of the
procedures adopted by the London Charter. More specifically, the article cited the
charter‟s acceptance of count two as a legitimate charge and its denial of respondeat
superior as a valid legal defense as two areas of contention. Furthermore, the article
claimed the defendants were already guilty in the eyes of the world and a criminal court
in Germany or Poland could try them for murder just as easily. Rather, the true purpose
of the conspiracy charge, the article alleged, was to “justify the harsh treatment of all
Germans and the acquisition of German industries and commerce.”98 It is unclear from
the article whether it was Foust or the attorneys interviewed who advocated the latter two
assertions.
Unlike the other three publications examined, the Tribune relegated news of the
trial‟s commencement to page seven, predicting correctly that the defense would
challenge the tribunal‟s legitimacy the following day.99 On that day, Foust‟s article
contained portions of the defense motion and segments of Jackson‟s opening address. In
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addition, the newspaper published fragments of Göring‟s declaration. While the phrasing
differed slightly from that published in The New York Times, the substance of his
statement remained intact.100
As the trial commenced, it appears that Foust infused a certain degree of cynicism
into most of his writings, likely undermining the proceedings in the eyes of his readers.
For example, in December, after the defenses had requested that witnesses from Great
Britain and the United States testify on their clients‟ behalf, the Tribune published
another article by Foust, this one examining the limits of the tribunal‟s jurisdiction and
the conditions under which the witnesses might appear. Assuming some would be
unwilling to testify, Foust speculated that if the tribunal subpoenaed a witness (which the
London Charter had allowed for) then that witness might challenge the tribunal in his
native courts. Although the American prosecution team had stated that the four
signatories of the charter would assist in procuring witnesses, Foust wrote that after
speaking with members of the British and French teams, they conceded that their own
“courts would be reluctant to recognize the jurisdiction of the international tribunal
within their own territories.”101
In its coverage of the trial, even when reporting on the daily events at Nuremberg,
articles published in the Tribune often contained cutting remarks directed towards the
prosecution, the tribunal, or both, regardless of whether the story originated from one of
its correspondents or a news service. For example, when the newspaper printed an article
reporting the tribunal‟s reaction to redundancy in the Americans‟ presentation of
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evidence using the same AP story used by The Post, the Chicago paper ran the story
under the headline “JUDGES HECKLE U.S. LAWYER AT WAR CRIMES TRIAL.”102
When the tribunal declared a recess on 14 January so it could discuss changes in
procedure that would accelerate the trial, Foust described the tribunal as being “enmeshed
in legal novelties of its own invention.103 Foust then construed that any expediency
would come at the expense of the defense, observing that the tribunal was already subject
to criticism.104
In March, Foust continued his critique of the trial, criticizing not only its length but
also the fiscal toll levied on the Allied Control Commission and the shattered German
economy. As Nuremberg fell within the American occupation zone, Foust argued that
the United States shouldered the majority of the financial burden. Aside from asserting
that one million dollars had been spent repairing the Palace of Justice, the reporter did not
provide an exact figure for the trial‟s cost to date. In the article he did contend that, had
German courts tried the defendants, it would have cost ten million dollars less, been less
time consuming, and have exacted the same punishment on the accused.105
During the defense phase, the Tribune was persistent in its criticism of the trial. On
21 March, it framed Jackson‟s cross-examination of Göring in a less than flattering light,
despite using the same AP story that had run in the LA Times the previous day. Utilizing
a similar approach as that applied to the AP article of 19 December, the newspaper
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inserted the subheading “Defeats Justice Jackson in Row Over Testimony” below the title
in an apparent jab at the chief American prosecutor.106
While the newspaper nestled news of the above exchange on page seventeen of the
edition, several days later other testimony that caused some embarrassment for the
prosecution featured prominently in the Tribune. During Hess‟s testimony, news of the
nonaggression pact‟s “secret protocol” landed on the front page of the Chicago paper‟s
26 March edition. In fairness, Raymond Daniell‟s article received similar treatment in
The Times the same day. In the Tribune’s article, written by Hal Foust, several minor
differences surfaced. Foust reported incorrectly that Colonel Yuri Pokrovsky (spelled
“Pocrowski” in the article) rather than Rudenko had objected to Dr. Seidl‟s request to
enter the Gaus‟s affidavit into the record. In addition, he described the agreement as
being between “two dictators. . . . For [the] expansion of the[ir] totalitarian
governments.”107 Finally, the correspondent related that Seidl had withheld a portion of
Hess‟s prepared testimony referring to Great Britain‟s usage of concentration camps
during the Boer War.108 While Foust‟s misidentification of the Soviet prosecutor was
likely an unintentional and cosmetic error, his choice of words when describing Stalin
and the Soviet Union and his inclusion of the omitted Hess testimony in his article appear
to be a deliberate attack on the tribunal‟s co-member, likening the communist state to the
Third Reich.
Surprisingly, the newspaper missed an additional opportunity to attack the Soviet
Union months later. In July, the newspaper virtually ignored the testimony of Colonel
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Ahrens and the defenses‟ allegations that responsibility for the Katyn Forest massacre lay
with the Soviet Union. Rather than publish the initial findings of the international
commission, the newspaper cited only Markov‟s statement that the Germans did not
allow the commission to conduct a thorough examination of the gravesite. The article
itself was less than a third of a column and printed on page fifteen.109 The following day,
the paper printed an article almost identical to the first on page seventeen adding that the
commission had reached its conclusion under duress from German officials.110 In the
realm of tu quoque, Foust‟s comparisons did not appear to extend to the United States, as
during the defenses of Raeder and Dönitz, neither he nor the Chicago Daily Tribune
reported on the Nimitz affidavit.
While the critiques of Foust and the Tribune often centered on the prosecution‟s
performance, the tribunal‟s legitimacy, and the wartime conduct of its member nations,
the newspaper did advance another criticism that went unreported by the other three
publications discussed above. On 28 March the Tribune reported the tribunal‟s decision
restricting the press‟s access to documents presented by the defense until the tribunal had
ruled on their admissibility. Coming on the heels of Rudenko‟s objection to the Gaus
affidavit, Foust penned an article in which he noted that that Pokrovsky had made the
initial request. Paraphrasing the prosecutor, Foust wrote that the Soviet had asked the
tribunal to stem the press‟s access to “irrelevant, dirty, nasty, calumnies by private
individuals against such distinguished personages as President Roosevelt.”111 It seems
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likely that Foust‟s article reflected the sentiments of McCormick, himself long a staunch
proponent of a free press.
In its editorials, the Tribune pontificated on many of the issues reported on by Foust
and remained adamant in its opposition to the trial, seldom conceding that it could benefit
humanity. An editorial published after the London Conference had concluded deemed
the proceedings as legally baseless and prejudicial, as the charge of aggressive war was
retroactive and the creation of the IMT itself violated the Second Hague Convention by
superseding German law.112 Another editorial questioned why Stalin himself was not on
trial, citing the Soviet Union‟s entry into a non-aggression pact with Germany prior to
Hitler‟s attack on Poland in 1939 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of the beleaguered
state.113 President Truman‟s selection of tribunal members generated attention from the
newspaper‟s editorial board as one editorial observed that, as attorney general during the
Roosevelt Administration, Biddle was “a great fellow to make up law as he [went]
along.”114
As the trial commenced, the newspaper‟s editorials intensified. Reiterating its
denouncement of the trial, one editorial agreed that the accused should stand trial for
murder. However, it argued that such trials should occur in established national courts
overseen by judges from neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland. Recalling its
earlier pronouncement that Stalin was guilty of the same crimes with which the Allies
charged the defendants, the Tribune argued further that the Soviet strongman had
sabotaged other countries‟ efforts in stopping Hitler‟s war machine while the
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nonaggression pact was still in effect. Under orders from Stalin, the newspaper
contended, native communists had contributed to the malaise in prewar France and
stymied the flow of American goods to Britain. The editorial also held the French and
British partially responsible for the Reich’s seizure of the Sudetenland and the expansion
that followed. In addition, the Tribune compared Great Britain with the Wehrmacht,
arguing that they currently exercised similar practices, albeit to a lesser degree, against
the populations of Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. The piece predicted that the
trial‟s legacy would be one of “self-righteous hypocrisy.”115 The Tribune repeated its
accusation of hypocrisy in several other editorials throughout the trial. One editorial
questioned the authenticity of the American protest against former Chetnik leader Draja
Mihailovich‟s treatment during his trial in Yugoslavia. The United States, the Tribune
declared, forfeited its moral standing when Jackson signed the London Charter.116 A
final editorial coincided with the closing summations of Jackson and Shawcross,
repeating the accusations the newspaper had made in its editorial of 21 November.117
A week into the trial, the Tribune addressed the military‟s attitude towards the
indictment of the German General Staff and High Command. Citing Frank Mason‟s
article in The Times, the editorial segued into an evaluation of the conspiracy charge and
the concept of institutional guilt, arguing that Jackson‟s trial concept resembled more
closely Nazi procedure rather than American legal traditions. As a precursor to Foust‟s
article of 13 December, the editorial asserted that American courts would deny the
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authority of the IMT if the latter compelled U.S. citizens to testify.118 A few weeks later,
the Tribune linked the debate over the IMT‟s jurisdiction, as well as the New Dealers
who supported it, to a more nefarious objective. The editorial reported that, in a speech
in New York, Connecticut Senator Brian McMahon had broached the subject of whether
the United Nations could “prosecute an individual or group . . . for violations of a nature
which may lead to world insecurity.”119 His words, the editorial asserted, indicated that
McMahon, a former assistant attorney general during the Roosevelt Administration,
concurred with Jackson‟s supposed sentiments that the United Nations superseded the
Constitution of the United States.120
The Tribune’s objections to the tribunal‟s evidentiary procedures surfaced in several
other editorials throughout the spring. In March, after Seidl‟s attempted submission of
the Gaus affidavit and the Pokrovsky request, one editorial contested Jackson‟s
declaration in his opening statement that one of the purposes of the tribunal was to
establish for the historical record the events of the previous decade. That record, the
editorial argued, was incomplete because the tribunal had ruled some of the defense‟s
evidence irrelevant.121 In a later editorial, the publication accused Jackson of only
submitting evidence that condemned the defendants but vindicated the Soviet Union and
Britain.122
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When addressing the motivation behind the indictment of the six organizations and
the prosecutions‟ application of the conspiracy charge, the Tribune treated the
prosecution with suspicion. Despite Jackson‟s assertion that a conviction of the indicted
organizations would not result in an automatic conviction of its members, the newspaper
argued that in subsequent trials the burden of proof would rest with the defense in
contradiction to American legal principles. Thus, the editorial reasoned, the indictment
of a member of an organization already declared criminal by the tribunal would likely
result in a conviction. The real intent of the conspiracy charge, the editorial concluded,
was to assign guilt to the entire German nation.123 The newspaper repeated the previous
allegation in a sanctimonious editorial on Easter Sunday. In it, the Tribune declared that
the proceedings at Nuremberg were so corrupt as to “have gagged Pilate.”124
The newspaper‟s homily, while exaggerated in its prose, does demonstrate well the
position held by McCormick and his publication towards the trial. In keeping with the
scriptural tone of the previous editorial, when compared with the LA Times, The Post, and
The Times, McCormick might have felt like the Prophet Isaiah, that is, a voice in the
wilderness. However, in The Wall Street Journal, the Tribune found an ally, albeit an
ally that seemed less concerned with covering the events at Nuremberg.
The Wall Street Journal
As discussed in the previous chapter, the quantity of coverage provided by The Wall
Street Journal fell far short of the other four publications. On 21 November, the financial
journal published a short blurb on its front page noting simply that the opening day of the
trial consisted of the reading of the indictments by the prosecution and that both Hess and
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Ribbentrop had fallen ill during the proceedings.125 Throughout the remainder of the
trial, The Journal’s coverage was sporadic at best and did not report on the prosecution‟s
performance, the emergence of the nonaggression pact‟s “secret protocol,” or the
disputed culpability for the carnage in the Katyn Forest. When the American prosecutors
asked for a conviction on count one against the indicted organizations, the newspaper did
acknowledge that it represented “the most complicated phase of the Nuernberg
proceedings.”126
Equaling the condemnation found in McCormick‟s newspaper in substance, if not in
frequency or piquancy, The Journal published a denunciation of the trial, as well as the
involvement of the U.S.S.R., in its editorial section. Written by journalist and historian
William Henry Chamberlin, the opinion piece noted correctly that the Soviet Union
would not face repercussions for its invasion of Finland in 1939 and the Baltic States
months later and echoed the Tribune’s contention that there was no precedent for the
trial. However, the article did concede that those who had formulated the aggressive
policies of both Germany and Japan and who had committed atrocities deserved severe
retribution. Yet the injustice of prosecuting whole classes in the process, Chamberlin
argued, would nullify the apt punishment of those truly guilty. The classes referred to by
Chamberlin included industrialists and those whose actions “would be considered
patriotic if performed in the service of the United Nations [re Allies].”127 A bastion of
political conservatism, the financial paper‟s renunciation of the trial comes as no surprise.
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However, unlike the Tribune, The Journal would not publish another editorial pertaining
to the trial until its conclusion the following October.
As the tribunal deliberated on the fates of the twenty-two defendants, the five
publications and the world at large awaited its decision. The eventual verdicts, sentences
passed, executions, and a surprising turn of events would provide further fodder for their
editorials. Such reactions would cement the publications‟ positions towards the
International Military Tribunal and the Trial of the Major War Criminals.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE END . . . AND THEN THE FIREWORKS: REACTIONS TO THE VERDICTS,
SENTENCING, AND PRECENDENTS ESTABLISHED
“I was a little astonished that they found it so easy to deal with a military man. I
should have thought that the military would have provided a special problem.”1 – General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2 October 1946
In the weeks leading up to the tribunal‟s announcement of the verdicts, a blanket of
security had enveloped the Palace of Justice, preventing any premature reports of the
tribunal‟s deliberations. With little to account for save the disposition of the defendants,
the press devoted most of its coverage to reviewing the proceedings and speculating on
the potential fate of the accused and the impact of the verdicts. In an editorial in early
September, the Los Angeles Times observed that the trial‟s prominence on the global
stage had lessened, supplanted instead by the growing tensions among the Allies and the
realignment and reconstruction of the postwar world. While lamenting the public‟s
waning attention, the editorial espoused the belief that the precedents set by the trial
might serve “as a landmark in the progress of civilization.”2 However, two rulings issued
by the tribunal, just days before it was to announce the verdicts, shifted the attention of
the LA Times and its brethren away from such optimistic predictions and back on the
tribunal itself. These announcements generated some attention from the press, although,
in the newspapers examined, coverage of the tribunal‟s declarations was relatively
incongruent. In one publication, reaction to the tribunal‟s declarations, or the lack of a
reaction, raises questions about the newspaper‟s motives. Conversely, another
newspaper‟s reaction to the same decree would reinforce its position toward the IMT.
Coverage of the first of the tribunal‟s rulings, the barring of photographers from the
courtroom during sentencing, was relatively uniform. While The Journal and The Post
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did not publish any news relating to the ban, The Times published its first report on the
ruling on 28 September, noting that the international correspondents‟ committee had
lodged a protest with the tribunal over its decision.3 The following day the paper again
reported on the committee‟s objection as well as an individual protest by the British
correspondents after the tribunal allocated ten of their forty-five seats in the gallery to
members of the German press.4 The Times credited the AP as the source of both articles.
In an article also culled from the AP, the LA Times noted the committee‟s protest.5 Like
the other two newspapers, the Tribune ran a story on the ban attributed to the AP.6
However, the articles in both the LA Times and Tribune contained information
pertaining to the tribunal‟s second ruling that went unreported in The Times. The tribunal
had announced that, as part of the security precautions, either the tribunal itself or the
United States Army would prosecute individuals who leaked information about the
deliberations before the verdicts‟ official release.7 In addition to the Tribune and the LA
Times, The Post also reported on the tribunal‟s gag order.8 As it had with the tribunal‟s
ban on photographers, The Journal chose not to report on the ruling.
It seems odd that The New York Times did not publish any news of the gag order. To
attribute the newspaper‟s omission to mere oversight seems rather naïve given the
quantity of coverage it had devoted to the trial and its aforementioned usage of the AP as
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the source of the two articles mentioned above. However, to suggest the newspaper
withheld news of the ruling so as not to taint the tribunal with the stench of censorship
seems almost equal in its cynicism. As noted in previous chapters, although The Times
often softened the tone of its coverage when reporting instances that cast the tribunal or
the prosecution in an unflattering light (such as it had during the Göring crossexamination), the newspaper had not shied away from addressing the more controversial
aspects of the IMT in its reporting or on its editorial page despite its acknowledged
support of the trial. Without additional information, it falls on the reader to determine if
either line of reasoning contributed to The Times’ lack of coverage regarding the gag
order.
While The Times’ failure (intentional or otherwise) to address the censorship might
have left its readers unsure of the newspaper‟s position on the issue, the Chicago Daily
Tribune’s reaction to the ruling left little doubt. Two days after the Midwestern
publication reported on the gag order, an editorial in the Tribune challenged the tribunal‟s
decrees. This would not be the first time McCormick had opposed censorship. The
publisher had long been an advocate of free speech even that when the views expressed
might have offended his conservative sensibilities. While serving as the chairman of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association‟s Committee on Freedom of the Press,
McCormick, in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Organization, had financed
a successful effort to overturn Minnesota‟s Public Nuisance Law in 1931. The law,
known as “Lommen‟s Gag Law” after its sponsor, had allowed for the suppression of
publications deemed malicious, lewd, or derogatory by Minnesota courts.9
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Given McCormick‟s sentiments and the newspaper‟s position toward the tribunal‟s
suppression of documentary evidence in March, the Tribune‟s opposition to the IMT‟s
announcement is not surprising. The tribunal, the editorial argued, had no authority to
prosecute the correspondents who released such proscribed information or the owners of
the newspapers that published it. Any jurisdiction extended by the tribunal over
American journalists or anyone else, the editorial‟s author contended, would be as
fraudulent as its jurisdiction concerning the accused. To the Tribune, the imposition of
the gag order was the latest example in what had been a long line of specious conduct by
the tribunal (including the aforementioned evidentiary ruling) and rendered the
legitimacy of the upcoming verdicts moot. The editorial concluded by comparing the
methods used by the tribunal to those utilized by Hitler, Stalin, and Tito.10
The same day the Tribune published the editorial discussed above, the tribunal ruled
on the criminality of the six indicted organizations. Given the five-hour difference in
time between Germany and the United States, three of the five newspapers published
accounts of the verdicts the same day the tribunal announced them and each article
featured prominently on the publications‟ front pages. Lagging in its coverage, The
Post’s article did not contain information about the tribunal‟s decision, only an
examination of the tightened security around the Palace of Justice and a description of the
order of the proceedings.11 News of the proceedings would not appear in The Journal
until the following day.
The LA Times provided the most succinct coverage, reporting that, after summarizing
the evidence presented to it, the tribunal announced that it was sufficient to establish that
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multiple conspiracies had existed among the defendants and their affiliated organizations
to constitute a nationwide conspiracy in the planning of aggressive war. Despite a title
that implied that the tribunal had already sentenced the individual defendants, the article
went on to state the tribunal had ruled that the planning and execution of an aggressive
war was indeed illegal and that the Gestapo-SD, SS, and the NSDAP leadership were in
fact criminal organizations and, thus, their former members could face prosecution.
While the tribunal declined to rule on the criminality of the SA, citing its effective
emasculation following the blood purge of 1934, it declared that the Reich Cabinet and
the German General Staff and High Command were not themselves criminal, while
noting that membership in the two organizations did not exempt individuals from
prosecution for individual war crimes.12
As had been common throughout the trial, The Times and Tribune each devoted
considerable space to covering the activities at Nuremberg. Elaborating on the
information found in the LA Times’ article, both publications noted the tribunal‟s
condemnation of the German General Staff and High Command although neither
identified its speaker, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence. Speaking on behalf of the tribunal, the
British jurist stated that, despite its acquittal, members of the organization were “a
disgrace to the honorable profession of arms.”13 In addition to their descriptions of the
tribunal‟s ruling, in the same edition both newspapers published articles that promoted
access for the press to any potential executions ordered by the tribunal. The Tribune
reported that Pennsylvania Congressman Herbert McGlinchey had sent President Truman
a letter protesting the Allied Control Council‟s proposed ban prohibiting correspondents
12
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from attending any executions ordered by the tribunal.14 Likewise, The Times noted that
UP President Hugh Baillie had filed a petition with the American representative on the
control council, General Joseph T. McNarney, requesting that it allow members of the
press to attend such executions.15
On 1 October, The Wall Street Journal published an account of the previous day‟s
proceedings. Brief to the point of being incorrect, The Journal announced that the
tribunal had found four organizations to be non-criminal, listing the German General
Staff and High Command as two separate entities. In addition, the article stated
erroneously that the tribunal had declared only several units of the Gestapo, Elite Guard
(SS) and spy system (SD) criminal rather than the organizations in their entirety. The
article did not refer to the guilt of the Nazi leadership corps. However, The Journal
article did convey the main point desired by Jackson throughout the trial, that the IMT
had ruled that “starting a war . . . [was] „the supreme crime.‟”16
Like The Journal, on 1 October The Washington Post published the tribunal‟s
verdicts as they related to the six indicted organizations. Comparable in its detail to The
Times and the Tribune, The Post’s article also revealed that Keitel, after listening to the
evidentiary summary, had assumed the tribunal would sentence him to death and had
requested an execution by firing squad. Addressing the issue of the press‟s presence at
any potential execution, The Post reported that the Allied Control Council would allow
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two newspaper correspondents from each of the four nations represented on the tribunal
to witness any executions.17
Unlike The Post and The Journal, the articles published in the LA Times, The Times,
and the Tribune on 1 October recounted the individual verdicts, with the latter two
papers‟ headlines announcing the guilt of nineteen of the twenty-two defendants
(including the absent Bormann). Because sentencing occurred separately following the
noon recess, the newspapers reported only the guilt or acquittal of the defendents.
The Tribune’s coverage of the actual verdicts was relatively brief, providing a list of
the individual defendants and their guilt as it related to the individual counts. The
newspaper reported that the tribunal had acquitted Schacht, Von Papen, and Fritzsche
(although German officials would later try and convict each during later denazification
trials). The article also noted that the tribunal had convicted Göring, von Ribbentrop,
Rosenberg, Keitel, Jodl, and von Neurath on all four counts and had found Hess guilty of
counts one and two.18 In addition, a follow up article by Hal Foust reported that the
tribunal‟s ruling had established that in the future political leaders would possess
accountability for the crimes of the state. Foust went on explain that in subsequent trials
the burden of proving one‟s own innocence would rest on the accused, as the tribunal‟s
declaration of criminality of the four organizations had “branded an estimated 400,000
Germans as war criminals.”19
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Given the Tribune’s opposition to the trial, as well as the piquancy of some of Foust‟s
earlier work, the latter assertion seems to suggest that some of the trial‟s repercussions
would stand in stark contrast to the traditional legal principle of an assumption of
innocence. However, in the same edition the Tribune published a short article reflecting
the allayment of what had been one of the newspapers‟ primary concerns. Having
maintained the position that the indictment of the German General Staff and High
Command set a dangerous precedent for military officers in general, the newspaper
reported that the general staff‟s acquittal as an organization had met with approval by
American army officers. The article quoted the deputy chief of the U.S. Army‟s
intelligence division in Europe, Colonel D.F. Fritzsche, who, when expressing his relief
at the tribunal‟s ruling, stated that “„it is encouraging to any staff officer that the court has
not set a precedent under which he might . . . be prosecuted just for doing his job.‟”20
One should note, however, that the acquittal of the German General Staff and High
Command did not eradicate all discussion in the print media about the tribunal‟s
conviction of Keitel, Jodl, and the two admirals. Although Eisenhower‟s coy statement,
found in the opening of this chapter and published in the LA Times as well as The New
York Times, did not articulate the general‟s concerns, just days before the executions The
Post featured a column that alleged that Eisenhower was disturbed by the convictions. A
beltway insider known for his column Washington Merry-Go-Round, Drew Pearson
wrote that Eisenhower believed the verdicts could have negative repercussions in the
event of a future war with the Soviet Union. However, Pearson noted that Washington
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officials had dismissed such fears, stating that the trial had only declared aggressive
warfare illegal.21
In the LA Times, coverage of the verdicts mirrored that of the 1 October Tribune, as
the California paper credited the AP as its article‟s source. The only notable information
found in the newspaper was a supplemental article affirming, as The Post had that same
day, that the Allied Control Council would allow the press access to any executions
forthcoming. The article attributed the control council‟s decision to Baillie‟s appeal.22
The New York Times also reported the control council‟s announcement in its 1
October edition although one could easily overlook it amidst the newspaper‟s articles
devoted to the tribunal‟s ruling and the defendants‟ reactions.23 In its main article, The
Times provided a complete list of the verdicts and included portions of the tribunal‟s
justifications for its decision. The article also contained The Times’ prediction that most,
if not all, of the convicted would likely hang or be shot.24 Specific to a companion piece
written by Dana Schmidt was a passage that asserted that the tribunal‟s verification that
aggressive war was indeed an international crime reflected the evolutionary nature of
international law.25 Finally, The Times published a summary of the tribunal‟s judgment
of the six indicted organizations. The summary included the tribunal‟s rationale when
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considering the credibility of each individual count.26 The AP had originally provided
the condensed report for members of the press, and the text found within came directly
from the trial‟s official record. However, of the five newspapers included in this study,
only The New York Times chose to reprint it in its entirety.
The Times was also the first of the five newspapers to comment on the verdicts on its
editorial page. Characterizing the justice meted out by the tribunal as passionless and in
accordance with the best legal tenets of modernity, the editorial stated that, although
fundamental questions pertaining to the tribunal‟s jurisdiction remained, the verdicts
rendered and their inherent fairness were beyond reproach. Due to the tribunal‟s stance
on the legality of aggressive war, the editorial warned, political leaders would now utilize
belligerency as a method of foreign policy at their own peril. In addition, the editorial
argued that the declaration of criminality against the SS, leadership corps, and GestapoSD did not extend guilt to all of their members, as later tribunals would consider
individual circumstances. The Times concluded its editorial by declaring the tribunal‟s
ruling “a magnificent achievement and a long step toward a new conception of
international justice which makes future peace more secure.”27
The sentences and ensuing dissension from two of the tribunal‟s members provided
additional grist for the New York newspaper. Excluding editorials, nine articles devoted
to the proceedings appeared in The Times’ 2 October edition, including the complete text
of nine of the individual verdicts, excerpts from nine others, and summaries of still
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another four.28 Reporting on the sentences, Kathleen McLaughlin noted that Göring,
Keitel, Jodl, and nine other condemned men (including Bormann, assuming he was ever
located) would hang within fifteen days. However, Hess received a life sentence. In her
article, McLaughlin noted that the Soviet member of the tribunal, Nikitchenko, had
objected to the three acquittals, the exoneration of the German General Staff and High
Command, and Hess‟s sentence, believing that the former Deputy Führer deserved the
ultimate penalty. The tribunal, the article stated, would publish Nikitchenko‟s opinion in
its official record.29 Although unreported in the McLaughlin article, the Soviet alternate
Volchkov joined Nikitchenko in his dissent. Foreign correspondent Anne O‟Hare
McCormick complemented McLaughlin‟s work by providing a narrative on The Times’
editorial page of the sentencing itself. Interspersed with observations on the future
impact of the verdicts, McCormick described the defendents‟ behavior begrudgingly
noting that, without exception, each had conducted himself with dignity.30
The Times also reported that Robert Jackson had joined the Soviets in their dissent.
Specifically, the justice protested the acquittals of Schacht and von Papen, as well as the
absolution of the General Staff and High Command. However, the article asserted that,
despite his professed shock over Schacht‟s acquittal, Jackson had contended the
individual verdicts were secondary to the precedents the trial had established.31
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Accompanying the previous article, the newspaper published Jackson‟s full statement in
its entirety.32
Unique to The Times, the newspaper featured a special opinion piece written by its
military editor, Hanson Baldwin, that appeared alongside its coverage of the sentencing.
Baldwin observed that the acquittals of Schacht, Fritzsche, and von Papen, along with the
tribunal‟s exoneration of the three indicted organizations, had helped legitimize the trial
in the eyes of many of its critics. The conduct of the IMT, he continued, contrasted
favorably with earlier war crimes trials undertaken by the Allies. Baldwin pointed
particularly to the trial and execution of the commander of the Japanese Fourteenth Army
Group, Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Noting that an American military
tribunal had convicted Yamashita in part because of war crimes committed by
subordinates in the Philippines without his authorization or consent, Baldwin wrote that
many in the American military feared the IMT would follow similar procedural rules
after it had indicted the German General Staff and High Command. The organization‟s
absolution and the conduct of the tribunal during the proceedings, Baldwin concluded,
had upheld the concepts of western justice.33 The Times supplemented Baldwin‟s
editorial with another that, while sympathetic to the Soviets‟ dissent, asserted that the
tribunal‟s jurisdiction did not extend to domestic crimes of which Schacht, Fritzsche, and
von Papen were assuredly guilty of committing.34
On 3 October, The Times published another editorial espousing the virtues of the
tribunal and illustrating, at least in its opinion, the precedents set by the trial. Foremost
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among them, the editorial stated, was the illegality of aggressive war and the supreme
jurisdiction the international community now possessed to indict transgressors. While the
editorial conceded that during the recent trial only the vanquished had faced prosecution,
it noted that in the future the international community would hold all nations, including
the IMT‟s designers, to the same standard.35
Unlike The New York Times, the editorial boards of both The Wall Street Journal and
The Washington Post did not opine on the proceedings or the impact of the trial. In fact,
in the days immediately following the trial, their combined coverage paled in comparison
to that of The Times, as both publications condensed their coverage of the verdicts and
the sentencing into two concise articles. Aside from its mention of the Soviets‟
opposition to the acquittals, The Journal article of 2 October did not allude to any other
responses to the proceedings in Nuremberg, be they from individuals or media outlets.
The paper made no mention of Justice Jackson‟s concurrence with the Soviet dissent.
Rather, The Journal’s article provided an outline of the events of 30 September and 1
October without providing a full record of the sentences.36
The Post encapsulated much of the information related in McLaughlin‟s work and
other AP pieces published in The Times, including the acquittals of Schacht, von Papen,
and Fritzsche.37 A day later, the Washington paper published a composite of reactions to
the sentences among the world‟s press. Containing observations from both The Times
and Tribune, The Post’s article related that the international press had a generally
favorable view of the proceedings. Further, the article reported that newspapers in
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addition to Pravda in other countries once under German occupation decried the
acquittals. Such protest, The Post explained, extended beyond areas under Soviet
influence such as Poland. Newspapers in Paris and the three Western military zones in
Berlin also denounced the acquittals. The only exception noted in the article originated
in the Italian publication Il Buonsenso. The Post reported that, in its editorial, Il
Buonsenso portrayed the tribunal members as hypocrites and argued the verdicts
amounted to victor‟s justice. In its description of the Italian paper, The Post asserted that
it had fascist sympathies.38
While editorials commenting on the verdicts never appeared in The Washington Post
during the period examined, Barnet Nover devoted a column to the trial two days after
the tribunal announced the sentences. This would be the last column Nover dedicated to
the war crimes trial and, like the others, presented it in a favorable light. In his column,
Nover agreed with Jackson‟s contention that the tribunal‟s rejection of individual
immunity for the crimes of the state and its criminalization of aggressive warfare as a
diplomatic tool dwarfed the fate of the individual defendents. The foreign policy
columnist praised the work done by the Allied prosecutors and called the trial “a great
landmark in the history of civilization.”39 The praise offered by Nover‟s colleague at The
Post a few weeks later was less grandiose. In an editorial published on the eve of the
executions, Associate Editor Merlo Pusey conceded that the tribunal had conducted itself
appropriately and the verdicts rendered were just. However, Pusey observed that the
London Charter had created only a temporary solution. Because the executive agreement
entered into by its members was impermanent, Pusey suggested that an international
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convention codify the model established at Nuremberg and assign responsibility of future
trials to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.40
On the opposite end of the North American continent, the LA Times’ coverage
relating to the sentencing produced a menagerie of articles that ventured from the
proficient and insightful to the macabre. In its primary coverage, the paper differed
slightly from The Post in that the former did not mention Jackson‟s dissent or discuss
future prosecution against those acquitted.41 However, in a separate article that reported
Jackson‟s contention that the individual verdicts paled in comparison to the precedents
established, the newspaper did note the justice‟s objections.42 Accompanying the former
article, the paper provided its readers with a summary of the defendants‟ charges, the
verdicts, and the sentences passed.43
In the same edition, the LA Times reported that the sentences had met with approval
from the area‟s Jewish community. The article stated that, at a meeting sponsored by the
Jewish Black Book Committee, speakers had called the sentences “„just and fair.‟”44 The
article is remarkable given that, of the five publications examined, only the LA Times
offered reactions from the Jewish-American population. Also notable by its origin, its
implication, and the sensationalism offered by its implications, the newspaper published a
short blurb attributed to the Chicago Tribune Press Service. The article reported that an
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unnamed London company had shipped nooses created especially for the condemned to
Nuremberg. Without citing a source, the article concluded by noting that unidentified
individuals had placed the order before the tribunal had announced the verdicts.45 The
following day, a UP article published in the newspaper reported that the expected British
executioner, Albert Pierrepoint, had returned to London. The article also reported that
the official hangman for the U.S. Army, Master-Sergeant John C. Woods, was “itching to
execute the 11 Nazis.”46
Reaction to the verdicts among the syndicated columnists carried in the newspaper, as
well as its editors and other contributors, was favorable. In his column, Walter Lippmann
applied the verdicts of the tribunal to the present global state rather than focus on the trial
itself. He observed that, while others might launch wars of aggression in the future, the
entire world would hold such transgressors accountable.47 Echoing the previous
sentiments expressed by Lippmann in his column of 2 October, the LA Times editorial
board contended that the precedents established by the tribunal‟s rulings advanced the
cause of peace. Examining the acquittal of Schacht, the editorial observed that the
banker‟s exoneration should not dampen the general feeling of elation surrounding the
convictions of the other nineteen men. Moreover, the editorial concluded by calling the
tribunal‟s judgment “the greatest single accomplishment on the side of civilization since
the war [had] ended.”48
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Polyzoides also weighed in on the acquittals and what he believed were lenient
sentences for some of the convicted. Noting the surrealism of being in concurrence with
the views espoused within the Soviet Union, the author argued that Schacht and von
Papen shared in the guilt of the convicted and should share in their fate. Polyzoides went
on to assert that the prison sentences received by von Schirach and von Neurath were too
lenient. In his conclusion, the author attributed the tribunal‟s mercy to its rejection of
continental legal theory in favor of those espoused by English Common law.49
In the aftermath of the trial, the final commentary published in the LA Times came
from the pen of Raymond Moley. The man who once suggested that Göring would
testify against his fellow Nazis in exchange for a prison sentence wrote two columns for
the newspaper several days apart assessing the American prosecution team‟s
performance, evaluating the trial process, and examining Hjalmar Schacht. Moley‟s
description of Schacht is of little importance save the author‟s portrayal of the former
Reichsbank president as a charlatan who had deceived the tribunal as he had the
international banking community during Germany‟s rearmament in the 1930s.50 In his
evaluation of the prosecution, Moley singled out Jackson and commended the justice for
his performance despite the complexity of the conspiracy case, opposition to the trial
plan, and the trial‟s length and tedium. As to the trial itself, the author addressed two
primary criticisms of the trial: the retroactive nature of count two and the tribunal‟s
deviation from Anglo-American legal principles. Moley asserted that, while ex post facto
applied to the creation of the tribunal, count two was already illegal under the conditions
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Second, Moley noted that the procedures used in the trial
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derived from the London Charter and not from American jurisprudence. In his opinion,
Moley wrote that the defendants “were given all the elements of a fair trial.”51
In his article of 2 October, Tribune correspondent Hal Foust repeated the assertions
made in the LA Times article culled from the Chicago Tribune Press Service. Foust
reported that, in addition to the nooses, the British had allocated twenty executioners for
the task, including Henry Pierrepoint, the father of Albert Pierrepoint and a
septuagenarian described by Foust as “Britain‟s No. 1 hangman.”52 The article also
featured on its front page a report on the previous day‟s proceedings describing in detail
the reactions of Göring, Hess, Keitel, and others to their sentencing. In addition, the
Tribune article contained two short paragraphs noting the Soviets‟ dissent.53
A telling indicator of the Tribune’s opinion of the verdicts and the sentences imposed
appeared on the publication‟s front page beside Foust‟s article. A cartoon with the
heading “MONUMENT TO STUPIDITY” depicted a smug Göring pointing to a statue
adorned with a swastika armband. Although an aura of light obscured the statue‟s head,
inscribed on the pedestal were the words “German Martyr” followed by a short
denunciation of the trial.54 Rather than establish the culpability of the Nazi leaders in the
eyes of their countrymen, the cartoon implied that the trial had made them into folk
heroes. Should any confusion arise from the newspaper‟s endorsement of the cartoon‟s
message, an editorial appearing in the same edition dispelled such misunderstanding. As
it had in its editorial of the previous November, the Tribune’s editorial reiterated that the
51

Moley, “JUSTICE AT NUERNBERG,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 1946.

52

Foust, “GOERING AND 10 OTHERS TO DIE AT NUERNBERG,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 2
October 1946.
53

Ibid.

54

Unknown, “MONUMENT TO STUPIDITY,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 2 October 1946.

116
judges represented nations that were guilty of many of the same crimes as the men they
had convicted. History, the Tribune believed, would support this assertion. The editorial
concluded that the precedents established at Nuremberg stymied the growth of
civilization by advancing the principle of victor‟s justice, regressing society to a state of
barbarism.55
Several days later, the Tribune published another editorial, again outlining its
objections to the trial. Referring to the Foust article of 2 October, the editorial questioned
both Britain‟s motives in supplying the hangman and its overall military prowess during
the war. Noting Bavaria‟s desire to prosecute those acquitted at Nuremberg, the paper‟s
editors repeated their long-held contention that German courts could have conducted the
trial and obtained similar results. Instead, the editorial continued, the victorious nations
had created an international tribunal whose foundation and procedures were diametrically
opposed to the U.S. Constitution and American legal principles. This was not a deterrent
for the American participants, the editorial argued, as Jackson and Biddle were “New
Dealers” familiar with such legal degeneracy. Finally, the Tribune mourned the
American army‟s participation in the upcoming executions, as it would sully its
reputation by aiding in the advancement of “New Dealer” tenets and the imperial
ambitions of Britain.56
However, the executions had yet to occur. In the days following the sentencing,
much of the press‟s coverage relating to Nuremberg focused on the behavior of the
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condemned inside the Nuremberg Prison and their appeals for clemency or alternative
methods of execution. Little deviation appeared in the five publications‟ coverage. Only
The Times offered any interpretation of the control council‟s decision. In its editorial, the
newspaper asserted the appellate process represented another example of the tribunal‟s
inherent fairness. It went on to state that only a small minority still maintained the trial
had been illegal and, as the publication had in past editorials, presented its arguments to
the contrary. The editorial declared that the denial of clemency was the option available
to the council due to the enormity of the Nazis‟ crimes and that the condemned warranted
no mercy, not even, referring to the requests by Jodl and Keitel that they be shot, “the
mercy of a soldier‟s bullet.”57 Yet even while the control council deliberated on the
appeals in Berlin, two events occurred stateside, one of which The Times had alluded to
in the previous editorial, that deflected the press‟s attention away from Germany
temporarily and presented contrasts in both the press‟s coverage and interpretation.
In an address at the University of Buffalo on 4 October, Robert Jackson told his
audience that the precedents established at Nuremberg applied to all nations and would
serve as a deterrent against future aggression. However, the justice warned that
dictatorships sire belligerency and that humanity could not achieve global tranquility
until all governments protected its minorities.58 The Times, The Post, and the LA Times
all published accounts of Jackson‟s speech that varied in their length and detail. While
the latter two newspapers relied on the AP for their articles, Morris Kaplan of The Times
provided the most detailed account, writing that in his speech that Jackson had drawn
similarities between Nazism and the Soviet Union‟s dominion in Eastern Europe, an
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observation that went unreported in The Post and LA Times articles.59 In addition, The
Times published the entire text of Jackson‟s address.
The following day, the publication commented on Jackson‟s speech on its editorial
page. In its editorial The Times urged the victorious nations attending the Paris Peace
Conference to uphold the ideals espoused by Jackson and respect basic human rights in
their treatment of Germany‟s former allies.60 Contrary to the quantity of coverage found
in The Times and, to a lesser extent, in The Post and LA Times, the Tribune and The
Journal did not report on Jackson‟s address. Several weeks later, the Tribune did
comment on Jackson‟s speech. However, in its editorial of 23 October the newspaper
asked the justice rhetorically why the Soviet Union was not on trial if, as Jackson had
implied in his speech, the communist nation possessed the same characteristics as Nazi
Germany.61
As it had with Jackson, both The Times and the Tribune would cover the comments of
another polarizing American political figure. On its front page, The Times reported that,
in a speech made at Ohio‟s Kenyon College, Republican Senator Robert Taft had
denounced the trial, likening it to the political trials in the Soviet Union and attributed the
tribunal‟s creation to a draconian foreign policy that had abandoned traditional American
principles. In response to a question from the audience, the senator suggested that life
imprisonment for the condemned would be more appropriate than death, as the tribunal
had charged them with their chief crime retroactively. The article noted that a co-speaker
at the college, Professor Harold Laski, had offered a rejoinder. A representative of the
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British Labor Party, Laski had suggested that if imprisonment were a suitable
punishment, even though the proceedings were indeed ex post facto, then a death
sentence would be equably just.62
For four consecutive days, The Times published articles that reported reactions to
Taft‟s assertion from various individuals and groups. The first article reported that New
York City Councilman Eugene Connolly had asked Governor Thomas Dewey and other
state Republican leaders to renounce Taft‟s position.63 The following day, another article
noted that Taft‟s speech had become a major campaign issue and reported that Governor
Dewey and Irving Ives, a Republican candidate for one of the New York Senate seats,
had issued a joint statement affirming the fairness of the trial. Their statement, the article
related, did not mention Taft by name.64 In the same edition, another article reported that
the National Lawyers Guild and Florida Senator Claude Pepper, a Democrat, had both
taken offense at Taft‟s remarks.65 On 10 October, another article reported that the
International Bar Association had also rejected Taft‟s analysis of the tribunal.66
However, amidst Taft‟s political tempest, The Times’ Washington correspondent
Arthur Krock penned an opinion piece that appeared to place Taft‟s comments in context.
Praising the senator for his courage and dedication to his values, Krock noted that Taft
had not considered popular sentiments before making his opinions known.
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Nonprofessionals, Krock observed, had not appreciated the splitting of legal hairs
engaged in by the senator from Ohio. In his conclusion, Krock predicated that this gaffe,
if indeed it was one, would likely damage Taft‟s presidential aspirations.67 The Times’
editorial board did not seem to share Krock‟s appreciation of Taft‟s ethical stance and, in
an 11 October editorial, questioned the logic of the senator‟s assessment of the sentences.
Although the editorial focused primarily on the Allied Control Council‟s denial of the
appeals and the legitimacy of the tribunal, it observed that Admiral Raeder had asked for
the death sentence instead of life imprisonment. The admiral‟s request, the editorial
reasoned, cast doubts on Taft‟s contention that incarceration was more just than
execution.68
The Tribune, the LA Times, and The Post also printed news of Taft‟s speech in their
publications. Published before the political firestorm had erupted, the Chicago Daily
Tribune printed excerpts from Taft‟s speech but did not mention Laski‟s challenge to
Taft‟s assertion that the death sentence was unjust, although the article quoted Laski
when discussing Taft‟s views on price controls.69 Like the Tribune, the LA Times printed
news of Taft‟s speech before controversy had attached itself to it. However, the LA
Times included Laski‟s response to Taft‟s view on the severity of the sentences in light of
how the tribunal had reached its verdicts.70 While it did not mention Laski, in its article
The Post paraphrased Taft‟s comments and cited the Dewey-Ives statement, observing
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that many considered Dewey and Taft the frontrunners for the 1948 Republican
presidential nomination.71
Considering the dearth of its coverage throughout the trial‟s duration and its almost
non-existent commentary directed towards matters relating to the IMT, it seems
surprising that The Journal devoted any space to the Taft controversy. The Journal’s
editorial appeared several weeks after Taft‟s speech and responded to a letter sent to the
publication by Clarence B. Hewes, a resident of Washington, D.C. In his letter, Hewes
called the trial a farce and voiced his agreement with the position assumed by Senator
Taft. Hewes expanded on Taft‟s allusions to Soviet totalitarianism and pointed to the
Soviet Union‟s prewar aggression towards Finland and later occupation of the Baltic
States.72 In its response, The Journal endorsed Hewes‟ arguments and asserted that the
Soviet Union had aided the Nazi war machine in its crimes (apparently in reference to the
nonaggression pact‟s secret codicil). In additional, the editorial suggested that the Allies‟
insistence on the Reich’s unconditional surrender had eliminated any chance of the
German prosecution of those indicted under the London Charter. The origin of the
Allies‟ policy of unconditional surrender, the editorial concluded, warranted considerable
study.73
Although the orations of Jackson and Taft prompted additional discussion about the
tribunal‟s legitimacy, fairness, and potential legacy, on 16 October the press‟s attention
turned back to Nuremberg. The Trial of the Major War Criminals climaxed with
Göring‟s suicide and the subsequent hangings of the condemned. While the five
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newspapers examined in this study devoted ample coverage to the executions and the
circumstances surrounding Göring‟s procurement of potassium cyanide, only The New
York Times and Chicago Daily Tribune used this opportunity to advance their
interpretations of the trial for a final time.
On 16 October, the editorial board of The Times characterized the deceased as weakwilled men who allowed themselves to become the tools of a hell spawn in return for
personal power. Through their deaths, the editorial continued, each had atoned somewhat
for his crimes by serving as a warning to others who might follow the same path. In its
conclusion, the editorial warned that the international community must guard against
future movements like National Socialism that utilized such a group of opportunists and
sadists to advance their agendas.74
Although the preceding editorial was the last commentary published in The Times that
discussed the merit of the trial itself, the following day the newspaper printed an article
on Jackson‟s reaction to Göring‟s suicide. In the article, Jackson declared that, by ending
his life, the former Reichsmarschall had forfeited his potential martyrdom. Without a
lasting symbol, Jackson reasoned, Nazism would not revive. The justice concluded his
remarks, the article noted, by asserting that Göring‟s death had “killed the myth of Nazi
bravery and stoicism and deep conviction.”75 While the LA Times and The Post both
published accounts similar to the one found in The Times, neither the Tribune nor The
Journal printed news of Jackson‟s statement.
Contrary to the opinions expressed by Jackson and in The Times, the Tribune reported
that the Army and Navy Journal had declared the executions would encourage aggression
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among nations rather than impede it. Regardless of the rulings made at Nuremberg, the
editors of the military journal contended that, in the future, subjugated nations would fear
reprisals from the victor. Therefore, the only alternative would be to build up national
armaments, thus creating a global arms race. In its conclusion, the article noted that the
Army and Navy Journal had also derided the rest of the Four Powers for not taking an
active role in the trial‟s security or in the executions.76 Another article published in the
Tribune scrutinized the method of execution. Hal Foust reported that the Allied Control
Council had rejected a British request for an inquiry into the execution. According to
Foust, several eyewitnesses to the execution had alleged that Master-Sergeant Woods had
botched the hangings, in some instances leaving several of the condemned men to
strangle to death.77 The preceding articles‟ inference contrasted distinctly with Jackson‟s
assessment reported in The Post, the LA Times, and The Times that the executions
vanquished the spectre of Nazism.
In its final commentaries on the trial, the Tribune’s evaluations remained consistent
with those adopted fifteen months earlier. One editorial repeated the publication‟s
contention that the tribunal had applied the charge of waging an aggressive war and the
conspiracy charge attached to it retroactively. In addition, the newspaper denounced the
Soviet Union‟s participation in the trial and listed a compilation of offenses the
communist nation had committed that violated the London Charter‟s definition of
aggressive war. As it had in previous editorials, the publication prophesied that history,
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as well as the German people, would judge the proceedings harshly.78 In its final
editorial dedicated to the Trial of the Major War Criminals, the Tribune again
summarized the grounds on which it had opposed the trial. As in the past, the editorial
testified to the Soviet Union‟s guilt, evident by its invasions of Poland and Finland.
Though the condemned had deserved their punishment (even if the authority that had
prescribed it was in question), the newspaper declared that Stalin and Molotov should
share a similar fate.79
The editorials published in the Chicago Daily Tribune throughout the trial had
eliminated all reasonable doubt as to the newspaper‟s disposition towards the tribunal.
As will be discussed in the conclusion, the Tribune’s attitude likely influenced its overall
coverage of the trial. However, it would be both inaccurate and unfair to suggest that
only Robert McCormick‟s publication exuded biases in its coverage of the Trial of the
Major War Criminals. To varying degrees, the other newspapers examined in this study
did as well.
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CONCLUSION
As noted in the previous chapters, the best indicator of each newspaper‟s position
towards the trial rests in the opinions expressed in its editorials. The views expressed by
their columnists, be they employed by the publication directly or carried through
syndication, also contribute to the overall tone of a newspaper‟s coverage. The final
mechanism used to gauge the tone of a newspaper‟s coverage of the trial -- the presence
of articles reflecting the trial in a favorable or unfavorable light (such as the contrasting
accounts of the Göring cross-examination) -- reinforces the positions suggested by the
first two indicators. However, assigning bias to these articles is itself subjective.
Nonetheless, by examining each newspaper‟s coverage using these three indicators, one
discovers that each publication‟s attitude toward the IMT remained consistent throughout
the trial‟s duration and tended to reflect the ideological leanings of each newspaper.
As discussed in chapters two and three, the quantity of coverage found in The Times
far surpassed that of the other four newspapers and likely reflected the newspaper‟s
commitment to publicizing the trial. Of the 415 articles relating to the proceedings, the
vast majority did not contain any overt indication of bias towards or against the
proceedings, although, as noted in the previous chapters, there were examples of The
Times using softer language in those articles that cast the tribunal in a poor light.
However, of the thirty-seven articles that did contain an identifiable bias, the ratio of
favorable to unfavorable articles was almost four to one. Taken as a percentage, articles
favorable towards the trial represented seven percent of The Times’ total coverage. In its
editorials, The New York Times never wavered in its endorsement of the trial. Although
the publication‟s editors did acknowledge that the trial‟s design lent itself to possible
abuses, this did not affect their recognition of the tribunal‟s legitimacy nor the proposed
benefits its precedents could bestow upon humanity.
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In its coverage of the trial, the LA Times contained fewer articles that exuded any
indication of bias. Out of 220 articles reporting on the trial, only eight displayed any
sense of partiality. Here, the quantitative difference between positive and negative
articles was negligible. However, of the seven editorials that commented on the
Nuremberg proceedings, all seven endorsed or expressed a favorable disposition toward
the trial. The biggest indicator of the newspaper‟s attitude towards the trial lies in the
columns and syndicated columns published by the newspaper. In the nine columns
written about the trial specific to the publication, six endorsed the trial, one expressed
some reservations about the proceedings, and two remained neutral in tone. In addition,
of the six columns penned by Walter Lippmann, five presented the trial in favorable
terms while one did not express an opinion at all.
Like the LA Times, an examination of The Post reveals a positive bias towards the
trial in its coverage, but one so slight as to appear inconsequential. As discussed in
previous chapters the editorials published in The Washington Post expressed a positive
view of the IMT and the trial as a whole. All fourteen of The Post’s editorials contained
such sentiments. Likewise, the columns of Novar and Pusey were all favorable towards
the trial. Only in Drew Pearson‟s Washington Merry-Go-Round was some reservation
expressed towards the precedents established by the trial. Finally, The Post published
two of the Lippmann columns also found in the LA Times that were supportive of the
trial.
Second only to The Times in sheer quantity of coverage devoted towards the trial, the
Chicago Daily Tribune’s antipathy towards the proceedings seems evident in the articles
published in the newspaper. In its coverage of the trial, those articles that presented the
tribunal or the prosecution in a negative light outweighed those that were positive by a
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ratio of six to one. As a percentage, negative articles comprised almost ten percent of the
Tribune’s total coverage of the trial. Coupled with the Tribune’s editorials, the
newspaper‟s disposition towards the trial leaves little room for misinterpretation.
Based on the Chamberlin commentary that appeared in its pages at the onset of the
trial and the editorial published in October 1946, one might assume that The Wall Street
Journal possessed a negative opinion of the Trial of the Major War Criminals. The
presence of only two editorials published over a sixteen-month span does not lend itself
to establishing a firm correlation between the financial journal‟s political ideology and its
attitude towards the trial. The Journal’s coverage of the trial adds little to the
interpretation of its position due to the brevity and scarcity of information pertaining to
Nuremberg found in its pages. As noted early in this study, the newspaper focused
primarily on business and financial news and likely did not concern itself with the trial.1
However, the few opinions offered by The Journal are consistent with its ideology.
After examining each newspaper‟s coverage of the Trial of the Major War Criminals
from August 1945 until November 1946, it appears that a strong relationship existed
between each publication‟s position towards the trial and its ideological position in all but
The Wall Street Journal. Those newspapers considered traditionally moderate to liberal
in their ideology, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the LA Times
overwhelmingly supported the trial in their editorials and in the columns printed in their
respective newspapers. Conversely, the conservative Chicago Daily Tribune opposed the
IMT throughout the trial‟s duration. Based on the scant editorials found in The Journal, a
similar, if weaker, relationship existed between its opposition towards the trial and its
conservative ideology. However, as discussed above, only in The Times and the Tribune
1
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did their position towards the trial seem to influence their actual coverage of the
proceedings to any significant extent.
Today, with access to twenty-four hour news services and commentary through
various forms of media, accusations of bias are commonplace, especially when applied to
controversial or polarizing issues. As this thesis indicates, media bias is no new
invention and often serves the interests or advocates the beliefs of a medium‟s ownership
or management. However, this is not as nefarious as it might appear. By endorsing or
opposing the creation of the International Military Tribunal and the proceedings that
followed, these newspapers hoped to convert the unconverted among their readership and
embolden those who already shared the principles advanced by these publications. In
doing so, issues arose that reflected the uncertainty of the post-war era concerning,
among other things, the encroachment of national sovereignty by international
organizations such as the IMT and the United Nations, and the West‟s continued
relationship with the Soviet Union. The introduction of such issues and the discussions
they generated helped define the United States during the second half of the twentieth
century, affecting the world at large. So too will the ideas advanced in the news media of
today eventually influence the future.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE MORGENTHAU PLAN: APPENDIX B: PUNISHMENT OF CERTAIN WAR
CRIMES AND TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GROUPS
A. Punishment of Certain War Criminals
(1) Arch-criminals.
A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been
recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and
transmitted to the appropriate military authorities. The military authorities shall
be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:
(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as
possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer
of the General rank.
(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put
to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United
Nations.
(2) Certain Other War Criminals
(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military
Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed
against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable,
representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on
such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by
the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions
may be ordered to try from time to time.
(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the
issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in causing the
death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and
tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of
the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody
for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:
(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.
(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of
other persons
(iii)The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color,
creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes
specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military
commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating
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circumstances, in which case other punishment may be meted out,
including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon
conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.
B. Detention of Certain Groups
All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the
guilt of each individual is determined:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The S.S.
The Gestapo.
All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.
All high Government and Nazi Party Officials.
All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. Registration of Males
An appropriate program will be formulated for the re-registration as soon as
possible of all males of the age of 14 or over. The registration shall be on a form
and in a manner to be prescribed by the military authorities and shall show,
among other things, whether or not the person registering is a member of the Nazi
Party or affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S., S.A., or Kraft Korps.
D. Labor Battalions
Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership
in the S.S., the Gestapo, and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion
into compulsory labor battalions to serve outside Germany for reconstruction
purpose.
E. Dissolution of Nazi Organizations
The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler
Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc. should be dissolved and their properties
and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any
attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.
F. Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges
All members of the following groups should be dismissed from police office,
disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public offices or to engage in
journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in
banking, manufacturing or trade:

(1) The Nazi Party
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(2) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or the abetted
the Nazi Program.
(3) The Junkers.
(4) Military and Naval officers.
G. Junker Estates
All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the
system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.
H. Prohibition on Emigration
(1) A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany
from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from
the Allied Military Government.
(2) Violation of the Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military
commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be
prescribed, including death.
(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such
person from leaving (without permission).
Henry Morgenthau JR.
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APPENDIX B
SUBJECT: TRIAL OF EUROPEAN WAR CRIMINALS
(BY COLONEL MURRAY C. BERNAYS, G-1)
September 15, 1944
THE GENERAL PROBLEM
1.

a. There will be many thousands of war criminals who should be tried for crimes
committed all over Europe. Their offenses range from the establishment of policy at
the center of the Nazi organization, down to the scattered individual acts of
criminality. Some offenders are guilty as principals, some as accessories. In many
cases it will be difficult to establish the individual‟s identity or to connect him with
the particular act charged. Witnesses will be dead and scattered, and the gathering of
proof will be laborious and costly. The offenders will become subject to trial under
many and divergent codes and procedures. The applicable basic law, law as to
justification (e.g. orders of duly constituted superiors), procedures, and rules of
evidence will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The paper work will be
enormous, the liaison and coordination singularly difficult.
b. Undoubtedly, the Nazis have been counting on the magnitude and ingenuity of
their offenses, the number of the offenders, the law‟s complexities, and delay and war
weariness as major defenses against effective prosecution. Trial on an individual
basis, and by old modes and procedures, will go far to realize the Nazi hopes in this
respect.
THE MINORITES PROBLEM

2.

a. Many of the Axis atrocities were committed before there was a state of war.
These cannot be categorized as war crimes under existing law.
b. Some of the worst outrages were committed by Axis powers against their own
nationals on racial, religious, and political grounds. As to these, the offenders can
plead justification under domestic law. Also, to call these atrocities war crimes
would set the precedent of an international right to sit in judgment on the conduct of
the several states toward their own nationals. This would open the door to
incalculable consequences and present grave questions of policy.
c. However, widely publicized statements of the highest leaders have been
interpreted as assuring that the above atrocities would be prosecuted by the United
Nations as war crimes.

3.

a. It may be expected that even though the above acts cannot be reached as war
crimes, the Axis authorities who committed them will be punishable in many cases
with equal or greater severity for offenses which are war crimes. This, however, will
not necessarily cover all the cases, and in any event it will not satisfy the insistence of
the minority groups that recognition should be given to the criminal character of the
specific acts and policies which they complain.
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b. The alternative has been suggested of bringing pressure to bear on successor
Governments in the Axis countries to punish the offenders through their own legal
processes. Even if all successor Governments should be so inclined, and should be
able to do so under their several legal systems, it is hardly likely that all of them can
be counted on to be as vigorous and effective as they should be. Furthermore, such a
course would not meet the demand that the United Nations make good their apparent
assurance that these acts would be stamped as criminal by international judgment, and
punished accordingly.
4. To let these brutalities go unpunished will leave millions of persons frustrated and
disillusioned. The fact that these acts are believed to be outside the jurisdiction of the
United Nations War Crimes Commission as presently constituted has already aroused
vigorous protest. Strong pressure is being brought upon the United States and British
Governments by organized Jewish groups, representing their co-religionists and
undoubtedly also expressing the views of many others who are not of their faith, to
have these acts categorized and treated as war crimes. It must be anticipated that the
pressure will grow stronger with time.
DEFICIENCIES OF CERTAIN SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
5. Perhaps because of the apparently prohibitive complexities involved, the suggestion
has been made that when the arch-Nazis (Hitler, Himmler, et al.) are apprehended and
authoritatively identified, they be executed out of hand. The justification is,
presumably, that proof of their guilt would be the merest formality. However, this
suggestion would not solve the problem of punishing the thousands of less
outstanding culprits. Furthermore, it would do violence to the very principles for
which the United Nations have taken up arms, and furnish apparent justification for
what the Nazis themselves have taught and done. It would also help the Nazis elevate
Hitler to martyrdom. The suggested procedure would taint an essential act of justice
with false color of vindictiveness.
6. The alternative suggestion has been made that the offenders be given “streamlined”
trials. The intention, presumably, would be to limit the proof, perhaps to the extent of
keeping it down to the bare essentials of a prima facie case with regard to the
particular atrocities charged. This could be done without injuring the substance of
justice. However, it would not solve the problems discussed in the preceding
sections.
7. The basic difficulty with the suggestions heretofore considered is in the approach. It
will never be possible to catch and convict every Axis war criminal, or even any great
number of them, under the old concepts and procedures. Even if this could be done it
would not, of itself, be enough. The ultimate offense, for example, in the case of
Lidice, is not alone the obliteration of the village, but even more, the assertion of the
right to do it. The ordinary thug does not defend on the ground that thuggery is
noble; he only contends that the police have arrested the wrong man. Behind each
Axis war criminal, however, lies the basic criminal instigation of the Nazi doctrine
and policy. It is the guilty nature of this instigation that must be established, for only
thus will the conviction and punishment of the individuals concerned achieve their
true moral and juristic significance. In turn, this approach throws light on the nature
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of the individual‟s guilt, which is not dependent on the commission of specific
criminal acts, but follows inevitably from the mere fact of voluntary membership in
organizations devised solely to commit such acts.
BASIC OBJECTIVES
8.

a. The punishment of Axis war criminals should aim at three prime objectives:
first, the establishment of a solemnly considered international judgment that alleged
high interests of state are not acceptable as justification for national crimes of
violence, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations; second, bringing
home to the world the realities and menace of racism and totalitarianism, and third,
arousing the German people to a sense of their guilt, and realization of their
responsibility for the crimes committed by their government.
b. If these objectives are not achieved, Germany will simply have lost another
war. The German people will not know the barbarians they have supported, nor will
they have any understanding of the criminal characters of their conduct and the
world‟s judgment upon it. The Fascist potential will thus remain undiminished both
in Germany and elsewhere, and its scope unimpaired. If, on the other hand, the
approach suggested herein is adopted, the victory can be turned to more valuable use
than merely putting off the Fascist menace to another day.
PROPOSED SOLUTION

9. The following is therefore recommended for consideration:
a. The Nazi Government and its Party and State agencies, including the SA, SS,
and Gestapo, should be charged before an appropriately constituted international
court with conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful
populations in violation of the laws of war.
b. For the purposes of trial before the above court, the prosecuting Nations should
bring to the bar only such individual defendents, considered to be representative of
the defendant organizations, as they elect.
c. The proceedings should be public and widely publicized, and the evidence
should be full enough to prove the guilty intent (Nazi doctrine and policy) as well as
the criminal conduct (atrocious acts in violation of the laws of war).
d. The judgment should adjudicate:
(1) That the Nazi Government and its mentioned agencies are guilty as charged.
(2) That every member of the Government and organizations on trial is guilty of
the same offense. Such adjudication of guilt would require no proof that the
individuals affected participated in any overt act other than membership in the
conspiracy.
e. Sentence would be passed by the court on the individual defendants before it.
f. Thereafter, every member of the mentioned Government and organizations
would be subject to arrest, trial and punishment in the national courts of the several
United Nations. Proof of membership, without more, would establish guilt of
participation in the mentioned conspiracy, and the individual would be punished in
the discretion of the court. Proof of the commission of other criminal acts would
subject the individual to additional punishments conformably to local law.

152
10. It is particularly noted, in connection with the foregoing:
a. That in view of the nature of the charge, everything done in furtherance of the
conspiracy from the time of its inception would be admissible, including domestic
atrocities against minority groups within Germany, and domestic atrocities induced or
procured by the German Government to be committed by other Axis Nations against
their respective nationals.
b. That once the conspiracy is established, each act of every member thereof
during its continuance and in furtherance of its purposes would be imputable to all
other members thereof.
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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, SUBJECT: TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT
OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
[Washington,] January 22, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals.
This memorandum deals with ways and means for carrying out the policy regarding
the trial and punishment of Nazi criminals, as established in the statements on that subject
which are annexed (Tabs A to F).
I.

THE MOSCOW DECLARATION

In the Moscow Declaration (Tab D) the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Soviet Union took note of the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans and laid down the
policy: (1) that those German officers and men who have been responsible for or have
taken a consenting part in these atrocities “will be sent back to the countries in which
their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished
according to the laws of those liberated countries and of the free governments which will
be created therein”: and (2) that the above declaration “is without prejudice to the case of
the major war criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and
who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.”
II.

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

The United Nations War Crimes Commission is located in London, and consists of
representatives of some fifteen of the United Nations. The Soviet Government is not a
member.
This Commission has been charged with the collection of lists of the criminals
referred to, the recording of the available supporting proof, and the making of
recommendations as to the tribunals to try and the procedure for trying such criminals.
The Commission has no investigative or prosecuting authority or personnel. It has no
authority to try offenders of any kind.
The War Crimes Commission receives its lists of war criminals from the investigating
authorities, if any, set up the respective United Nations. The first unofficial meeting of
the Commission was held in London on October 26, 1943, and the first official meeting
was held there on January 18, 1944. Up to this time, the cases of approximately 1,000
offenders have been docketed with the Commission. The labors of the Commission have
not resulted in any governmental agreement as to the tribunals to try or the procedures for
trying war criminals.
The Commission has been widely and publicly criticized for the paucity of the results
of its work. In recent months its activities have been marked by dissensions. The British
representative, who was also Chairman of the Commission, and the Norwegian member,
have resigned.
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III.

SCOPE AND DIMENSIONS OF THE WAR CRIMES PROBLEM

The crimes to be punished. The criminality of the German leaders and their associates
does not consist solely of individual outrages, but represents the result of a systematic
and planned reign of terror within Germany, in the satellite Axis countries, and in the
occupied countries of Europe. This conduct goes back at least as far as 1933, when Hitler
was first appointed Chancellor of the Reich. It has been marked by mass murders,
imprisonments, expulsions and deportations of populations; the starvation, torture and
inhuman treatment of civilians; the wholesale looting of public and private property on a
scale unparalleled in history; and, after initiation of “total” war, its prosecution with utter
and ruthless disregard for the laws and customs of war.
We are satisfied that these atrocities were perpetrated in pursuance of a premeditated
criminal plan or enterprise which either contemplated or necessarily involved their
commission.
The criminals to be punished. The outstanding offenders are, of course, those leaders
of the Nazi Party and German Reich who since January 30, 1933, have been in control of
formulating and executing Nazi policies.
In addition, the Nazi leaders created and utilized a numerous organization for carrying
out the acts of oppression and terrorism which their program involved. Chief among the
instrumentalities used by them are the SS, from the personnel of which the Gestapo is
constituted, and the SA. These organizations consist of exactingly screened volunteers
who are pledged to absolute obedience. The members of these organizations are also the
personnel primarily relied upon to carry on postwar guerilla and underground operations.
IV.

DIFFICULTIES OF AN EFFECTIVE WAR CRIMES PROGRAM

Difficulties of identification and proof. The names of the chief German leaders are
well known, and the proof of their guilt will not offer great difficulties. However, the
crimes to be punished have been committed upon such a large scale that the problem of
identification, trial and punishment of their perpetrators presents a situation without
parallel in the administration of criminal justice. In thousands of cases, it will be
impossible to establish the offender‟s identity or to connect him with the particular act
charged. Witnesses will be dead, otherwise incapacitated and scattered. The gathering of
proof will be laborious and costly, and the mechanical problems involved in uncovering
and preparing proof of particular offenses one of appalling dimensions. It is evident that
only a negligible minority of the offenders will be reached by attempting to try them on
the basis of separate prosecutions for their individual offenses. It is not unlikely, in fact,
that the Nazis have been counting on just such considerations, together with delay and
war weariness, to protect them against punishment for their crimes if they lost the war.
Legal Difficulties. The attempt to punish the Nazi leaders and their association for all
of the atrocities committed by them also involves serious legal difficulties. Many of
those atrocities, as noted in your statement on the subject of prosecution dated 24 March
1944 (Tab E), were “begun by the Nazis in the days of peace and multiplied by them a
hundred times in times of war.” These pre-war atrocities are neither “war crimes” in the
technical sense, nor offenses against international law; and the extent to which they may
have been in violation of German law, as changed by the Nazis, is doubtful.
Nevertheless, the declared policy of the United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be
punished; and the interests of postwar security and a necessary rehabilitation of German
peoples, as well as the demands of justice, require that this be done.
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V.

RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

After Germany‟s unconditional surrender, the United Nations could, if they elected,
put to death the most notorious Nazi criminals, such as Hitler or Himmler, without trial or
hearing. We do not favor this method. While it has the advantages of a sure and swift
disposition, it would be violative of the most fundamental principles of justice, common
to all the United Nations. This would encourage the Germans to turn these criminals into
martyrs, and, in any event, only a few individuals could be reached in this way.
We think that the just and effective solution likes in the use of the judicial method.
Condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, would command maximum
public support in our own times and receive the respect of history. The use of the judicial
method will, in addition, make available for all mankind to study in future years an
authentic record of Nazi crimes and criminality.
We recommend the following:
The German leaders and the organizations employed by them, such as those referred
to above (SA, SS, Gestapo), should be charged both with the commission of their
atrocious crimes, and also with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which
included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calculated to bring them about.
The allegation of the criminal enterprise would be so couched as to permit full proof of
the entire Nazi plan from its inception and the means used in its furtherance and
execution, including the prewar atrocities and those committed against their own
nationals, neutrals, and stateless persons, as well as the waging of an illegal war of
aggression with ruthless disregard for international law and the rules of war. Such a
charge would be firmly founded upon the rule of liability, common to all penal systems
and included in the general doctrines of the laws of war, that those who participate in the
formulation and execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes are jointly liable
for each of the offenses committed and jointly responsible for the acts of each other.
Under such a charge there are admissible in evidence the acts of any of the conspirators
done in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether or not these acts were in themselves
criminal and subject to separate prosecution as such.
The trial of this charge and the determination of the guilty parties would be carried out
in two stages:
The United Nations would, in the first instance, bring before an international tribunal
created by Executive Agreement, the highest ranking German leaders to a number fairly
representative of the groups and organizations charged with complicity in the basic
criminal plan. Adjudication would be sought not only of the guilt of those individuals
physically before the court, but also of the complicity of the members of the
organizations included within the charge. The court would make findings adjudicating
the facts established, including the nature and purposes of the criminal plan, the identity
of the groups and organizations guilty of complicity in it, and the acts committed in its
execution. The court would also sentence those individual defendants physically before
it who are convicted.
The above would complete the mission of this international tribunal.
Thereafter, there would be brought before occupation courts the individuals not sent
back for trial under the provisions of the Moscow Declaration, and members of the
organizations who are charged with complicity through such memberships, but against
whom there is not sufficient proof of specific atrocities. In view of the nature of the
charges and the representative character of the defendants who were before the court in
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the first trial, the findings of that court should justly be taken to constitute a general
adjudication of the criminal character of the groups and organizations referred to, binding
upon all members thereof in their subsequent trials inoccupation courts. In these
subsequent trials, therefore, the only necessary proof of guilt of any particular defendant
would be his membership in one of these organizations. Proof would also be taken of the
nature and extent of the individual‟s participation. The punishment of each defendant
would be made appropriate to the facts of his particular case. In appropriate cases, the
penalty might be imprisonment at hard labor instead of the death penalty, and the
offenders could be worked in restoring the devastated areas.
Individual defendants who can be connected with specific atrocities will be tried and
punished in the national courts of the countries concerned, as contemplated in the
Moscow Declaration.
VI.

NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF TRIBUNALS

We favor the trial of the prime leaders by an international military commission or
military court, established by Executive Agreement of the heads of State of the interested
United Nations. This would require no enabling legislation or treaty. If deemed
preferable the tribunal could be established by action of the Supreme Authority (Control
Council for Germany).
The court might consist of seven members, one each to be appointed by The British
Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union and France, and three to be
appointed by agreement among the other United Nations who become parties to the
proposed procedure.
The court may consist of civilian or military personnel, or both. We would prefer a
court of military personnel, as being less likely to give undue weight to technical
contentions and legalistic arguments.
The subsequent trials would be had, as noted, in occupation courts; or in the national
courts of the country concerned or in their own military courts; or, if desired, by
international military courts.
VII.

PREPARATION OF CASE

A successful prosecution of the basic charge will manifestly depend upon early,
careful, and thorough compilation of the necessary evidence. This is particularly
important with regard to so much of the case as involves the basic criminal plan. Success
will depend, further, upon cooperative action in this regard among the interested United
Nations, and the early establishment of a competent executive and technical staff to carry
out the project.
In our opinion, the United Nations War Crimes Commission cannot be satisfactorily
employed for this purpose, and having performed its mission, may now be dissolved.
We recommend that there be set up a full time executive group consisting of one
military representative each of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and France. This group should have under it an adequate staff of attorneys and
research personnel to search out the available data, analyze them, prepare the charges to
conform to the proof, and arrange the evidence for presentation to the international
military tribunal.
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VIII.

SOVIET ATTITUDE

The Soviet attitude, we believe, is indicated in the Note of M. Molotov attached
hereto as Tab F. The position taken therein is that the Soviet Union is ready to support
all practical measures on the part of the Allied and friendly governments in bringing the
Hitlerites and their accomplices to justice, and favors their trial before “the courts of the
special international tribunal” and their punishment in accordance with applicable
criminal law.
IX.

BRITISH ATTITUDE

In an Aide-Mémoire from the British Embassy to the Department of State dated
October 30, 1944, the British Foreign Office indicates that it is prepared to agree and to
cooperate in establishing Mixed Military Tribunals to deal with cases which for one
reason or another could not be tried in national courts. This would appear, according to
the Aide-Mémoire, to include those cases where a person is accused of having committed
war crimes against the nationals of several of the United Nations.
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APPENDIX D
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION OF EUROPEAN
AXIS WAR CRIMINALS
1. In accordance with the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, concerning the
responsibility of the Nazis and Hitlerites for atrocities and crimes in violation of
International Law, and in accordance with other statements of the United Nations
regarding the punishment of those who have committed, been responsible for, or taken a
consenting part in, such atrocities and crimes, the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, acting by
their duly authorized representatives, concluded the following agreement to which the
adherence of all members of the United Nations is provided for, in order to provide the
necessary practical measures for the prompt prosecution and trial of the major war
criminals of the European Axis Powers, including the groups and organizations
responsible for or taking a consenting part in the commission of such crimes and in the
execution of criminal plans.
2. All members of the United Nations shall be invited by the Government of the
United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the other Signatories hereto, to adhere to this
Agreement. Such adherence shall in each case be notified to the Government of the
United Kingdom, which shall promptly inform the other parties to this agreement.
3. The Signatories agree that the Control Council for Germany shall establish policies
and procedures governing (a) the return to the scene of their crimes of persons in
Germany charged with criminal offenses, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration,
and (b) the surrender of persons within Germany in the custody of any of the Signatories
who are demanded for prosecution by any party to this Agreement.
4. The parties to this Agreement agree to bring to trial before an International Military
Tribunal, in the name, of their respective peoples, major criminals, including groups and
organizations referred to in Article 1. To this end the Soviet Union, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France have each designated a representative to act as its Chief of
Counsel. The Chiefs of Counsel shall be responsible for determining, preparing the
charges against, and bringing to trial the persons and organizations so to be tried.
5. The Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France shall also
promptly designate representatives to sit upon an International Military Tribunal which
shall be charged with trying such persons, groups, and organizations.
6. There is hereby adopted the Annex to this instrument which (a) declares applicable
International Law and specifies acts constituting criminal violations of International Law,
(b) sets out the powers and duties of the Chiefs of Counsel, (c) provides for the
establishment, jurisdiction, procedures, and powers of an International Military Tribunal,
and (d) makes provision for the punishment of those convicted before such International
Military Tribunal.
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Annex
1. This Annex is adopted pursuant to the Executive Agreement made this day by the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, which Agreement provides for the adherence thereto of all members of the
United Nations who may elect so to adhere.
2. The purpose of this Annex, in pursuance of the aforesaid Executive Agreement, is
to make detailed provisions for the necessary practical means and measures to carry out
the declaration issued at Moscow on October 30, 1943, and other statements of the
United Nations on the question of punishment of war criminals insofar as they relate to
the trial and punishment of major war criminals.
3. To this end this Annex (a) declares applicable International Law and specifies acts
constituting criminal violations of International Law, (b) sets out the powers and duties of
the Chiefs of Counsel for the purpose of bringing the major war criminals, including
groups and organizations, to trial for their criminal violations of International Law, (c)
provides for the establishment, the jurisdiction, procedures, and powers of the
International Military Tribunal to be established for the purpose of trying such criminals
for their crimes, and (d) makes provision for the punishment of those convicted before
such International Military Tribunal.
4. For convenience, (a) the four Signatories will sometimes be referred to as "the
Signatories," (b) the members of the United Nations adhering hereto as provided in the
preceding Article will sometimes be referred to as "the Adherents," and (c) the
Signatories and all Adherents will sometimes be collectively referred to as "the parties to
this Agreement."
5. The Tribunal shall be bound by this declaration of the Signatories that the
following acts are criminal violations of International Law:
(1) Violations of the laws, rules, and customs of war. Such violations shall include,
but shall not be limited to, mass murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilian
populations and the plunder of such populations.
(2) Launching a war of aggression.
(3) Invasion or threat of invasion of, or initiation of war against, other countries in
breach of treaties, agreements or assurances between nations, or otherwise in violation of
International Law.
(4) Entering into a common plan or enterprise aimed at domination over other
nations, which plan or enterprise included or intended, or was reasonably calculated to
involve, or in its execution did involve, the use of unlawful means for its
accomplishment, including any or all of the acts set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e)above
or the use of a combination of such unlawful means with other means.
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(5) Atrocities and persecutions and deportations on political, racial, or religious
grounds, in pursuance of the common plan or enterprise referred to in subparagraph (d)
hereof, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
"International law" shall be taken to include treaties, agreements, and assurances
between nations and the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of
the public conscience.
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
6. There shall be set up by the Signatories an International Military Tribunal which
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any charges presented pursuant to Article
10. Such International Military Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an
alternate, to be appointed as follows: one member and one alternate each by the Soviet
Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The alternate, so far as
practicable, shall be present at the sessions of the Tribunal. The presiding officer shall be
selected by vote of a majority of the members of the Tribunal, and if they are unable to
agree, the respective appointees of each of the Signatories shall preside in rotation on
successive days.
PROVISIONS FOR BRINGING DEFENDANTS TO TRIAL
7. The parties to this Agreement agree to bring to trial before the International
Military Tribunal at ------------------------------or such other place as the parties may
unanimously agree in the names of their respective peoples, the major criminals,
including groups and organizations, referred to in Article 2.
8. Chiefs of Counsel appointed by the Signatories shall be charged with:
(1) determining the persons, groups, and organizations against whom in their
judgment there exists sufficient proof of criminal violations of International Law set out
in Article 5 above to warrant their being brought to trial before the International Military
Tribunal;
(2) preparing the charges against such persons and organizations;
(3) determining the proof which in their judgment has sufficient probative value to be
offered in evidence against any or all such persons, groups and organizations;
(4) instituting and conducting before the International Military Tribunal prosecutions
of such persons, groups and organizations.
Determination of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) above shall be
by agreement of the Chiefs of Counsel, provided that any Chief of Counsel may (1) bring
to trial before such International Military Tribunal any person in the custody of his
Government or of any Government which consents to the trial of such person, and any
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group or organization, representative members of which are in the custody of his
Government, if, in his judgment such person, group, or organization has committed any
criminal violation of International Law defined in Article 6 hereof; and (2) introduce any
evidence which in his judgment has probative value relevant to the issues raised by the
charges being tried.
9. The Chiefs of Counsel shall also be charged with recommending rules of procedure
for adoption by the International Military Tribunal.
CONSTITUTION OF TRIBUNAL
10. The International Military Tribunal shall have the power (a) after receiving
recommendations of the Chiefs of Counsel, to establish its own rules of procedure, which
shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; (b) to summon witnesses,
including defendants, and to require their attendance and testimony; (c) to require the
production of documents and other evidentiary material; (d) to administer oaths; (e) to
appoint special masters and other officers to take evidence, and to make findings, except
findings of guilt, or certify summaries of evidence to the International Military Tribunal
whether before or during the trial, and (f) generally to exercise in a manner not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement plenary authority with respect to the
trial of charges brought pursuant to this Agreement. Its judgment of guilt or innocence
shall be final and not subject to revision.
11. There shall be lodged with the Court prior to, the commencement of the trial an
indictment, supported by full particulars, specifying in detail the charges against the
defendants being brought to trial. No proof shall be lodged with the Court except at the
trial, and copies of any matters to be introduced in writing shall be furnished the
defendant prior to their introduction.
12. In the event of the death or incapacity of any member of the International Military
Tribunal, his alternate shall sit in his stead without interruption of the proceedings. All
actions and decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members.
13. In the conduct of the trial, questions may be put by each Chief of Counsel, or his
representative, or by any member of the Tribunal, in his own language, and shall be
translated and communicated to the witness, the defendants, and each member of the
Tribunal in his own language. The witness may answer in his own language, and the
answers will be translated in like manner. Written matter introduced in evidence shall be
translated into the languages of the defendants and of each of the members of the
Tribunal. A record of the trial will be kept in the language of each of the members of the
Tribunal and in German, and each such record shall be an official record of the
proceedings.
FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS
14. In order to insure fair trial for defendants the following procedure is established:
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(1) Reasonable notice shall be given to the defendants of the charges against them and
of the opportunity to defend. Such notice may be actual or constructive. The Tribunal
shall determine what constitutes reasonable notice in any given instance.
(2) The defendants physically present before the Tribunal will (1) be furnished with
copies translated into their own language, of any indictment, statement of charges, or
other document of arraignment upon which they are being tried; (2) be given fair
opportunity to be heard in their defence and to have the assistance of counsel. The
Tribunal shall determine to what extent and for what reasons proceedings against
defendants may be taken without their presence.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS FOR LIABILITY AND DEFENCE
15. In the trial, the Tribunal shall apply the general rule of liability that those who
participate in the formulation or execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes
are liable for each of the offenses committed and responsible for the acts of each other.
16. Any defence based upon the fact that the accused is or was the head or purported
head or other principal official of a State is legally inadmissible and will not be
entertained.
17. The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or to government
sanction shall not constitute a defense per se, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
PROVISIONS REGARDING PROOF
18. The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedures and shall
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. It shall employ with all
possible liberality simplifications of proof, such as but not limited to: requiring
defendants to make written proffers of proof; making extensive use of judicial notice;
receiving sworn or unsworn statements of witnesses, depositions, recorded examinations
before or findings of military or other tribunals, copies of official reports, publications
and documents or other evidentiary materials and all such other evidence as is
customarily received by international tribunals.
19. The Tribunal shall (a) confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the
issues raised by the charges, (b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will
cause unreasonable delay and rule out irrelevant issues of any kind whatsoever, (c) deal
summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion
of any defendant or his counsel from some or all further proceedings but without
prejudice to the determination of the charges.
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PUNISHMENT
20. Defendants brought to trial before the Tribunal shall, upon conviction, suffer
death or such other punishment as shall be determined by the Tribunal to be just.
21. The sentences shall be carried out in accordance with written orders of the
Control Council, and the Control Council may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the
sentences but may not increase the severity thereof.
TRIAL OF GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS
22. Groups or organizations, official or unofficial may be charged before the Tribunal
with criminal acts or with complicity therein by producing before the Tribunal and
putting on trial such of their number as the Tribunal may determine to be fairly
representative of the group or organization in question. Upon conviction of a group or an
organization, the Tribunal shall make written findings and enter written judgment on the
charges against such group or organization and the representative members on trial.
23. Upon conviction of any group or organization, any party to this Agreement may
bring charges against any person for participation in its criminal activities pursuant to the
provisions of Article 15 hereof before any occupation or other Tribunal established by it.
In any such trial the findings of the International Military Tribunal as to the criminality of
the group or organization shall be binding upon the occupation or other Tribunal. Upon
proof of membership in such group or organization, such person shall be deemed to have
participated in and be guilty of its criminal activities unless he proves the absence of
voluntary participation. A person so convicted shall suffer death or such other
punishment as the Tribunal may deem just in light of the degree of his culpability.
24. Any party to this agreement may, either in a proceeding described in Paragraph 23
or in an independent proceeding, charge any person, before an occupation or other
Tribunal, with any crime other than the crimes referred to in Paragraph 23, and such
Tribunal may, upon his conviction, impose upon him for such crime punishment
independent of and additional to the punishment imposed for participation in the criminal
activities of such group or organization.
EXPENSES
25. The expenses of the International Military Tribunal shall be charged by the
Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council, and the
expenses of the Chiefs of Counsel shall be borne by the respective Signatories.
RETURN OF OFFENDERS TO THE SCENE OF THEIR CRIMES
26. The Signatories agree that the Control Council for Germany shall establish
policies and procedures governing (a) the return of persons in Germany charged with
criminal offenses to the scene of their crimes in accordance with the Moscow Declaration
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and (b) the surrender of persons within Germany in the custody of any of the Signatories
who are demanded for prosecution by any party to this Agreement.
Memorandum to Conference of Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Provisional
Government of France, Submitted by the United States To Accompany
Redraft of Its Proposal
The Moscow Declaration left the higher German authorities whose crimes were not
geographically localized to be punished by "joint decision" of the powers involved.
The United States proposal is based on the idea that the "joint decision" should be
reached through hearings having the characteristics of a judicial inquiry rather than of a
political fiat. Its underlying assumptions are that decisions should be reached through an
Inter-Allied Tribunal, and that it should be done through a main trial of the principal
individuals and the organizations which they represent. It is assumed that the trial could
take place at a single fixed place, and that the trial would be by some procedure neither
our own nor that of any one country but acceptable to our public as a fair judicial
determination of the fact of guilt.
We do not propose adoption of our American Court procedure. One of the chief
reasons for suggesting a Military Commission is that it affords opportunity for special
procedures adapted to the unprecedented nature of our case.
The United States, as the memorandum submitted with the original proposal at San
Francisco indicates, has conceived of this case as a broad one. It must be borne in mind
that Russian, French, English, and other European peoples are familiar with the Hitlerite
atrocities and oppressions at first-hand. Our country, three thousand miles away, has
known of them chiefly through the press and radio and through the accusations of those
who have suffered rather than through immediate experience. German atrocities in the
last war were charged. The public of my country was disillusioned because most of these
charges were never authenticated by trial and conviction. If there is to be continuing
support in the United States f or international measures to prevent the regrowth of
Naziism, it is necessary now to authenticate, by methods -which the American people
will regard as of the highest accuracy, the whole history of this Nazi movement,
including its extermination of minorities, its aggressions against neighbors, its treachery
and its barbarism.
For this reason, the American representatives conceive of this case as more than the
trial of many particular offenses and offenders. It involves our whole attitude towards the
waging of aggressive war, which we think, as Professor Trainin has pointed out in his
book, is an international crime. It is mainly oil this basis that our country justified, prior
to our own entry into the war, its lend-lease and other policies of support for the anti-Nazi
cause.
We have not envisaged this case as a trial of isolated criminal acts. We envisaged it as
a trial of the master planners in which the criminality consists of making and executing
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the master plan to attack the international peace. We are, of course, interested in proving
the many manifestations of that plan in local offenses and terrorisms, but in this main
case we are interested in establishing them as proof of the design. We are of course
interested in bringing all these individual criminals to justice in other appropriate
proceeding.
The United States proposal, therefore, contemplates a single main trial of
representative Nazi leaders and of the organizations which were the important
instrumentalities of the Hitlerite movement. This is what we consider the function of the
main international tribunal. It may be necessary, subsequently, to have other trials of
individuals, but it will not be necessary to try again the questions decided by the main
trial.
We are ready to consider appropriate procedures to this end drawn from Russian,
British, French, American, or any other, experience. The United States would not
welcome a situation in which I would be expected to participate in a large number of
individual trials, held in various parts of Europe, to try particular outrages. My present
organization is not set up for that work. My function is to get at the groups which have
master-minded the attack, by such barbaric methods, on the peace of the world. Our
occupation courts will of course handle appropriate individual cases.
It would seem that the primary reason for an International Tribunal is the fact that
many local trials, while useful in themselves, will fail to disclose the general design
which is back of the multitude of local offenses and that, therefore, the attention of the
International trial must be focused on the broader aspects of the Hitlerite conspiracy.
We submit a redraft of our proposal attempting to retain its essential purposes and yet
to meet as far as possible the suggestions of the Russian, French, and British memoranda.
I call attention to the official statement of the responsibility which the United States
conceives it has for the trial of prisoners in its possession as outlined in my report to the
President, a copy of which we have provided. By reason of the President's unqualified
endorsement of it, the essentials it states represent the President's views as well as my
own.
ROBERT H. JACKSON
Chief of Counsel for the United States of America.
30 June 1945.
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APPENDIX E
AGREEMENT AND CHARTER
AGREEMENT by the Government of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the
Provisional Government of the FRENCH REPUBLIC, the Government of the UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and the Government
of the UNI0N Of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUPLICS for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS of the EUROPEAN Axis
WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of their
intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice;
AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German
atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men and members of
the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities
and crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done
in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein;
AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the case of
major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location and who will be
punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies;
Now THEREFORE the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (hereinafter called "the Signatories") acting in the interests of all the United
Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this
Agreement.
Article 1. There shall be established after consultation with the Control Council for
Germany an International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses
have no particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their
capacity as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.
Article 2. The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military
Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter
shall form. an integral part of this Agreement.
Article 3. Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to make available for
the investigation of the charges and trial the major war criminals detained by them who
are to be tried by the International Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their
best endeavors to make available for investigation of the charges against and the trial
before the International Military Tribunal such of the major war criminals as are not in
the territories of any of the Signatories.
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Article 4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions established by the
Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war criminals to the countries where they
committed their crimes.
Article 5. Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this Agreement by
notice given through the diplomatic channel to the Government of the United Kingdom,
who shall inform the other signatory and adhering Governments of each such adherence.
Article 6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of
any national or occupation court established or to be established in any allied territory or
in Germany for the trial of war criminals.
Article 7. This Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature and shall
remain in force for the period of one year and shall continue thereafter, subject to the
right of any Signatory to give, through the diplomatic channel, one month's notice of
intention to terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any proceedings already
taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement.
DONNE [sic] in quadruplicate in London this 8th, day of August 1945 each in
English, French and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity.
For the Government of the United States of America
R0BERT H. JACKSON
For the Provisional Government of the French Republic
ROBERT FALCO
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
JOWITT C.
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
I. NIKITCHENKO
A. TRAININ
Charter of the International Military Tribunal
I. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
Article 1. In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th, day of August 1945 by
the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be
established an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called "the Tribunal") for the
just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.
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Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an alternate. One
member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of the Signatories. The alternates
shall, so -far as they are able, be present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness
of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to fulfill his
functions, his alternate shall take his place.
Article 3. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by
the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel. Each Signatory may replace its
member of the Tribunal or his alternate for reasons of health or for other good reasons,
except that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate.
Article 4.
(a) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the alternate for any absent
member shall be necessary to constitute the quorum.
(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins, agree among
themselves upon the selection from their number of a President, and the President shall
hold office during that trial, or as may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three
members. The principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. If,
however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the four
Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the Tribunal shall preside.
(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a majority vote and in case
the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive: provided always
that convictions and sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three
members of the Tribunal.
Article 5. In case of need and depending on the number of the matters to be tried,
other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment, functions, and procedure of each
Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be governed by this Charter.
II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof
for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations,
committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal for which, there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing;
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(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.(1)
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of
a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
Article 9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the
Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be
convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a
criminal organization.
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that
the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of
the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the
Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal
shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the
Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.
Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the
Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts.
In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved
and shall Dot be questioned.
Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national,
military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other
than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after
convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and additional to the
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punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such
group or organization.
Article 12. The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person
charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been
found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to
conduct the hearing in his absence.
Article 13. The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These rules shall not be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter.
III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS
Article 14. Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the investigation of
the charges against and the prosecution of major war criminals.
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following purposes:
(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief Prosecutors and
his staff,
(b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal,
(c) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted therewith,
(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents with the Tribunal,
(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft rules of
procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shall have power to
accept, with or without amendments, or to reject, the rules so recommended.
The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and shall appoint
a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the principle of rotation:
provided that if there is an equal division of vote concerning the designation of a
Defendant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that
proposal will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the particular
Defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred against him.
Article 15. The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in collaboration with
one another, also undertake the following duties:
(a) investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial of all necessary
evidence,
(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Committee in accordance
with paragraph (c) of Article 14 hereof,
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(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the Defendants,
(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,
(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be assigned to them,
to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to them for the purposes of
the preparation for and conduct of the Trial.
It is understood that no witness or Defendant detained by any Signatory shall be taken
out of the possession of that Signatory without its assent.
IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the following procedure
shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges
against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and of all the documents lodged with
the Indictment, translated into a language which he understands, shall be furnished to the
Defendant at a reasonable time before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he shall have the right
to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his Trial shall be conducted in, or
translated into, a language which the Defendant understands.
(d) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense before the Tribunal or
to have the assistance of Counsel.
(e) A defendant shall have the right through himself or through his Counsel to present
evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any witness called
by the Prosecution.
V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL
Article 17. The Tribunal shall have the power
(a) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance and testimony
and to put questions to them,
(b) to interrogate any Defendant,
(c) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary material,
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(d) to administer oaths to witnesses,
(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the Tribunal
including the power to have evidence taken on commission.
Article 18. The Tribunal shall
(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the
charges,
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay,
and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever,
(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including
exclusion of any Defendant or his Counsel from some or all further proceedings, but
without prejudice to the determination of the charges.
Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall
adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure,
and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.
Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of any evidence
before it is offered so that it may rule upon the relevance thereof.
Article 21. The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but
shall take judicial notice thereof It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental
documents and reports of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the
committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, and
the records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of the United Nations.
Article 22. The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The first meetings
of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a
place to be designated by the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at
Nuremberg, and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal may
decide.
Article 23. One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the prosecution at
each Trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be discharged by him personally, or
by any person or persons authorized by him. The function of Counsel for a Defendant
may be discharged at the Defendant's request by any Counsel professionally qualified to
conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who may be
specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal.
Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following course:
(a) The Indictment shall be read in court.

173
(b) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty".
(c) The prosecution shall make an opening statement.
(d) The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what evidence (if any) they
wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the admissibility of any
such evidence.
(e) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after that the witnesses
for the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by the Tribunal to be
admissible shall be called by either the Prosecution or the Defense.
(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any Defendant, at any
time.
(g) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may cross-examine any
witnesses and any Defendant who gives testimony.
(h) The Defense shall address the court.
(i) The Prosecution shall address the court.
(j) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.
(k) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.
Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, and all court proceedings
conducted, in English, French and Russian, and in the language of the Defendant. So
much of the record and of the proceedings may also be translated into the language of any
country in which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the
interests of justice and public opinion.
VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any
Defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to
review.
Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a Defendant, on
conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.
Article 28. In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal shall have the
right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and order its delivery to the
Control Council for Germany.
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Article 29. In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the
orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may at any time reduce or otherwise
alter the sentences, but may not increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for
Germany, after any Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh
evidence which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the Council shall
report accordingly to the Committee established under Article 14 hereof , for such action
as they may consider proper, having regard to the interests of justice.
VII EXPENSES
Article 30. The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials, shall be charged by the
Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council for
Germany.
(1) See protocol [LXI] for correction of this paragraph.
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APPENDIX F
VERDICTS AND SENTENCING OF THE DEFENDANTS*
Defendant

Charged
Count 1

Martin Bormann**

X

Karl Dönitz

X

Hans Frank

X

Wilhelm Frick

X

Hans Fritzsche

X

Walther Funk

Verdict
Count 2

X

Count 3

Count 4

Count
1

X

X

NG

X

NG

X

X

NG

X

X

X

NG

X

X

NG

X

X

X

X

Hermann Göring

X

X

X

Rudolf Hess

X

X

Alfred Jodl

X

X

Ernst Kaltenbrunner

X

Wilhelm Keitel

X

Gustav Krupp von
Bohlen und
Halbach***

Sentence
Count
2
G

Count
3

Count
4

G

G

G

DEATH
10 YEARS

G

G

DEATH

G

G

G

DEATH

NG

NG

NG

G

G

G

LIFE

X

G

G

G

G

DEATH

X

X

G

G

NG

NG

LIFE

X

X

G

G

G

G

DEATH

X

X

NG

G

G

DEATH

X

X

X

G

G

G

G

DEATH

X

X

X

G

G

G

G

15 YEARS

NG

NG

G

G

G

ACQUITED

Robert Ley****

X

X

X

X

Constantin von
Neurath

X

X

X

X

Franz von Papen

X

X

Erich Raeder

X

X

X

Joachim von
Ribbentrop

X

X

X

X

G

G

G

G

DEATH

Alfred Rosenberg

X

X

X

X

G

G

G

G

DEATH

Fritz Sauckel

X

X

X

X

NG

NG

G

G

DEATH

Hjalmar Schacht

X

X

NG

NG

Baldur von Schirach

X

Arthur Seyss-Inquart

X

X

Albert Speer

X

X

Julius Streicher

X

Key:

Indicted-X

X

NG

X

X

NG

G

X

X

NG

G

X

NG

Guilty-G

ACQUITED

ACQUITED
G

20 YEARS

G

G

DEATH

NG

G

20 YEARS

G

DEATH

Not Guilty-NG

*Table created by the author
**Defendant was tried in absentia
***Defendant was indicted but not tried due to medical reasons
*****Defendant committed suicide prior to trial

LIFE
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APPENDIX G
BREAKDOWN OF COVERAGE BY NEWSPAPER*
Type

Disposition

Chicago

Los Angeles

The New

The Wall

The

Towards the

Daily

Times

York Times

Street

Washington

Trial

Tribune

Journal

Post

Favorable

5

5

29

0

5

Neutral

277

212

378

24

153

Unfavorable

30

3

8

0

3

Favorable

0

6

1

0

4

Neutral

0

2

0

0

0

Unfavorable

0

1

1

0

1

Favorable

0

7

18

0

14

Neutral

0

0

5

0

1

Unfavorable

19

0

0

2

0

Syndicated

Favorable

0

5

0

0

2

Columns

Neutral

0

1

0

0

0

Unfavorable

0

0

0

0

0

Articles

Columns

Editorials

*Table created by the author

